Narrative:

Our day started with the first officer deadheading from mco to sju at XA10 and the captain deadheading from mia to sju at XA25 to fly flight from sju to lax, which was supposed to depart from sju at XE15. The flight was scheduled for 7 hours 29 mins. During the flight, the captain and I began discussing the legality of the flight without a relief pilot. We both looked in flight manual, part 1, section 3, and section 8 to see what the legality was for having an additional pilot. We both looked at subpart right 'flight time limitations.' our actual flight time did not meet the 8 hour requirement. We commented on the fact that this was going to be a long flight and with the deadheading involved, that a relief pilot would have been a good idea. As we got closer to lax and prepared for descent, the captain (who was the PF) commented that he was ok, but getting tired from such a long flight. I monitored his behavior throughout the flight to make sure that he was ok and I backed him up to verify all the actions he was taking to comply with ATC instructions. After an uneventful landing on runway 25L, lax tower asked if we could clear at taxiway M and if not, go to taxiway T. The captain said yes, he could clear at taxiway M, since we were already there and I informed the tower that yes we could make taxiway M. Tower then said that we were cleared to exit at taxiway M and to hold short of runway 25. I informed tower that we would exit on taxiway M and hold short of runway 25R. We came almost to a complete stop on runway 25L so that we could make the 90 degree turn off onto taxiway M. During this time, tower was giving another aircraft takeoff clearance for runway 25R. After we exited the runway, we were taxiing very, very slowly -- slower than a brisk walk. I looked to my right and I saw a commuter aircraft holding in position for takeoff on runway 25R. I noticed that our aircraft was still moving forward slightly and I yelled 'stop!' he stopped the aircraft. He asked me if he crossed the hold short line and I said yes, at which time tower instructed the aircraft holding in position to abort the takeoff clearance. The tower then instructed us to cross runway 25R and gave me a number for the captain to call for a possible violation. The captain called the tower and they told him that it was his fault by allowing the aircraft to continue to roll past the hold short line. Supplemental information from acn 603118: me and my first officer couldn't believe this schedule. It was absolutely too long without a relief pilot. We received several rertes during the flight and I was sitting in the sun for the duration. Needless to say, we were both fighting fatigue during the flight, consuming many cups of coffee and fluids during the flight. We also researched our part 1 for the legality and couldn't find anything about deadheading counting against flying time. We were both very diligent on our approach and landing with all our bases covered, approach briefing, route 2 built into the FMC for quick runway change. I had my airport diagram clamped to the approach holder for ready reference. We touched down and tower asked if we could make taxiway K as there was an aircraft holding short of runway 25R on taxiway M further down. At this point, we had been on duty 11 hours 13 mins. I guess since I was so relieved that the flight had gone so well in my exhausted, fatigued state, I went numb to situational awareness. Before I could realize what I had done, runway 25R was approaching and the boundary (double line) had been crossed. If there is an overwhelming factor in this incident, it must be the state of fatigue that this crew was experiencing. I was weak in the legs when I tried to walk and probably sounded suspect to the tower when I called. Recommendations: 1) a relief pilot when the flying time exceeds 8 hours -- that includes deadhead time. 2) a note in the operations pages that in lax, the parallel runway comes up quick (runway 25R) after turning off runway 25L. If ever in my life I could rewind 10 seconds of my life and do it over again, it would be the few seconds I experienced yesterday.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION BY A B767 WHEN FLT CREW ALLOWED ACFT TO CROSS THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 25R AT LAX, CA.

