Narrative:

I launched from cmh and had planned to have enough fuel to fly the mission and return to cmh. I had visually verified that the fueler had topped the tanks per my request. I also performed a very thorough preflight inspection of the aircraft. As far as fuel planning, when flying this specific aircraft at low altitudes with proper leaning, it can usually be operated for 3 hours 50 mins, with a 30 min VFR fuel reserve. This is the endurance window that I was using for my flight. While I was nearing cmh I was starting to get near the end of this endurance window. I knew that I still had 1 more site to shoot that was 2 mi southeast of the field. At this time, according to my fuel planning, I should have had about 30 mins of fuel left before I got to my 30 min reserve. The only thing that was getting to me was the fact that the fuel gauges were getting very low. I was uncomfortable, I re-leaned the plane and verified both of the mags were firing well. I thought through everything that I had been taught about the common inaccuracy of fuel gauges in aircraft. I took into account my recent experiences in aircraft that had 1-2 hours of fuel on board even though the gauges indicated that they were completely empty. I also considered that even if something were to go wrong while I was over the site that I should be able to make a power off landing so I decided that I needed to trust my fuel planning, as that is the most accurate means of knowing my fuel state. I made my first circle of the site at 2500 ft MSL and as I came around the north side of the target my engine began to surge. I immediately turned north to establish a base leg for the runway. I was already on with tower due to my proximity to the field, I told them that I needed to land and that I was having fuel trouble. The tower controller cleared me to land immediately, and then subsequently voided the clearance for an airliner that was on a long final for the runway. Due to the fact that runway 28L was closed and had people and equipment on it, I had to go for the north runway (runway 28R). The winds were 220 degrees at 17 KTS gusting to 21 KTS. This did not help my cause, but it did appear that I would be able to make the runway, I foolishly added 10 degrees of flaps. On short final, I rounded out over the blast pad. The threshold lights were directly in front of me and my intention was to avoid hitting them with my landing gear. I could see the main gear on my left so I aimed it in between 2 of the lights, as I got close I tried to bring the right side up with bank to clear the lights, but unfortunately I hit one of them. I told the tower over the radio 'I think I tagged one of your reils.' the tower said they would check on it. During this bit of conversation, I made a controled landing on the runway and was rolling out. The tower asked if I was going to be able to cost clear of the runway and I informed him that I thought I was going to be able to, but I would let him know if I couldn't make it. I did make it onto the first available taxiway, then got out and pushed it clear. Ground spoke to me and said that they were sending a tug. After the tow fuel was added to the plane and after meeting with the airport authority/authorized over the broken light, and meeting with 2 gentlemen from the columbus FSDO, at their request I started the plane. This made it clear that fuel exhaustion was clearly the culprit. As part of an assignment from my employer, I ran the numbers again to see why I ran out of fuel 20 mins before I was supposed to reach my VFR reserve. The deciding factor was that I planned with a power setting of 2300 RPM but due to the winds I was actually running a power setting 2400 RPM without thinking of the difference that this would make in my endurance numbers, which is a 35 min difference per the manual. I gave a presentation to all of the other pilots at my place of employment on fuel management and the discussion that it prompted was very educational to all of us.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF C152 EXPERIENCES ENG FAILURE DUE TO FUEL EXHAUSTION. DEAD STICKS TO A SAFE LNDG AT CMH.

