Narrative:

On dec/tue/03, I operated flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. After preflting the aircraft interior and reading the maintenance logbook, I discovered that the aircraft had come from maintenance and needed a security check and all of the first flight of the day checks. After both my first officer and I successfully tested our oxygen masks, I noticed that we only had 800 psi showing on EICAS display 2. I made a write-up in the aircraft logbook and called maintenance to have them service the crew oxygen. They came out to the aircraft and took the logbook from the flight deck. After several mins, the mechanic turned the logbook and told me that we had an EICAS display indication problem. He deferred the EICAS display oxygen indication and told me that we had approximately 1700 psi, handed me the logbook and abruptly left. I reviewed the deferral in the logbook and the MEL in our flight standards manual. Everything was complied with according to the deferral and the MEL. Upon further review of the logbook, I noticed that the mechanic did not provide us with a new maintenance base release. Once again I called maintenance to have them provide us with a maintenance base release. The same mechanic who was at the aircraft to perform the deferral came back to sign off the maintenance base release. Both times when he was at our aircraft, he had a very bad attitude towards my first officer and myself. Almost as if it was a bother for him to come out and do his job, especially the second time when he had to come back and do what should have been done the first time he was there. Now that all of the logbook paperwork had been properly done, we departed for ZZZ2 16 mins late. We had an uneventful flight. The oxygen EICAS display deferral requires that the crew oxygen pressure must be verified to be within the normal range for the outside air temperature and the required crew members prior to each flight. Upon arrival in ZZZ1, a mechanic, who was there to verify our oxygen pressure and continue to comply with the deferral, met us. He took the logbook and left. A few mins alter, he returned to the flight deck and told me that the pressure reading was zero. He asked us to test our oxygen masks. We did and they did not test. They were consistent with not having any oxygen pressure. The mechanic left the flight deck and went to check the oxygen again. He returned to the flight deck and said that he svced the crew oxygen and asked us to again test our masks. We did and they tested properly. The mechanic went back outside the aircraft to check our oxygen pressure after we tested our masks. He returned and again told us we did not have any oxygen pressure. Upon further investigation, he discovered that the crew oxygen bottle had been turned off. He turned it on and had us check our oxygen masks once again. They tested properly. The mechanic left the flight deck and went outside once again. When he returned, he informed us that we had enough oxygen for 3 crew members according to the outside air temperature, and that the pressure indication from the outside of the aircraft on the oxygen service panel (ironically) matched the pressure on the EICAS display. Now that we were both satisfied that the entire flight deck crew had sufficient oxygen to safely fly and that the deferral was once again complied with, the flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ departed and was uneventful. Maintenance sent us up in the sky with absolutely no crew oxygen. Furthermore, they deferred the indication on the EICAS display instead of probing deeper into the oxygen system to see if the crew oxygen was actually turned on. However, this probably began earlier that morning when scheduled maintenance was performed and the crew oxygen system was perhaps shut off and never turned back on. And, they assured us that we had plenty of oxygen for the entire flight deck crew when in fact we had none.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CANADAIR CL-65 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE CREW OXYGEN BOTTLE SHUTOFF. TECHNICIAN HAD DEFERRED THE EICAS OXYGEN WARNING.

