Narrative:

We were taxiing for departure. Taxi instructions were to cross runway 12R at taxiway east, turn left on taxiway P and right on runway 6. Runway 12R was the active for landing and runway 12L for departures. One of our company aircraft was holding short of runway 12L on taxiway C. I was unsure of what the controller was trying to accomplish. When I turned right onto runway 6, I crossed a hold line for runway 12L. Contributing factors were the fact that I don't operate regularly at stl, taxi instructions were rather complex, and the controller issued a bare minimum of instruction. Additionally, I believe some controllers are increasingly creating a climate through impatience and intimidation where pilots hesitate to question instructions. In the future, if I have the slightest doubt concerning taxi instructions, I will stop the airplane and ask questions until I am satisfied. In this case, I did ask for clarification, but the controller only repeated his original instructions with no expanded explanation and I attempted to comply in the interest of expediting the flow of traffic. Supplemental information from acn 617569: as soon as I saw that hold line, I informed the captain we were supposed to hold short, at which time he slammed on the brakes and we stopped. However, we had already crossed the line. Contributing factors were: I (first officer) was running checklist, taxiing too fast, no understanding the end result on the clearance, fatigue, a new first officer and a captain that does not fly much in stl.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: JS32 CREW HAD A RWY INCURSION AT STL DUE TO PLT CONFUSION WITH ATC INSTRUCTIONS AND TAXIING TOO FAST.

Narrative: WE WERE TAXIING FOR DEP. TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO CROSS RWY 12R AT TXWY E, TURN L ON TXWY P AND R ON RWY 6. RWY 12R WAS THE ACTIVE FOR LNDG AND RWY 12L FOR DEPS. ONE OF OUR COMPANY ACFT WAS HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 12L ON TXWY C. I WAS UNSURE OF WHAT THE CTLR WAS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH. WHEN I TURNED R ONTO RWY 6, I CROSSED A HOLD LINE FOR RWY 12L. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE THE FACT THAT I DON'T OPERATE REGULARLY AT STL, TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE RATHER COMPLEX, AND THE CTLR ISSUED A BARE MINIMUM OF INSTRUCTION. ADDITIONALLY, I BELIEVE SOME CTLRS ARE INCREASINGLY CREATING A CLIMATE THROUGH IMPATIENCE AND INTIMIDATION WHERE PLTS HESITATE TO QUESTION INSTRUCTIONS. IN THE FUTURE, IF I HAVE THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT CONCERNING TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, I WILL STOP THE AIRPLANE AND ASK QUESTIONS UNTIL I AM SATISFIED. IN THIS CASE, I DID ASK FOR CLARIFICATION, BUT THE CTLR ONLY REPEATED HIS ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS WITH NO EXPANDED EXPLANATION AND I ATTEMPTED TO COMPLY IN THE INTEREST OF EXPEDITING THE FLOW OF TFC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 617569: AS SOON AS I SAW THAT HOLD LINE, I INFORMED THE CAPT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO HOLD SHORT, AT WHICH TIME HE SLAMMED ON THE BRAKES AND WE STOPPED. HOWEVER, WE HAD ALREADY CROSSED THE LINE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: I (FO) WAS RUNNING CHKLIST, TAXIING TOO FAST, NO UNDERSTANDING THE END RESULT ON THE CLRNC, FATIGUE, A NEW FO AND A CAPT THAT DOES NOT FLY MUCH IN STL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.