A cockpit discussion related to checklist use is instigated by the PIC of a departure A319 climbing ...

Attributes
ACN	620213
Time
Date	200406
Day	Mon
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : sjc.airport
State Reference	CA
Altitude	msl bound lower : 2300 msl bound upper : 4000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : nct.tracon
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	A319
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	climbout : intermediate altitude
Route In Use	departure sid : san jose
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 2500 flight time type : 1800
ASRS Report	620213
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Events
Anomaly	conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : company policies
Independent Detector	atc equipment other atc equipment : radar aircraft equipment : tcas other controllera other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	controller : issued new clearance controller : issued advisory controller : separated traffic
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Flight Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance Airspace Structure Environmental Factor
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance

Narrative:

On departure out of sjc, we were given an early turn to heading 120 degrees on the SID. The captain called for flaps up, after takeoff checklist. As he called this, I noticed traffic inside of 5 NM less than 1400 ft separation and climbing. I saw the traffic on TCASII, not visually. I thought of this as a potential threat and, as a first for me, verbally stated the after takeoff checklist instead of reading it. As this was going on, ATC called out the position of the traffic and told us to climb without delay through 4000 ft. The checklist was called for at 2300 ft. The captain demanded I re-accomplish the checklist by reading it. I deemed it unsafe to do so as I had not seen the traffic and this had already caused us to miss the original traffic call by ATC. We never saw the traffic, but did expedite our climb and the traffic became no factor. There was not a near miss. The captain explained to me (at cruise) that I could not use judgement on any SOP, and I could have simply delayed reading the checklist. I viewed this particular incident as time critical and safety related and that is why I did not read the 3 item checklist and is also why, at that particular moment, I told the captain I could not pull out the checklist and read it. This was totally unacceptable to the captain. He viewed my telling him I could not read the checklist as a challenge to his authority/authorized. Nothing could be further from the truth and I only viewed the immediate threat of an unseen VFR aircraft in making my immediate decision. I make every effort to follow all SOP's and I don't recall ever verbalizing any checklist during my time at this airline. I recognize the ultimate authority/authorized of the captain and recognize he is in charge of the flight and safety. The final word is the captain's. But, having said all that, given the same situation, I would delay reading the checklist until clear of the traffic and hope this would satisfy all parties involved.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A COCKPIT DISCUSSION RELATED TO CHKLIST USE IS INSTIGATED BY THE PIC OF A DEP A319 CLBING TO 4000 FT ON THE SJC SID WHEN THE FO WAS LOOKING FOR TFC INSTEAD OF READING THE CHKLIST AFTER TKOF FROM SJC, CA.

Narrative: ON DEP OUT OF SJC, WE WERE GIVEN AN EARLY TURN TO HDG 120 DEGS ON THE SID. THE CAPT CALLED FOR FLAPS UP, AFTER TKOF CHKLIST. AS HE CALLED THIS, I NOTICED TFC INSIDE OF 5 NM LESS THAN 1400 FT SEPARATION AND CLBING. I SAW THE TFC ON TCASII, NOT VISUALLY. I THOUGHT OF THIS AS A POTENTIAL THREAT AND, AS A FIRST FOR ME, VERBALLY STATED THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST INSTEAD OF READING IT. AS THIS WAS GOING ON, ATC CALLED OUT THE POS OF THE TFC AND TOLD US TO CLB WITHOUT DELAY THROUGH 4000 FT. THE CHKLIST WAS CALLED FOR AT 2300 FT. THE CAPT DEMANDED I RE-ACCOMPLISH THE CHKLIST BY READING IT. I DEEMED IT UNSAFE TO DO SO AS I HAD NOT SEEN THE TFC AND THIS HAD ALREADY CAUSED US TO MISS THE ORIGINAL TFC CALL BY ATC. WE NEVER SAW THE TFC, BUT DID EXPEDITE OUR CLB AND THE TFC BECAME NO FACTOR. THERE WAS NOT A NEAR MISS. THE CAPT EXPLAINED TO ME (AT CRUISE) THAT I COULD NOT USE JUDGEMENT ON ANY SOP, AND I COULD HAVE SIMPLY DELAYED READING THE CHKLIST. I VIEWED THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT AS TIME CRITICAL AND SAFETY RELATED AND THAT IS WHY I DID NOT READ THE 3 ITEM CHKLIST AND IS ALSO WHY, AT THAT PARTICULAR MOMENT, I TOLD THE CAPT I COULD NOT PULL OUT THE CHKLIST AND READ IT. THIS WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE CAPT. HE VIEWED MY TELLING HIM I COULD NOT READ THE CHKLIST AS A CHALLENGE TO HIS AUTH. NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER FROM THE TRUTH AND I ONLY VIEWED THE IMMEDIATE THREAT OF AN UNSEEN VFR ACFT IN MAKING MY IMMEDIATE DECISION. I MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO FOLLOW ALL SOP'S AND I DON'T RECALL EVER VERBALIZING ANY CHKLIST DURING MY TIME AT THIS AIRLINE. I RECOGNIZE THE ULTIMATE AUTH OF THE CAPT AND RECOGNIZE HE IS IN CHARGE OF THE FLT AND SAFETY. THE FINAL WORD IS THE CAPT'S. BUT, HAVING SAID ALL THAT, GIVEN THE SAME SIT, I WOULD DELAY READING THE CHKLIST UNTIL CLR OF THE TFC AND HOPE THIS WOULD SATISFY ALL PARTIES INVOLVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

A cockpit discussion related to checklist use is instigated by the PIC of a departure A319 climbing to 4000 ft on the sjc SID when the first officer was looking for traffic instead of reading the checklist after takeoff from sjc, ca.