Narrative:

I am submitting this report to self disclose on flight from sea-ZZZ. We had approximately 1000 pounds of center tank fuel. I had the center tank pumps on, and made a mental note that I could possibly get a master caution on the takeoff roll. All the checklists were completed, and we pushed back, started the engines, and taxied to runway 16L. We were cleared for takeoff and applied toga and commenced the takeoff roll. I was the PNF. I saw the master caution light illuminate and looked at the annunciator and I did not see the fuel light. The first officer then immediately called doors. In my preprogrammed mind I did not hear what I expected and did an rejected takeoff. As I rolled out I immediately knew that rejected takeoff was not the thing to have done. We returned to the gate where I made the PA's and asked the first officer to start working on the brake cooling times. I contacted dispatch, spoke with maintenance and operations. I did not once check the calculations that the first officer did for brake cooling. I subsequently learned that gross miscalculations were made on the times. When I arrived at destination, I was removed from duty. I have since received special purposes training covering all the areas that I made mistakes. It was one thing to do an unnecessary rejected takeoff, but I really felt terrible about the brake cooling error because I know that if I had just taken more time to review everything, this miscalculation, more than likely, would not have occurred if both pilots did go over the charts. The special training that I received really helped me in seeing where I went wrong, and I left flight standards with a positive feeling.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A HIGH SPD ABORT DEEMED UNNECESSARY AFTER A MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED FOR A DOOR WARNING IS FOLLOWED BY A TOO EARLY TKOF BEFORE THE BRAKES AND TIRES HAD COMPLETED THEIR COOLING OFF PERIOD AT SEA, WA.

Narrative: I AM SUBMITTING THIS RPT TO SELF DISCLOSE ON FLT FROM SEA-ZZZ. WE HAD APPROX 1000 LBS OF CTR TANK FUEL. I HAD THE CTR TANK PUMPS ON, AND MADE A MENTAL NOTE THAT I COULD POSSIBLY GET A MASTER CAUTION ON THE TKOF ROLL. ALL THE CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED, AND WE PUSHED BACK, STARTED THE ENGS, AND TAXIED TO RWY 16L. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND APPLIED TOGA AND COMMENCED THE TKOF ROLL. I WAS THE PNF. I SAW THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATE AND LOOKED AT THE ANNUNCIATOR AND I DID NOT SEE THE FUEL LIGHT. THE FO THEN IMMEDIATELY CALLED DOORS. IN MY PREPROGRAMMED MIND I DID NOT HEAR WHAT I EXPECTED AND DID AN RTO. AS I ROLLED OUT I IMMEDIATELY KNEW THAT RTO WAS NOT THE THING TO HAVE DONE. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE WHERE I MADE THE PA'S AND ASKED THE FO TO START WORKING ON THE BRAKE COOLING TIMES. I CONTACTED DISPATCH, SPOKE WITH MAINT AND OPS. I DID NOT ONCE CHK THE CALCULATIONS THAT THE FO DID FOR BRAKE COOLING. I SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED THAT GROSS MISCALCULATIONS WERE MADE ON THE TIMES. WHEN I ARRIVED AT DEST, I WAS REMOVED FROM DUTY. I HAVE SINCE RECEIVED SPECIAL PURPOSES TRAINING COVERING ALL THE AREAS THAT I MADE MISTAKES. IT WAS ONE THING TO DO AN UNNECESSARY RTO, BUT I REALLY FELT TERRIBLE ABOUT THE BRAKE COOLING ERROR BECAUSE I KNOW THAT IF I HAD JUST TAKEN MORE TIME TO REVIEW EVERYTHING, THIS MISCALCULATION, MORE THAN LIKELY, WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED IF BOTH PLTS DID GO OVER THE CHARTS. THE SPECIAL TRAINING THAT I RECEIVED REALLY HELPED ME IN SEEING WHERE I WENT WRONG, AND I LEFT FLT STANDARDS WITH A POSITIVE FEELING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.