Narrative:

Upon given clearance to runway 10R, the aircraft was taxied wbound onto taxiway C to what we thought was the correct route to the approach end of runway 10R for takeoff. However, the ground controller advised us that there was no access to runway 10R via taxiway C wbound and we must make a 180 degree turn on taxiway C to back taxi down runway 10R to the approach end for takeoff. The PF considered that comment to be a clearance to actually back taxi wbound to runway 10R, while the PNF took the comment to mean we were to hold short. Meanwhile, we had been given a routing to our destination by ground control (PNF was unable to reach clearance delivery because of a squelch sound on frequency) that was different from routing filed and the PNF was engaged in checking the high altitude chart for the proper designation of J186 to the ohios intersection. It was only a hundred yards or so to taxiway C3 where we would intersect with runway 10R. I looked up to the right as we started to turn right (a natural habit) onto runway 10R to back taxi and saw a small aircraft about 1/2 mi on final and above us (he had been instructed to go around and did so). At that time the ground controller said to cross the runway and make a 180 degrees on the other side and hold short. I wasn't sure if we screwed up or if the pilot of the small aircraft had. We were told to contact tower when ready and we advised tower we needed a min or so (to find the headings and fixes and put them into the FMS). I loaded the box and completed the before takeoff checklist before informing the tower we were ready to go. We taxied wbound on runway 10R with our takeoff clearance. After takeoff, we were asked to call when we got on the ground. At cruise during the 2 hour flight, we went over the incident to try to bring light on exactly what had happened. Upon arrival, I called the number. I explained what had happened and he told me the supervisors and controllers were meeting as we spoke. I asked if I could give them my explanation and was put on the line with a supervisor at cmh tower. He explained the seriousness of the infraction and stated there could be a pilot deviation report filed. I agreed that this is a serious matter and I take responsibility for my aircraft, whether I'm in the left seat or the right. I offer no excuses. I stated, however, that I felt there were mitigating circumstances that led to the incursion and that a close look might be important in preventing another occurrence at cmh: 1) there was confusion as to taxiway C access to runway 10R. Commercial chart provider showed it accessible. There was no signage on the taxiway and no pilot postings in the flight planning room. Preflight cmh NOTAMS showed no closed txwys. Neither pilot recalls ground control saying we had to back taxi on runway 10R until after we had already committed to a wbound taxi on taxiway C. 2) there was confusion regarding ground control's clearance -- whether to hold short of runway 10R or back taxi down the runway. The PF and PNF had differing opinions as to the clearance, but didn't realize that at the time. 3) the pilot performing the PNF duties was distraction with the charts and should have been monitoring the taxi. I accept that and must take ultimate responsibility for the safety of the operation of the aircraft. I believe, however, that ohios intersection was more difficult to find than necessary -- it was not on any departure chart. 4) our commercial chart provider should be notified to change the airport diagram, NOTAMS issued with details of the closure and inaccessibility to runway 10R from taxiway C, and signs/posted warnings placed in the pilot rooms at cmh FBO's. 5) the cockpit speakers in our learjet are weak. Neither crew member was using a headset which could have made communications more clear, however, my headset does not work in this aircraft. I sincerely regret that this happened. We were lucky this time. Crew has discussed and debriefed the occurrence in detail. I've been flying jet aircraft into high density airports since the 60's and even the most careful can become distraction. I plan to bring this incident to light within our company as a training device and will cooperate with cmh ATC and your office in whatever way is necessary. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: rptrvalidated lack of cockpit communication was the principle factor in this incursion. Reporter advised that his preflight briefing was from a commercial provider and they did not display taxiway closures with their automated briefing package.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PART 135 LJ35 OPERATOR MISINTERPRETS CMH GND CTLR CLRNC RESULTING IN A RWY 10R INCURSION.

