Narrative:

First officer was the PF. Captain was the PNF. MEL prior to takeoff was yaw damper #2 inoperative. At XA21Z, at FL350, 'smoke forward cargo detection fault' and 'smoke aft cargo detection ECAM' occurred. I told the first officer to keep flying and handle ATC while I ran the ECAM. Upon confirming with dispatch that we had no live animals in cargo, closed the afo isolation valves as per ECAM. I informed the purser of the situation and asked the cabin crew to be extra vigilant for any unusual smells or signs of heat. Approximately 50 NM west of ord at XD07Z, we got 'navigation ir 3 fault ECAM.' I ran the ECAM and, as indications were that the 'ir' might be available in 'att,' I selected 'att' on 'ir 3' and entered heading data on the CDU. At XD15Z, we got 'navigation 1 fault ECAM.' I lost my display, aircraft reverted to 'altitude law' with a loss of autothrust, autoflt, autoplt off, and navigation GPWS fault. With these indications, I deemed that the first officer should continue to fly and handle ATC while I ran the ECAM's and checklists. We decided to divert to ord with coordination with dispatch. We discussed declaring an emergency and decided, at this time, to request priority handling. ATC gave us immediate vectors for the bdf arrival. I called the purser to the flight deck and appraised him of the situation, intended diversion and requested he do a cabin advisory. The first officer was doing a great job of flying and dealing with ATC and we worked closely with each other to insure that neither one of us was getting overloaded with our tasks. While talking to approach control, we got a 'navigation heading discrepancy ECAM' and we informed ATC that we had unreliable navigation and compasses. I kept attempting to input heading into the CDU using the standby compass, but the situation was deteriorating, so we requested ATC to 'start and stop' turns to set us up for ILS runway 27L, the longest runway into the wind. Landing weight was 141000 pounds, night VMC (VMC a plus). No yaw damper. We planned flap 3 degrees, as per checklist. I thought it prudent to ask for emergency equipment standing by in case of any additional failures. As we knew that we would go into direct law once the gear was lowered, the first officer wisely had the aircraft stable and trimmed, on speed, flaps 3 degrees and delayed extending the gear until the OM. An uneventful final approach and smooth landing were accomplished, followed by a normal taxi in to the gate. It can be done. I believe that the superior flying skills of the first officer combined with solid CRM, particularly making sure that neither one of us was unduly over saturated (we were definitely saturated) contributed to the successful outcome of this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CREW HAD MULTIPLE EQUIP FAILURES IN ZAU CLASS A. THE CREW DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED TO ORD.

Narrative: FO WAS THE PF. CAPT WAS THE PNF. MEL PRIOR TO TKOF WAS YAW DAMPER #2 INOP. AT XA21Z, AT FL350, 'SMOKE FORWARD CARGO DETECTION FAULT' AND 'SMOKE AFT CARGO DETECTION ECAM' OCCURRED. I TOLD THE FO TO KEEP FLYING AND HANDLE ATC WHILE I RAN THE ECAM. UPON CONFIRMING WITH DISPATCH THAT WE HAD NO LIVE ANIMALS IN CARGO, CLOSED THE AFO ISOLATION VALVES AS PER ECAM. I INFORMED THE PURSER OF THE SIT AND ASKED THE CABIN CREW TO BE EXTRA VIGILANT FOR ANY UNUSUAL SMELLS OR SIGNS OF HEAT. APPROX 50 NM W OF ORD AT XD07Z, WE GOT 'NAV IR 3 FAULT ECAM.' I RAN THE ECAM AND, AS INDICATIONS WERE THAT THE 'IR' MIGHT BE AVAILABLE IN 'ATT,' I SELECTED 'ATT' ON 'IR 3' AND ENTERED HEADING DATA ON THE CDU. AT XD15Z, WE GOT 'NAV 1 FAULT ECAM.' I LOST MY DISPLAY, ACFT REVERTED TO 'ALT LAW' WITH A LOSS OF AUTOTHRUST, AUTOFLT, AUTOPLT OFF, AND NAV GPWS FAULT. WITH THESE INDICATIONS, I DEEMED THAT THE FO SHOULD CONTINUE TO FLY AND HANDLE ATC WHILE I RAN THE ECAM'S AND CHKLISTS. WE DECIDED TO DIVERT TO ORD WITH COORD WITH DISPATCH. WE DISCUSSED DECLARING AN EMER AND DECIDED, AT THIS TIME, TO REQUEST PRIORITY HANDLING. ATC GAVE US IMMEDIATE VECTORS FOR THE BDF ARR. I CALLED THE PURSER TO THE FLT DECK AND APPRAISED HIM OF THE SIT, INTENDED DIVERSION AND REQUESTED HE DO A CABIN ADVISORY. THE FO WAS DOING A GREAT JOB OF FLYING AND DEALING WITH ATC AND WE WORKED CLOSELY WITH EACH OTHER TO INSURE THAT NEITHER ONE OF US WAS GETTING OVERLOADED WITH OUR TASKS. WHILE TALKING TO APCH CTL, WE GOT A 'NAV HDG DISCREPANCY ECAM' AND WE INFORMED ATC THAT WE HAD UNRELIABLE NAV AND COMPASSES. I KEPT ATTEMPTING TO INPUT HDG INTO THE CDU USING THE STANDBY COMPASS, BUT THE SIT WAS DETERIORATING, SO WE REQUESTED ATC TO 'START AND STOP' TURNS TO SET US UP FOR ILS RWY 27L, THE LONGEST RWY INTO THE WIND. LNDG WT WAS 141000 LBS, NIGHT VMC (VMC A PLUS). NO YAW DAMPER. WE PLANNED FLAP 3 DEGS, AS PER CHKLIST. I THOUGHT IT PRUDENT TO ASK FOR EMER EQUIP STANDING BY IN CASE OF ANY ADDITIONAL FAILURES. AS WE KNEW THAT WE WOULD GO INTO DIRECT LAW ONCE THE GEAR WAS LOWERED, THE FO WISELY HAD THE ACFT STABLE AND TRIMMED, ON SPD, FLAPS 3 DEGS AND DELAYED EXTENDING THE GEAR UNTIL THE OM. AN UNEVENTFUL FINAL APCH AND SMOOTH LNDG WERE ACCOMPLISHED, FOLLOWED BY A NORMAL TAXI IN TO THE GATE. IT CAN BE DONE. I BELIEVE THAT THE SUPERIOR FLYING SKILLS OF THE FO COMBINED WITH SOLID CRM, PARTICULARLY MAKING SURE THAT NEITHER ONE OF US WAS UNDULY OVER SATURATED (WE WERE DEFINITELY SATURATED) CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.