Narrative:

An unexpected change of runway and approach caused us to continue something that we had not done, nor briefed. We were 1000 ft high on 2 mandatory xings for the approach and led to an unstabilized situation on final. We should never have accepted the assignment. A proper briefing should have been made. We were in excess of 1500 FPM on final below 500 ft upon roundout for landing. We got the GPWS 'terrain, terrain, pull up.' we also got 'GS, pull up' (as the first officer still had the original runway 22L ILS dialed on slide). The landing was made in the touchdown zone uneventfully. I can assure you that this situation will never happen to me again, as I now notice all of the events overlooked that would have flagged the problem. Supplemental information from acn 618754: we had briefed and set up our FMS system for the ILS to runway 4R which was being given to other aircraft, in addition to the ILS's to runway 22S at jfk. On what we thought was a base turn for ILS to runway 4R, approach cleared us for the VOR to runway 13L. The captain elected to accept the clearance, despite the fact that we had not briefed nor set up the approach. At this point, and for the remainder of the flight, we were VMC with the field in sight. I was uncomfortable with accepting the clearance, but because of my low time in this aircraft, and the fact that I had never encountered such a situation before in my experiences, I relied on the captain's decision making skills. Passing canarsie, the mandatory altitude is 1500 ft, we were more than 3000 ft. I felt executing a missed approach would result in further deviations because it had not been briefed. At this point we were following the lead-in lights, on short final. We also earlier received the 'GS' aural warning because my EFIS system was still programmed for the ILS approach. During the VOR approach, I was answering the captain's questions and setting up his side for the approach. This problem happened because we had fully set up for an approach we were never told specifically to expect. Hindsight being 20/20, we could have asked approach what to expect, requested delay vectors to set up for the VOR, or requested a specific approach. My lack of experience in this aircraft/operating environment did not adequately 'back up' the needs of the captain. The only thing that kept us from scraping metal, or causing damage, was the captain's finesse during the flare. There was no doubt in either of our minds having landed that we were wrong -- after all, hindsight is 20/20.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL-65 FLT CREW FAIL TO BRIEF A CHANGED APCH RESULTING IN A NON STABILIZED APCH, MISSING REQUIRED APCH XING RESTRS.

Narrative: AN UNEXPECTED CHANGE OF RWY AND APCH CAUSED US TO CONTINUE SOMETHING THAT WE HAD NOT DONE, NOR BRIEFED. WE WERE 1000 FT HIGH ON 2 MANDATORY XINGS FOR THE APCH AND LED TO AN UNSTABILIZED SIT ON FINAL. WE SHOULD NEVER HAVE ACCEPTED THE ASSIGNMENT. A PROPER BRIEFING SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE. WE WERE IN EXCESS OF 1500 FPM ON FINAL BELOW 500 FT UPON ROUNDOUT FOR LNDG. WE GOT THE GPWS 'TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL UP.' WE ALSO GOT 'GS, PULL UP' (AS THE FO STILL HAD THE ORIGINAL RWY 22L ILS DIALED ON SLIDE). THE LNDG WAS MADE IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE UNEVENTFULLY. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THIS SIT WILL NEVER HAPPEN TO ME AGAIN, AS I NOW NOTICE ALL OF THE EVENTS OVERLOOKED THAT WOULD HAVE FLAGGED THE PROB. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 618754: WE HAD BRIEFED AND SET UP OUR FMS SYS FOR THE ILS TO RWY 4R WHICH WAS BEING GIVEN TO OTHER ACFT, IN ADDITION TO THE ILS'S TO RWY 22S AT JFK. ON WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS A BASE TURN FOR ILS TO RWY 4R, APCH CLRED US FOR THE VOR TO RWY 13L. THE CAPT ELECTED TO ACCEPT THE CLRNC, DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE HAD NOT BRIEFED NOR SET UP THE APCH. AT THIS POINT, AND FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT, WE WERE VMC WITH THE FIELD IN SIGHT. I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH ACCEPTING THE CLRNC, BUT BECAUSE OF MY LOW TIME IN THIS ACFT, AND THE FACT THAT I HAD NEVER ENCOUNTERED SUCH A SIT BEFORE IN MY EXPERIENCES, I RELIED ON THE CAPT'S DECISION MAKING SKILLS. PASSING CANARSIE, THE MANDATORY ALT IS 1500 FT, WE WERE MORE THAN 3000 FT. I FELT EXECUTING A MISSED APCH WOULD RESULT IN FURTHER DEVS BECAUSE IT HAD NOT BEEN BRIEFED. AT THIS POINT WE WERE FOLLOWING THE LEAD-IN LIGHTS, ON SHORT FINAL. WE ALSO EARLIER RECEIVED THE 'GS' AURAL WARNING BECAUSE MY EFIS SYS WAS STILL PROGRAMMED FOR THE ILS APCH. DURING THE VOR APCH, I WAS ANSWERING THE CAPT'S QUESTIONS AND SETTING UP HIS SIDE FOR THE APCH. THIS PROB HAPPENED BECAUSE WE HAD FULLY SET UP FOR AN APCH WE WERE NEVER TOLD SPECIFICALLY TO EXPECT. HINDSIGHT BEING 20/20, WE COULD HAVE ASKED APCH WHAT TO EXPECT, REQUESTED DELAY VECTORS TO SET UP FOR THE VOR, OR REQUESTED A SPECIFIC APCH. MY LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THIS ACFT/OPERATING ENVIRONMENT DID NOT ADEQUATELY 'BACK UP' THE NEEDS OF THE CAPT. THE ONLY THING THAT KEPT US FROM SCRAPING METAL, OR CAUSING DAMAGE, WAS THE CAPT'S FINESSE DURING THE FLARE. THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN EITHER OF OUR MINDS HAVING LANDED THAT WE WERE WRONG -- AFTER ALL, HINDSIGHT IS 20/20.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.