Narrative: ON DEC/TUE/03, I OPERATED FLT FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1. AFTER PREFLTING THE ACFT INTERIOR AND READING THE MAINT LOGBOOK, I DISCOVERED THAT THE ACFT HAD COME FROM MAINT AND NEEDED A SECURITY CHK AND ALL OF THE FIRST FLT OF THE DAY CHKS. AFTER BOTH MY FO AND I SUCCESSFULLY TESTED OUR OXYGEN MASKS, I NOTICED THAT WE ONLY HAD 800 PSI SHOWING ON EICAS DISPLAY 2. I MADE A WRITE-UP IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK AND CALLED MAINT TO HAVE THEM SVC THE CREW OXYGEN. THEY CAME OUT TO THE ACFT AND TOOK THE LOGBOOK FROM THE FLT DECK. AFTER SEVERAL MINS, THE MECH TURNED THE LOGBOOK AND TOLD ME THAT WE HAD AN EICAS DISPLAY INDICATION PROB. HE DEFERRED THE EICAS DISPLAY OXYGEN INDICATION AND TOLD ME THAT WE HAD APPROX 1700 PSI, HANDED ME THE LOGBOOK AND ABRUPTLY LEFT. I REVIEWED THE DEFERRAL IN THE LOGBOOK AND THE MEL IN OUR FLT STANDARDS MANUAL. EVERYTHING WAS COMPLIED WITH ACCORDING TO THE DEFERRAL AND THE MEL. UPON FURTHER REVIEW OF THE LOGBOOK, I NOTICED THAT THE MECH DID NOT PROVIDE US WITH A NEW MAINT BASE RELEASE. ONCE AGAIN I CALLED MAINT TO HAVE THEM PROVIDE US WITH A MAINT BASE RELEASE. THE SAME MECH WHO WAS AT THE ACFT TO PERFORM THE DEFERRAL CAME BACK TO SIGN OFF THE MAINT BASE RELEASE. BOTH TIMES WHEN HE WAS AT OUR ACFT, HE HAD A VERY BAD ATTITUDE TOWARDS MY FO AND MYSELF. ALMOST AS IF IT WAS A BOTHER FOR HIM TO COME OUT AND DO HIS JOB, ESPECIALLY THE SECOND TIME WHEN HE HAD TO COME BACK AND DO WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE THE FIRST TIME HE WAS THERE. NOW THAT ALL OF THE LOGBOOK PAPERWORK HAD BEEN PROPERLY DONE, WE DEPARTED FOR ZZZ2 16 MINS LATE. WE HAD AN UNEVENTFUL FLT. THE OXYGEN EICAS DISPLAY DEFERRAL REQUIRES THAT THE CREW OXYGEN PRESSURE MUST BE VERIFIED TO BE WITHIN THE NORMAL RANGE FOR THE OUTSIDE AIR TEMP AND THE REQUIRED CREW MEMBERS PRIOR TO EACH FLT. UPON ARR IN ZZZ1, A MECH, WHO WAS THERE TO VERIFY OUR OXYGEN PRESSURE AND CONTINUE TO COMPLY WITH THE DEFERRAL, MET US. HE TOOK THE LOGBOOK AND LEFT. A FEW MINS ALTER, HE RETURNED TO THE FLT DECK AND TOLD ME THAT THE PRESSURE READING WAS ZERO. HE ASKED US TO TEST OUR OXYGEN MASKS. WE DID AND THEY DID NOT TEST. THEY WERE CONSISTENT WITH NOT HAVING ANY OXYGEN PRESSURE. THE MECH LEFT THE FLT DECK AND WENT TO CHK THE OXYGEN AGAIN. HE RETURNED TO THE FLT DECK AND SAID THAT HE SVCED THE CREW OXYGEN AND ASKED US TO AGAIN TEST OUR MASKS. WE DID AND THEY TESTED PROPERLY. THE MECH WENT BACK OUTSIDE THE ACFT TO CHK OUR OXYGEN PRESSURE AFTER WE TESTED OUR MASKS. HE RETURNED AND AGAIN TOLD US WE DID NOT HAVE ANY OXYGEN PRESSURE. UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION, HE DISCOVERED THAT THE CREW OXYGEN BOTTLE HAD BEEN TURNED OFF. HE TURNED IT ON AND HAD US CHK OUR OXYGEN MASKS ONCE AGAIN. THEY TESTED PROPERLY. THE MECH LEFT THE FLT DECK AND WENT OUTSIDE ONCE AGAIN. WHEN HE RETURNED, HE INFORMED US THAT WE HAD ENOUGH OXYGEN FOR 3 CREW MEMBERS ACCORDING TO THE OUTSIDE AIR TEMP, AND THAT THE PRESSURE INDICATION FROM THE OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT ON THE OXYGEN SVC PANEL (IRONICALLY) MATCHED THE PRESSURE ON THE EICAS DISPLAY. NOW THAT WE WERE BOTH SATISFIED THAT THE ENTIRE FLT DECK CREW HAD SUFFICIENT OXYGEN TO SAFELY FLY AND THAT THE DEFERRAL WAS ONCE AGAIN COMPLIED WITH, THE FLT FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ DEPARTED AND WAS UNEVENTFUL. MAINT SENT US UP IN THE SKY WITH ABSOLUTELY NO CREW OXYGEN. FURTHERMORE, THEY DEFERRED THE INDICATION ON THE EICAS DISPLAY INSTEAD OF PROBING DEEPER INTO THE OXYGEN SYS TO SEE IF THE CREW OXYGEN WAS ACTUALLY TURNED ON. HOWEVER, THIS PROBABLY BEGAN EARLIER THAT MORNING WHEN SCHEDULED MAINT WAS PERFORMED AND THE CREW OXYGEN SYS WAS PERHAPS SHUT OFF AND NEVER TURNED BACK ON. AND, THEY ASSURED US THAT WE HAD PLENTY OF OXYGEN FOR THE ENTIRE FLT DECK CREW WHEN IN FACT WE HAD NONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.