Narrative:

In 11 yrs of flying as captain on the MD80, I've never encountered the sheer number of odd and abnormal distrs and/or occurrences during a single flight. It started with an unusual number of gate agents that were especially concerned about 'getting an out time,' in spite of the fact maintenance was at the aircraft making an exterior inspection of some sort, which by the way I was never informed of until we were ready to close the forward door. During pushback, we received a call from the cabin informing us of an ill passenger in the lavatory. We stopped the push and discussed the situation. After receiving an assurance that the passenger was back in their seat and would be alright to continue the flight, we continued the push. During taxi out while still in the ramp area, we received a second call about the same passenger that was back in the lavatory. At this point the flight attendants were concerned, so after discussing it with them, I decided to return to the gate. After making a u-turn in the alley way, and arranging to go back to the gate, we received a third call about the same passenger. Once again, I stopped the aircraft and had a lengthy discussion with the flight attendants. It was determined that indeed the passenger was back in their seat, that the passenger would be fine to continue the flight (which they were), so I rescinded the decision to return to the gate. On the second taxi out, we received a runway change. After reaching the departure runway (runway 32L), ATC advised us of a large hawk reported at midfield. From the taxiway we were cleared for takeoff. At this point I'm in the habit of briefly advancing the throttles for one last check of the pressurization (outflow wheel valve movement) and to doublechk the aircraft confign, and for the first time in 11 yrs on the MD80, I'm glad I did it. The flap warning sounded as we rounded the corner. A quick check revealed that the aircraft was properly configured but the takeoff confign flap wheel readout was wrong. The first officer quickly dialed the correct setting and canceled the warning. At that point we had just begun the takeoff roll (no airspeed indication yet) when I saw at midfield (perhaps 2000-3000 ft down the runway) the biggest flipping bird I'd ever seen -- right above the runway. At this point I'd had enough. I elected to discontinue the takeoff, and we rolled down to taxiway T6 and cleared the runway. The abort was very low speed. In fact, there was probably no airspeed indication. The distance from taxiway T10 where we began the takeoff roll to taxiway T6 where we cleared is about 2000 ft, so this was not a high speed abort. The primary decision to abort was for the bird, but considering the events leading up to the takeoff roll, I'd be lying if I didn't say the whole situation wasn't passing the 'gut check.' conclusion: you can never slow down and doublechk everything enough. Some days there is going to be more than can be safely handled. If I had to do it over, I probably would have returned to the gate the first time, and gone home -- which, as it turned out, I wish I had, because on the return flight from mco we had a medical emergency. Supplemental information from acn 601027: I felt this was a good decision as our flight was progressively getting worse. We taxied clear, re-ran the checklist and completed the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A SERIES OF DISTRS OCCUR LEADING UP TO THE FINAL ONE ON THE RWY AT ORD THAT ENDS IN A REJECTED TKOF.