Narrative: OUR DAY STARTED WITH THE FO DEADHEADING FROM MCO TO SJU AT XA10 AND THE CAPT DEADHEADING FROM MIA TO SJU AT XA25 TO FLY FLT FROM SJU TO LAX, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO DEPART FROM SJU AT XE15. THE FLT WAS SCHEDULED FOR 7 HRS 29 MINS. DURING THE FLT, THE CAPT AND I BEGAN DISCUSSING THE LEGALITY OF THE FLT WITHOUT A RELIEF PLT. WE BOTH LOOKED IN FLT MANUAL, PART 1, SECTION 3, AND SECTION 8 TO SEE WHAT THE LEGALITY WAS FOR HAVING AN ADDITIONAL PLT. WE BOTH LOOKED AT SUBPART R 'FLT TIME LIMITATIONS.' OUR ACTUAL FLT TIME DID NOT MEET THE 8 HR REQUIREMENT. WE COMMENTED ON THE FACT THAT THIS WAS GOING TO BE A LONG FLT AND WITH THE DEADHEADING INVOLVED, THAT A RELIEF PLT WOULD HAVE BEEN A GOOD IDEA. AS WE GOT CLOSER TO LAX AND PREPARED FOR DSCNT, THE CAPT (WHO WAS THE PF) COMMENTED THAT HE WAS OK, BUT GETTING TIRED FROM SUCH A LONG FLT. I MONITORED HIS BEHAVIOR THROUGHOUT THE FLT TO MAKE SURE THAT HE WAS OK AND I BACKED HIM UP TO VERIFY ALL THE ACTIONS HE WAS TAKING TO COMPLY WITH ATC INSTRUCTIONS. AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG ON RWY 25L, LAX TWR ASKED IF WE COULD CLR AT TXWY M AND IF NOT, GO TO TXWY T. THE CAPT SAID YES, HE COULD CLR AT TXWY M, SINCE WE WERE ALREADY THERE AND I INFORMED THE TWR THAT YES WE COULD MAKE TXWY M. TWR THEN SAID THAT WE WERE CLRED TO EXIT AT TXWY M AND TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 25. I INFORMED TWR THAT WE WOULD EXIT ON TXWY M AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 25R. WE CAME ALMOST TO A COMPLETE STOP ON RWY 25L SO THAT WE COULD MAKE THE 90 DEG TURN OFF ONTO TXWY M. DURING THIS TIME, TWR WAS GIVING ANOTHER ACFT TKOF CLRNC FOR RWY 25R. AFTER WE EXITED THE RWY, WE WERE TAXIING VERY, VERY SLOWLY -- SLOWER THAN A BRISK WALK. I LOOKED TO MY R AND I SAW A COMMUTER ACFT HOLDING IN POS FOR TKOF ON RWY 25R. I NOTICED THAT OUR ACFT WAS STILL MOVING FORWARD SLIGHTLY AND I YELLED 'STOP!' HE STOPPED THE ACFT. HE ASKED ME IF HE CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE AND I SAID YES, AT WHICH TIME TWR INSTRUCTED THE ACFT HOLDING IN POS TO ABORT THE TKOF CLRNC. THE TWR THEN INSTRUCTED US TO CROSS RWY 25R AND GAVE ME A NUMBER FOR THE CAPT TO CALL FOR A POSSIBLE VIOLATION. THE CAPT CALLED THE TWR AND THEY TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS HIS FAULT BY ALLOWING THE ACFT TO CONTINUE TO ROLL PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 603118: ME AND MY FO COULDN'T BELIEVE THIS SCHEDULE. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY TOO LONG WITHOUT A RELIEF PLT. WE RECEIVED SEVERAL RERTES DURING THE FLT AND I WAS SITTING IN THE SUN FOR THE DURATION. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE WERE BOTH FIGHTING FATIGUE DURING THE FLT, CONSUMING MANY CUPS OF COFFEE AND FLUIDS DURING THE FLT. WE ALSO RESEARCHED OUR PART 1 FOR THE LEGALITY AND COULDN'T FIND ANYTHING ABOUT DEADHEADING COUNTING AGAINST FLYING TIME. WE WERE BOTH VERY DILIGENT ON OUR APCH AND LNDG WITH ALL OUR BASES COVERED, APCH BRIEFING, ROUTE 2 BUILT INTO THE FMC FOR QUICK RWY CHANGE. I HAD MY ARPT DIAGRAM CLAMPED TO THE APCH HOLDER FOR READY REF. WE TOUCHED DOWN AND TWR ASKED IF WE COULD MAKE TXWY K AS THERE WAS AN ACFT HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 25R ON TXWY M FURTHER DOWN. AT THIS POINT, WE HAD BEEN ON DUTY 11 HRS 13 MINS. I GUESS SINCE I WAS SO RELIEVED THAT THE FLT HAD GONE SO WELL IN MY EXHAUSTED, FATIGUED STATE, I WENT NUMB TO SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. BEFORE I COULD REALIZE WHAT I HAD DONE, RWY 25R WAS APCHING AND THE BOUNDARY (DOUBLE LINE) HAD BEEN CROSSED. IF THERE IS AN OVERWHELMING FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT, IT MUST BE THE STATE OF FATIGUE THAT THIS CREW WAS EXPERIENCING. I WAS WEAK IN THE LEGS WHEN I TRIED TO WALK AND PROBABLY SOUNDED SUSPECT TO THE TWR WHEN I CALLED. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) A RELIEF PLT WHEN THE FLYING TIME EXCEEDS 8 HRS -- THAT INCLUDES DEADHEAD TIME. 2) A NOTE IN THE OPS PAGES THAT IN LAX, THE PARALLEL RWY COMES UP QUICK (RWY 25R) AFTER TURNING OFF RWY 25L. IF EVER IN MY LIFE I COULD REWIND 10 SECONDS OF MY LIFE AND DO IT OVER AGAIN, IT WOULD BE THE FEW SECONDS I EXPERIENCED YESTERDAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.