Narrative:

I was the captain (PNF) on our company flight from detroit metropolitan airport to cincinnati lunken airport. The first officer (PF) was in the left seat. We received an ATC clearance to 'taxi into position and hold on runway 21R,' and were to expect to hold in position while tower departed an aircraft off a parallel runway on the west side of the airport. When our takeoff clearance was issued, it included a heading to fly after departure, which I entered into the flight mode panel. Once airborne and climbing through 400 ft AGL, the PF called for the heading select to be activated and I contacted departure while he flew the company climb profile. After what seemed to be a couple of mins, departure asked our heading, which I replied 220 degrees. Again, maybe 1 min passed when the controller issued a new heading -- 200 degrees. We flew that heading for a short time, then we were cleared to our first fix (cavvs). All further contact with departure was routine, ending with our handoff to ZOB. I didn't know of any errors or conflicts until dayton approach relayed a message from detroit to call because of 'loss of separation' problem. In my conversation with detroit metropolitan tower, I was told that the heading issued by tower was 200 degrees, and that I read back 200 degrees to them when I read back my takeoff clearance. On our initial climb out of detroit, I did see the aircraft that delayed our departure, I believe it was an airbus 320, and it was at our 1 O'clock position, higher and several mi ahead. When I looked at our TCASII, I believe it was indicating about 1000 ft above us, and maybe 5 mi ahead, on our navigation display, it was indicated as a hollow blue diamond. In hindsight, we did not practice good CRM. Per our company policy, I set the flight mode panel in accordance to our SOP, but the first officer never confirmed it nor referenced the heading when asking for the heading select to be engaged after takeoff. When departure queried us about our assigned heading, and I responded 220 degrees, I asked the first officer if I may have entered in the wrong heading prior to departure, but he reassured me that 220 was the correct heading assignment. I've never been afraid to ask ATC to repeat a clearance if one of us in the cockpit was unsure of the instructions, but for that to be an effective deterrent for preventing something like this from happening again, both pilots need to be engaged in active listening.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ALLEGED LOSS OF SEPARATION RPTED BY DEP CTL TO A DEP FOKKER 70 FLYING AN INCORRECT HDG AFTER DEP DTW, MI.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT (PNF) ON OUR COMPANY FLT FROM DETROIT METRO ARPT TO CINCINNATI LUNKEN ARPT. THE FO (PF) WAS IN THE L SEAT. WE RECEIVED AN ATC CLRNC TO 'TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 21R,' AND WERE TO EXPECT TO HOLD IN POS WHILE TWR DEPARTED AN ACFT OFF A PARALLEL RWY ON THE W SIDE OF THE ARPT. WHEN OUR TKOF CLRNC WAS ISSUED, IT INCLUDED A HDG TO FLY AFTER DEP, WHICH I ENTERED INTO THE FLT MODE PANEL. ONCE AIRBORNE AND CLBING THROUGH 400 FT AGL, THE PF CALLED FOR THE HDG SELECT TO BE ACTIVATED AND I CONTACTED DEP WHILE HE FLEW THE COMPANY CLB PROFILE. AFTER WHAT SEEMED TO BE A COUPLE OF MINS, DEP ASKED OUR HDG, WHICH I REPLIED 220 DEGS. AGAIN, MAYBE 1 MIN PASSED WHEN THE CTLR ISSUED A NEW HDG -- 200 DEGS. WE FLEW THAT HDG FOR A SHORT TIME, THEN WE WERE CLRED TO OUR FIRST FIX (CAVVS). ALL FURTHER CONTACT WITH DEP WAS ROUTINE, ENDING WITH OUR HDOF TO ZOB. I DIDN'T KNOW OF ANY ERRORS OR CONFLICTS UNTIL DAYTON APCH RELAYED A MESSAGE FROM DETROIT TO CALL BECAUSE OF 'LOSS OF SEPARATION' PROB. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH DETROIT METRO TWR, I WAS TOLD THAT THE HDG ISSUED BY TWR WAS 200 DEGS, AND THAT I READ BACK 200 DEGS TO THEM WHEN I READ BACK MY TKOF CLRNC. ON OUR INITIAL CLB OUT OF DETROIT, I DID SEE THE ACFT THAT DELAYED OUR DEP, I BELIEVE IT WAS AN AIRBUS 320, AND IT WAS AT OUR 1 O'CLOCK POS, HIGHER AND SEVERAL MI AHEAD. WHEN I LOOKED AT OUR TCASII, I BELIEVE IT WAS INDICATING ABOUT 1000 FT ABOVE US, AND MAYBE 5 MI AHEAD, ON OUR NAV DISPLAY, IT WAS INDICATED AS A HOLLOW BLUE DIAMOND. IN HINDSIGHT, WE DID NOT PRACTICE GOOD CRM. PER OUR COMPANY POLICY, I SET THE FLT MODE PANEL IN ACCORDANCE TO OUR SOP, BUT THE FO NEVER CONFIRMED IT NOR REFED THE HDG WHEN ASKING FOR THE HDG SELECT TO BE ENGAGED AFTER TKOF. WHEN DEP QUERIED US ABOUT OUR ASSIGNED HDG, AND I RESPONDED 220 DEGS, I ASKED THE FO IF I MAY HAVE ENTERED IN THE WRONG HDG PRIOR TO DEP, BUT HE REASSURED ME THAT 220 WAS THE CORRECT HDG ASSIGNMENT. I'VE NEVER BEEN AFRAID TO ASK ATC TO REPEAT A CLRNC IF ONE OF US IN THE COCKPIT WAS UNSURE OF THE INSTRUCTIONS, BUT FOR THAT TO BE AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT FOR PREVENTING SOMETHING LIKE THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN, BOTH PLTS NEED TO BE ENGAGED IN ACTIVE LISTENING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.