Narrative:

I was departing for a 1 week business trip. I preflted the aircraft and all was well. Fuel and oil were full, chocks out, tie downs removed and everything seemed ready. My wife and I then loaded several bags and other items and I seated myself in the cockpit while she departed for home in her car. The taxi out and run-up were normal and I requested takeoff clearance from the tower, which was granted. The takeoff roll seemed ok but, upon rotation, there seemed to be a slight vibration in the controls. Then, as I was climbing through 1100 ft MSL, the vibration got slightly worse, which didn't seem normal to me, and I elected to return to cma. I informed the tower I had some sort of control problem and needed to return whereupon landing clearance was granted at once. The landing was uneventful but when I was taxiing in, the tower informed me there seemed to be something on my right rear horizontal stabilizer. (Which was not visible to the tower on taxi out and takeoff because it was on the opposite side.) I taxied to the run-up area and someone from the airport staff, who just happened by, removed my jacket from the stabilizer and handed it to me. The stabilizer and the jacket was undamaged by the incident. The jacket was just simply laid on the stabilizer by my wife and, in the loading process, simply forgotten. I boarded the aircraft from the side opposite the jacket, so I didn't see it either. The vibration in the controls was simply the jacket flapping in the wind, but I had no way of knowing that and assumed the worst. Had I elected to continue the flight the jacket would most likely have blown off, but the possibility exists that something worse could have happened and I could have had a severe control problem. Therefore, the decision to return upon sensing something was not normal was probably a good one. I've given this event considerable thought and the only way I can see to have prevented this was to have preflted the aircraft after the loading took place, or at least done another walkaround after everything was ready and before starting, which seems like overkill. In the future I will load first and then perform the preflight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA PLT MAKES AN AIRBORNE RETURN DUE TO CTL VIBRATION DETERMINED TO BE THE RESULT OF A PERSONAL JACKET LEFT ON THE ELEVATOR.

Narrative: I WAS DEPARTING FOR A 1 WK BUSINESS TRIP. I PREFLTED THE ACFT AND ALL WAS WELL. FUEL AND OIL WERE FULL, CHOCKS OUT, TIE DOWNS REMOVED AND EVERYTHING SEEMED READY. MY WIFE AND I THEN LOADED SEVERAL BAGS AND OTHER ITEMS AND I SEATED MYSELF IN THE COCKPIT WHILE SHE DEPARTED FOR HOME IN HER CAR. THE TAXI OUT AND RUN-UP WERE NORMAL AND I REQUESTED TKOF CLRNC FROM THE TWR, WHICH WAS GRANTED. THE TKOF ROLL SEEMED OK BUT, UPON ROTATION, THERE SEEMED TO BE A SLIGHT VIBRATION IN THE CTLS. THEN, AS I WAS CLBING THROUGH 1100 FT MSL, THE VIBRATION GOT SLIGHTLY WORSE, WHICH DIDN'T SEEM NORMAL TO ME, AND I ELECTED TO RETURN TO CMA. I INFORMED THE TWR I HAD SOME SORT OF CTL PROB AND NEEDED TO RETURN WHEREUPON LNDG CLRNC WAS GRANTED AT ONCE. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL BUT WHEN I WAS TAXIING IN, THE TWR INFORMED ME THERE SEEMED TO BE SOMETHING ON MY R REAR HORIZ STABILIZER. (WHICH WAS NOT VISIBLE TO THE TWR ON TAXI OUT AND TKOF BECAUSE IT WAS ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE.) I TAXIED TO THE RUN-UP AREA AND SOMEONE FROM THE ARPT STAFF, WHO JUST HAPPENED BY, REMOVED MY JACKET FROM THE STABILIZER AND HANDED IT TO ME. THE STABILIZER AND THE JACKET WAS UNDAMAGED BY THE INCIDENT. THE JACKET WAS JUST SIMPLY LAID ON THE STABILIZER BY MY WIFE AND, IN THE LOADING PROCESS, SIMPLY FORGOTTEN. I BOARDED THE ACFT FROM THE SIDE OPPOSITE THE JACKET, SO I DIDN'T SEE IT EITHER. THE VIBRATION IN THE CTLS WAS SIMPLY THE JACKET FLAPPING IN THE WIND, BUT I HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING THAT AND ASSUMED THE WORST. HAD I ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE FLT THE JACKET WOULD MOST LIKELY HAVE BLOWN OFF, BUT THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT SOMETHING WORSE COULD HAVE HAPPENED AND I COULD HAVE HAD A SEVERE CTL PROB. THEREFORE, THE DECISION TO RETURN UPON SENSING SOMETHING WAS NOT NORMAL WAS PROBABLY A GOOD ONE. I'VE GIVEN THIS EVENT CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT AND THE ONLY WAY I CAN SEE TO HAVE PREVENTED THIS WAS TO HAVE PREFLTED THE ACFT AFTER THE LOADING TOOK PLACE, OR AT LEAST DONE ANOTHER WALKAROUND AFTER EVERYTHING WAS READY AND BEFORE STARTING, WHICH SEEMS LIKE OVERKILL. IN THE FUTURE I WILL LOAD FIRST AND THEN PERFORM THE PREFLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.