Narrative: UPON GIVEN CLRNC TO RWY 10R, THE ACFT WAS TAXIED WBOUND ONTO TXWY C TO WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS THE CORRECT RTE TO THE APCH END OF RWY 10R FOR TKOF. HOWEVER, THE GND CTLR ADVISED US THAT THERE WAS NO ACCESS TO RWY 10R VIA TXWY C WBOUND AND WE MUST MAKE A 180 DEG TURN ON TXWY C TO BACK TAXI DOWN RWY 10R TO THE APCH END FOR TKOF. THE PF CONSIDERED THAT COMMENT TO BE A CLRNC TO ACTUALLY BACK TAXI WBOUND TO RWY 10R, WHILE THE PNF TOOK THE COMMENT TO MEAN WE WERE TO HOLD SHORT. MEANWHILE, WE HAD BEEN GIVEN A ROUTING TO OUR DEST BY GND CTL (PNF WAS UNABLE TO REACH CLRNC DELIVERY BECAUSE OF A SQUELCH SOUND ON FREQ) THAT WAS DIFFERENT FROM ROUTING FILED AND THE PNF WAS ENGAGED IN CHKING THE HIGH ALT CHART FOR THE PROPER DESIGNATION OF J186 TO THE OHIOS INTXN. IT WAS ONLY A HUNDRED YARDS OR SO TO TXWY C3 WHERE WE WOULD INTERSECT WITH RWY 10R. I LOOKED UP TO THE R AS WE STARTED TO TURN R (A NATURAL HABIT) ONTO RWY 10R TO BACK TAXI AND SAW A SMALL ACFT ABOUT 1/2 MI ON FINAL AND ABOVE US (HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO GO AROUND AND DID SO). AT THAT TIME THE GND CTLR SAID TO CROSS THE RWY AND MAKE A 180 DEGS ON THE OTHER SIDE AND HOLD SHORT. I WASN'T SURE IF WE SCREWED UP OR IF THE PLT OF THE SMALL ACFT HAD. WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT TWR WHEN READY AND WE ADVISED TWR WE NEEDED A MIN OR SO (TO FIND THE HDGS AND FIXES AND PUT THEM INTO THE FMS). I LOADED THE BOX AND COMPLETED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST BEFORE INFORMING THE TWR WE WERE READY TO GO. WE TAXIED WBOUND ON RWY 10R WITH OUR TKOF CLRNC. AFTER TKOF, WE WERE ASKED TO CALL WHEN WE GOT ON THE GND. AT CRUISE DURING THE 2 HR FLT, WE WENT OVER THE INCIDENT TO TRY TO BRING LIGHT ON EXACTLY WHAT HAD HAPPENED. UPON ARR, I CALLED THE NUMBER. I EXPLAINED WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND HE TOLD ME THE SUPVRS AND CTLRS WERE MEETING AS WE SPOKE. I ASKED IF I COULD GIVE THEM MY EXPLANATION AND WAS PUT ON THE LINE WITH A SUPVR AT CMH TWR. HE EXPLAINED THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE INFRACTION AND STATED THERE COULD BE A PLTDEV RPT FILED. I AGREED THAT THIS IS A SERIOUS MATTER AND I TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY ACFT, WHETHER I'M IN THE L SEAT OR THE R. I OFFER NO EXCUSES. I STATED, HOWEVER, THAT I FELT THERE WERE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO THE INCURSION AND THAT A CLOSE LOOK MIGHT BE IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING ANOTHER OCCURRENCE AT CMH: 1) THERE WAS CONFUSION AS TO TXWY C ACCESS TO RWY 10R. COMMERCIAL CHART PROVIDER SHOWED IT ACCESSIBLE. THERE WAS NO SIGNAGE ON THE TXWY AND NO PLT POSTINGS IN THE FLT PLANNING ROOM. PREFLT CMH NOTAMS SHOWED NO CLOSED TXWYS. NEITHER PLT RECALLS GND CTL SAYING WE HAD TO BACK TAXI ON RWY 10R UNTIL AFTER WE HAD ALREADY COMMITTED TO A WBOUND TAXI ON TXWY C. 2) THERE WAS CONFUSION REGARDING GND CTL'S CLRNC -- WHETHER TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 10R OR BACK TAXI DOWN THE RWY. THE PF AND PNF HAD DIFFERING OPINIONS AS TO THE CLRNC, BUT DIDN'T REALIZE THAT AT THE TIME. 3) THE PLT PERFORMING THE PNF DUTIES WAS DISTR WITH THE CHARTS AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN MONITORING THE TAXI. I ACCEPT THAT AND MUST TAKE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SAFETY OF THE OP OF THE ACFT. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT OHIOS INTXN WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO FIND THAN NECESSARY -- IT WAS NOT ON ANY DEP CHART. 4) OUR COMMERCIAL CHART PROVIDER SHOULD BE NOTIFIED TO CHANGE THE ARPT DIAGRAM, NOTAMS ISSUED WITH DETAILS OF THE CLOSURE AND INACCESSIBILITY TO RWY 10R FROM TXWY C, AND SIGNS/POSTED WARNINGS PLACED IN THE PLT ROOMS AT CMH FBO'S. 5) THE COCKPIT SPEAKERS IN OUR LEARJET ARE WEAK. NEITHER CREW MEMBER WAS USING A HEADSET WHICH COULD HAVE MADE COMS MORE CLR, HOWEVER, MY HEADSET DOES NOT WORK IN THIS ACFT. I SINCERELY REGRET THAT THIS HAPPENED. WE WERE LUCKY THIS TIME. CREW HAS DISCUSSED AND DEBRIEFED THE OCCURRENCE IN DETAIL. I'VE BEEN FLYING JET ACFT INTO HIGH DENSITY ARPTS SINCE THE 60'S AND EVEN THE MOST CAREFUL CAN BECOME DISTR. I PLAN TO BRING THIS INCIDENT TO LIGHT WITHIN OUR COMPANY AS A TRAINING DEVICE AND WILL COOPERATE WITH CMH ATC AND YOUR OFFICE IN WHATEVER WAY IS NECESSARY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTRVALIDATED LACK OF COCKPIT COM WAS THE PRINCIPLE FACTOR IN THIS INCURSION. RPTR ADVISED THAT HIS PREFLT BRIEFING WAS FROM A COMMERCIAL PROVIDER AND THEY DID NOT DISPLAY TXWY CLOSURES WITH THEIR AUTOMATED BRIEFING PACKAGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.