Narrative: IN 11 YRS OF FLYING AS CAPT ON THE MD80, I'VE NEVER ENCOUNTERED THE SHEER NUMBER OF ODD AND ABNORMAL DISTRS AND/OR OCCURRENCES DURING A SINGLE FLT. IT STARTED WITH AN UNUSUAL NUMBER OF GATE AGENTS THAT WERE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT 'GETTING AN OUT TIME,' IN SPITE OF THE FACT MAINT WAS AT THE ACFT MAKING AN EXTERIOR INSPECTION OF SOME SORT, WHICH BY THE WAY I WAS NEVER INFORMED OF UNTIL WE WERE READY TO CLOSE THE FORWARD DOOR. DURING PUSHBACK, WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE CABIN INFORMING US OF AN ILL PAX IN THE LAVATORY. WE STOPPED THE PUSH AND DISCUSSED THE SIT. AFTER RECEIVING AN ASSURANCE THAT THE PAX WAS BACK IN THEIR SEAT AND WOULD BE ALRIGHT TO CONTINUE THE FLT, WE CONTINUED THE PUSH. DURING TAXI OUT WHILE STILL IN THE RAMP AREA, WE RECEIVED A SECOND CALL ABOUT THE SAME PAX THAT WAS BACK IN THE LAVATORY. AT THIS POINT THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE CONCERNED, SO AFTER DISCUSSING IT WITH THEM, I DECIDED TO RETURN TO THE GATE. AFTER MAKING A U-TURN IN THE ALLEY WAY, AND ARRANGING TO GO BACK TO THE GATE, WE RECEIVED A THIRD CALL ABOUT THE SAME PAX. ONCE AGAIN, I STOPPED THE ACFT AND HAD A LENGTHY DISCUSSION WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT INDEED THE PAX WAS BACK IN THEIR SEAT, THAT THE PAX WOULD BE FINE TO CONTINUE THE FLT (WHICH THEY WERE), SO I RESCINDED THE DECISION TO RETURN TO THE GATE. ON THE SECOND TAXI OUT, WE RECEIVED A RWY CHANGE. AFTER REACHING THE DEP RWY (RWY 32L), ATC ADVISED US OF A LARGE HAWK RPTED AT MIDFIELD. FROM THE TXWY WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. AT THIS POINT I'M IN THE HABIT OF BRIEFLY ADVANCING THE THROTTLES FOR ONE LAST CHK OF THE PRESSURIZATION (OUTFLOW WHEEL VALVE MOVEMENT) AND TO DOUBLECHK THE ACFT CONFIGN, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 11 YRS ON THE MD80, I'M GLAD I DID IT. THE FLAP WARNING SOUNDED AS WE ROUNDED THE CORNER. A QUICK CHK REVEALED THAT THE ACFT WAS PROPERLY CONFIGURED BUT THE TKOF CONFIGN FLAP WHEEL READOUT WAS WRONG. THE FO QUICKLY DIALED THE CORRECT SETTING AND CANCELED THE WARNING. AT THAT POINT WE HAD JUST BEGUN THE TKOF ROLL (NO AIRSPD INDICATION YET) WHEN I SAW AT MIDFIELD (PERHAPS 2000-3000 FT DOWN THE RWY) THE BIGGEST FLIPPING BIRD I'D EVER SEEN -- RIGHT ABOVE THE RWY. AT THIS POINT I'D HAD ENOUGH. I ELECTED TO DISCONTINUE THE TKOF, AND WE ROLLED DOWN TO TXWY T6 AND CLRED THE RWY. THE ABORT WAS VERY LOW SPD. IN FACT, THERE WAS PROBABLY NO AIRSPD INDICATION. THE DISTANCE FROM TXWY T10 WHERE WE BEGAN THE TKOF ROLL TO TXWY T6 WHERE WE CLRED IS ABOUT 2000 FT, SO THIS WAS NOT A HIGH SPD ABORT. THE PRIMARY DECISION TO ABORT WAS FOR THE BIRD, BUT CONSIDERING THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE TKOF ROLL, I'D BE LYING IF I DIDN'T SAY THE WHOLE SIT WASN'T PASSING THE 'GUT CHK.' CONCLUSION: YOU CAN NEVER SLOW DOWN AND DOUBLECHK EVERYTHING ENOUGH. SOME DAYS THERE IS GOING TO BE MORE THAN CAN BE SAFELY HANDLED. IF I HAD TO DO IT OVER, I PROBABLY WOULD HAVE RETURNED TO THE GATE THE FIRST TIME, AND GONE HOME -- WHICH, AS IT TURNED OUT, I WISH I HAD, BECAUSE ON THE RETURN FLT FROM MCO WE HAD A MEDICAL EMER. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 601027: I FELT THIS WAS A GOOD DECISION AS OUR FLT WAS PROGRESSIVELY GETTING WORSE. WE TAXIED CLR, RE-RAN THE CHKLIST AND COMPLETED THE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.