Narrative: I LAUNCHED FROM CMH AND HAD PLANNED TO HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO FLY THE MISSION AND RETURN TO CMH. I HAD VISUALLY VERIFIED THAT THE FUELER HAD TOPPED THE TANKS PER MY REQUEST. I ALSO PERFORMED A VERY THOROUGH PREFLT INSPECTION OF THE ACFT. AS FAR AS FUEL PLANNING, WHEN FLYING THIS SPECIFIC ACFT AT LOW ALTS WITH PROPER LEANING, IT CAN USUALLY BE OPERATED FOR 3 HRS 50 MINS, WITH A 30 MIN VFR FUEL RESERVE. THIS IS THE ENDURANCE WINDOW THAT I WAS USING FOR MY FLT. WHILE I WAS NEARING CMH I WAS STARTING TO GET NEAR THE END OF THIS ENDURANCE WINDOW. I KNEW THAT I STILL HAD 1 MORE SITE TO SHOOT THAT WAS 2 MI SE OF THE FIELD. AT THIS TIME, ACCORDING TO MY FUEL PLANNING, I SHOULD HAVE HAD ABOUT 30 MINS OF FUEL LEFT BEFORE I GOT TO MY 30 MIN RESERVE. THE ONLY THING THAT WAS GETTING TO ME WAS THE FACT THAT THE FUEL GAUGES WERE GETTING VERY LOW. I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE, I RE-LEANED THE PLANE AND VERIFIED BOTH OF THE MAGS WERE FIRING WELL. I THOUGHT THROUGH EVERYTHING THAT I HAD BEEN TAUGHT ABOUT THE COMMON INACCURACY OF FUEL GAUGES IN ACFT. I TOOK INTO ACCOUNT MY RECENT EXPERIENCES IN ACFT THAT HAD 1-2 HRS OF FUEL ON BOARD EVEN THOUGH THE GAUGES INDICATED THAT THEY WERE COMPLETELY EMPTY. I ALSO CONSIDERED THAT EVEN IF SOMETHING WERE TO GO WRONG WHILE I WAS OVER THE SITE THAT I SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE A PWR OFF LNDG SO I DECIDED THAT I NEEDED TO TRUST MY FUEL PLANNING, AS THAT IS THE MOST ACCURATE MEANS OF KNOWING MY FUEL STATE. I MADE MY FIRST CIRCLE OF THE SITE AT 2500 FT MSL AND AS I CAME AROUND THE N SIDE OF THE TARGET MY ENG BEGAN TO SURGE. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED N TO ESTABLISH A BASE LEG FOR THE RWY. I WAS ALREADY ON WITH TWR DUE TO MY PROX TO THE FIELD, I TOLD THEM THAT I NEEDED TO LAND AND THAT I WAS HAVING FUEL TROUBLE. THE TWR CTLR CLRED ME TO LAND IMMEDIATELY, AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY VOIDED THE CLRNC FOR AN AIRLINER THAT WAS ON A LONG FINAL FOR THE RWY. DUE TO THE FACT THAT RWY 28L WAS CLOSED AND HAD PEOPLE AND EQUIP ON IT, I HAD TO GO FOR THE N RWY (RWY 28R). THE WINDS WERE 220 DEGS AT 17 KTS GUSTING TO 21 KTS. THIS DID NOT HELP MY CAUSE, BUT IT DID APPEAR THAT I WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE THE RWY, I FOOLISHLY ADDED 10 DEGS OF FLAPS. ON SHORT FINAL, I ROUNDED OUT OVER THE BLAST PAD. THE THRESHOLD LIGHTS WERE DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF ME AND MY INTENTION WAS TO AVOID HITTING THEM WITH MY LNDG GEAR. I COULD SEE THE MAIN GEAR ON MY L SO I AIMED IT IN BTWN 2 OF THE LIGHTS, AS I GOT CLOSE I TRIED TO BRING THE RIGHT SIDE UP WITH BANK TO CLR THE LIGHTS, BUT UNFORTUNATELY I HIT ONE OF THEM. I TOLD THE TWR OVER THE RADIO 'I THINK I TAGGED ONE OF YOUR REILS.' THE TWR SAID THEY WOULD CHK ON IT. DURING THIS BIT OF CONVERSATION, I MADE A CTLED LNDG ON THE RWY AND WAS ROLLING OUT. THE TWR ASKED IF I WAS GOING TO BE ABLE TO COST CLR OF THE RWY AND I INFORMED HIM THAT I THOUGHT I WAS GOING TO BE ABLE TO, BUT I WOULD LET HIM KNOW IF I COULDN'T MAKE IT. I DID MAKE IT ONTO THE FIRST AVAILABLE TXWY, THEN GOT OUT AND PUSHED IT CLR. GND SPOKE TO ME AND SAID THAT THEY WERE SENDING A TUG. AFTER THE TOW FUEL WAS ADDED TO THE PLANE AND AFTER MEETING WITH THE ARPT AUTH OVER THE BROKEN LIGHT, AND MEETING WITH 2 GENTLEMEN FROM THE COLUMBUS FSDO, AT THEIR REQUEST I STARTED THE PLANE. THIS MADE IT CLR THAT FUEL EXHAUSTION WAS CLRLY THE CULPRIT. AS PART OF AN ASSIGNMENT FROM MY EMPLOYER, I RAN THE NUMBERS AGAIN TO SEE WHY I RAN OUT OF FUEL 20 MINS BEFORE I WAS SUPPOSED TO REACH MY VFR RESERVE. THE DECIDING FACTOR WAS THAT I PLANNED WITH A PWR SETTING OF 2300 RPM BUT DUE TO THE WINDS I WAS ACTUALLY RUNNING A PWR SETTING 2400 RPM WITHOUT THINKING OF THE DIFFERENCE THAT THIS WOULD MAKE IN MY ENDURANCE NUMBERS, WHICH IS A 35 MIN DIFFERENCE PER THE MANUAL. I GAVE A PRESENTATION TO ALL OF THE OTHER PLTS AT MY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT ON FUEL MGMNT AND THE DISCUSSION THAT IT PROMPTED WAS VERY EDUCATIONAL TO ALL OF US.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.