Narrative:

While en route to rno, approximately 80 mi north of lkv VORTAC, climbing through FL385 for FL410, we experienced #1 deu failure, plus #1 communication failure, yaw damper disengagement, autoplt disengagement, and eec alternate mode. Because we could not contact ATC, we squawked 7700 and descended to FL370. I opted not to climb to FL410 because of eec alternate mode. It took a few mins to run the checklist for deu and eec problems, and also to determine what frequency to attempt contact with ATC, since the #1 communication system had blanked. We finally contacted ATC on communication #2, and advised them that we were at FL370, and had descended because of a system failure. They asked if we required any further assistance, and we said not at this time. We checked circuit breakers, and found the standby bus 'sect' 1 circuit breaker low behind the first officer popped, and upon resetting it, recovered all system except eec alternate mode. Upon arrival in rno, I contacted maintenance control, and advised them all that had transpired. It was determined that no other action was required. I was contacted by my chief pilot the next day, who informed me that we now needed to write up popped circuit breakers as an 'information' entry. I was unaware of this new procedure, as apparently was maintenance control. I was still operating on the premise that the only 'information' write-up was for takeoff aborts for the takeoff warning horn. I now understand this new requirement.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B737 ENCOUNTER MULTIPLE SYS FAILURES, INCLUDING LOSS OF ATC COM, AT CRUISE NEAR LKV. OVERCOME DIFFICULTIES BUT FAIL TO PROPERLY LOG THE INCIDENT.

Narrative: WHILE ENRTE TO RNO, APPROX 80 MI N OF LKV VORTAC, CLBING THROUGH FL385 FOR FL410, WE EXPERIENCED #1 DEU FAILURE, PLUS #1 COM FAILURE, YAW DAMPER DISENGAGEMENT, AUTOPLT DISENGAGEMENT, AND EEC ALTERNATE MODE. BECAUSE WE COULD NOT CONTACT ATC, WE SQUAWKED 7700 AND DSNDED TO FL370. I OPTED NOT TO CLB TO FL410 BECAUSE OF EEC ALTERNATE MODE. IT TOOK A FEW MINS TO RUN THE CHKLIST FOR DEU AND EEC PROBS, AND ALSO TO DETERMINE WHAT FREQ TO ATTEMPT CONTACT WITH ATC, SINCE THE #1 COM SYS HAD BLANKED. WE FINALLY CONTACTED ATC ON COM #2, AND ADVISED THEM THAT WE WERE AT FL370, AND HAD DSNDED BECAUSE OF A SYS FAILURE. THEY ASKED IF WE REQUIRED ANY FURTHER ASSISTANCE, AND WE SAID NOT AT THIS TIME. WE CHKED CIRCUIT BREAKERS, AND FOUND THE STANDBY BUS 'SECT' 1 CIRCUIT BREAKER LOW BEHIND THE FO POPPED, AND UPON RESETTING IT, RECOVERED ALL SYS EXCEPT EEC ALTERNATE MODE. UPON ARR IN RNO, I CONTACTED MAINT CTL, AND ADVISED THEM ALL THAT HAD TRANSPIRED. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT NO OTHER ACTION WAS REQUIRED. I WAS CONTACTED BY MY CHIEF PLT THE NEXT DAY, WHO INFORMED ME THAT WE NOW NEEDED TO WRITE UP POPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS AS AN 'INFO' ENTRY. I WAS UNAWARE OF THIS NEW PROC, AS APPARENTLY WAS MAINT CTL. I WAS STILL OPERATING ON THE PREMISE THAT THE ONLY 'INFO' WRITE-UP WAS FOR TKOF ABORTS FOR THE TKOF WARNING HORN. I NOW UNDERSTAND THIS NEW REQUIREMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.