Narrative:

It was my leg going into long beach (lgb). The second and final leg of a 2-LEG, 8-HR day. It was the first time the captain had flown into long beach, and my second time. Along with my approach briefing, I briefed the captain that based on my last and only other landing at lgb, we should expect the tower to give us a left hand turn-off after rollout, and there were certain txwys that were closed or restr to aircraft smaller than our B757. The landing was normal, and upon rollout, as we were xferring control of the aircraft from the first officer to the captain, the tower instructed us to use taxiway D to taxiway a for turnoff. This was confusing, as the proper route would be taxiway a to taxiway D. The captain stopped the aircraft on the runway momentarily to ask for clarification, and the tower controller instructed us to use taxiway a, to taxiway D. We turned off runway 30 at taxiway a, then an immediate left on to taxiway D, whereupon the tower controller instructed us to call ground. I personally thought this was a non-standard procedure, as we still had an active runway to cross before getting to our parking ramp. The handoff to ground was given without any hold-short instructions. By the time we switched to ground, we had rolled through the intersection of taxiway D and runway 25R. We had just crossed this same runway 1 min earlier on our landing rollout. The ground controller instructed us to use taxiway G and hold short of runway 30. We were then cleared to cross runway 30 and taxi to the ramp. After landing, we spoke to the tower about the incident and his position was that we did not contact the ground controller soon enough before crossing runway 25R, and we did not have clearance to do so. Contributing factors to this incident were: 1) the captain's first time at this airport, and the first officer's second, resulting in unfamiliarity with the local ground procedures. 2) the tower giving taxi instructions while we were still in the rollout phase of landing, and verbally confirming the xfer of aircraft control between the first officer and captain. 3) a juxtaposition of taxiway identifiers in tower's instructions, requiring a clarification. 4) a very tight turnoff, followed by a very short and narrow taxiway length before reaching the runway 25R intersection. 5) tower's handoff to ground with no hold short instruction. 6) the captain and first officer being busy accomplishing the after-landing checklist and frequency change while taxiing in a tight and unfamiliar area. While speaking with the tower controller after the incident, the controller said that there was never a traffic conflict, and that he had protected that runway intersection because he suspected that we might do what we did. If that is the case, why didn't he issue a hold short instruction in conjunction with him sending us to ground? Supplemental information from acn 617969: I was fully focused on making the turn and the first officer was cleaning up the plane, so by the time we got to ground, we had entered the runway 25R intersection on taxiway D. At no time had we received any instruction to hold short of runway 25R, even when we were told to go to ground. They advised to contact tower via land line once we got in. From the inadequate ATIS to the confusing tower instructions to no hold short instruction by anyone at anytime, I felt somewhat set up for this incursion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION RWY 25R BY A B752 FLT CREW WHEN MAKING THE TIGHT TURN OFF RWY 30 TO TXWY D AT LGB, CA.

Narrative: IT WAS MY LEG GOING INTO LONG BEACH (LGB). THE SECOND AND FINAL LEG OF A 2-LEG, 8-HR DAY. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THE CAPT HAD FLOWN INTO LONG BEACH, AND MY SECOND TIME. ALONG WITH MY APCH BRIEFING, I BRIEFED THE CAPT THAT BASED ON MY LAST AND ONLY OTHER LNDG AT LGB, WE SHOULD EXPECT THE TWR TO GIVE US A L HAND TURN-OFF AFTER ROLLOUT, AND THERE WERE CERTAIN TXWYS THAT WERE CLOSED OR RESTR TO ACFT SMALLER THAN OUR B757. THE LNDG WAS NORMAL, AND UPON ROLLOUT, AS WE WERE XFERRING CTL OF THE ACFT FROM THE FO TO THE CAPT, THE TWR INSTRUCTED US TO USE TXWY D TO TXWY A FOR TURNOFF. THIS WAS CONFUSING, AS THE PROPER RTE WOULD BE TXWY A TO TXWY D. THE CAPT STOPPED THE ACFT ON THE RWY MOMENTARILY TO ASK FOR CLARIFICATION, AND THE TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO USE TXWY A, TO TXWY D. WE TURNED OFF RWY 30 AT TXWY A, THEN AN IMMEDIATE L ON TO TXWY D, WHEREUPON THE TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO CALL GND. I PERSONALLY THOUGHT THIS WAS A NON-STANDARD PROC, AS WE STILL HAD AN ACTIVE RWY TO CROSS BEFORE GETTING TO OUR PARKING RAMP. THE HDOF TO GND WAS GIVEN WITHOUT ANY HOLD-SHORT INSTRUCTIONS. BY THE TIME WE SWITCHED TO GND, WE HAD ROLLED THROUGH THE INTXN OF TXWY D AND RWY 25R. WE HAD JUST CROSSED THIS SAME RWY 1 MIN EARLIER ON OUR LNDG ROLLOUT. THE GND CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO USE TXWY G AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 30. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO CROSS RWY 30 AND TAXI TO THE RAMP. AFTER LNDG, WE SPOKE TO THE TWR ABOUT THE INCIDENT AND HIS POS WAS THAT WE DID NOT CONTACT THE GND CTLR SOON ENOUGH BEFORE XING RWY 25R, AND WE DID NOT HAVE CLRNC TO DO SO. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT WERE: 1) THE CAPT'S FIRST TIME AT THIS ARPT, AND THE FO'S SECOND, RESULTING IN UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE LCL GND PROCS. 2) THE TWR GIVING TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WHILE WE WERE STILL IN THE ROLLOUT PHASE OF LNDG, AND VERBALLY CONFIRMING THE XFER OF ACFT CTL BTWN THE FO AND CAPT. 3) A JUXTAPOSITION OF TXWY IDENTIFIERS IN TWR'S INSTRUCTIONS, REQUIRING A CLARIFICATION. 4) A VERY TIGHT TURNOFF, FOLLOWED BY A VERY SHORT AND NARROW TXWY LENGTH BEFORE REACHING THE RWY 25R INTXN. 5) TWR'S HDOF TO GND WITH NO HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION. 6) THE CAPT AND FO BEING BUSY ACCOMPLISHING THE AFTER-LNDG CHKLIST AND FREQ CHANGE WHILE TAXIING IN A TIGHT AND UNFAMILIAR AREA. WHILE SPEAKING WITH THE TWR CTLR AFTER THE INCIDENT, THE CTLR SAID THAT THERE WAS NEVER A TFC CONFLICT, AND THAT HE HAD PROTECTED THAT RWY INTXN BECAUSE HE SUSPECTED THAT WE MIGHT DO WHAT WE DID. IF THAT IS THE CASE, WHY DIDN'T HE ISSUE A HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH HIM SENDING US TO GND? SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 617969: I WAS FULLY FOCUSED ON MAKING THE TURN AND THE FO WAS CLEANING UP THE PLANE, SO BY THE TIME WE GOT TO GND, WE HAD ENTERED THE RWY 25R INTXN ON TXWY D. AT NO TIME HAD WE RECEIVED ANY INSTRUCTION TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 25R, EVEN WHEN WE WERE TOLD TO GO TO GND. THEY ADVISED TO CONTACT TWR VIA LAND LINE ONCE WE GOT IN. FROM THE INADEQUATE ATIS TO THE CONFUSING TWR INSTRUCTIONS TO NO HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION BY ANYONE AT ANYTIME, I FELT SOMEWHAT SET UP FOR THIS INCURSION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.