Narrative:

On approach being radar vectored to runway 9L at fll. ATC gave us a heading of 220 degrees and a clearance to descend and maintain 3000 ft. He instructed us to hold an airspeed of 180 KTS. We complied with ATC instructions and reported runway in sight. The controller pointed out traffic at our 11 O'clock position. We reported traffic in sight, a B737. The controller then cleared us for the visual approach to runway 9L to follow a B737. He instructed us to maintain 170 KTS until 5 mi out and added that 170 KTS should be good for traffic separation. We perceived the 170 KT clearance as an advisory instruction due to the controller's phraseology with the word 'should,' as well as the visual approach clearance behind the traffic. As we turned onto final approach, we began to close on the B737. The TCASII showed the traffic in front of us to be approximately 4 mi and closing at our speed of 170 KTS. We also had wake turbulence considerations to deal with. We began a speed reduction of about 10-15 KTS at 7 mi final. We then contacted tower as instructed and the tower cleared us to land #2 behind the B737. At the marker, we configured for landing and began to slow to our final approach speed, as our company approach profile indicates. We completed all appropriate checklists and landed at fll on runway 9L. After clearing the runway, we wre given our taxi instructions to the gate. While taxiing to the gate, the ground controller gave us a phone number and instructed us to call miami approach TRACON. After shutting down the aircraft and completing all appropriate checklists, I called the number as instructed. I spoke to a controller who wanted to know if we slowed down and why we slowed down. I told him our situation and the instructions that we received, and how we perceived the instructions. He informed me that the tapes were going to be pulled, because he had to instruct a cpr jet to go missed approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB135 CLRED FOR VISUAL APCH TO FLL SLOWS TO FOLLOW B737 RESULTING IN A GAR WITH FOLLOWING TFC.

Narrative: ON APCH BEING RADAR VECTORED TO RWY 9L AT FLL. ATC GAVE US A HDG OF 220 DEGS AND A CLRNC TO DSND AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT. HE INSTRUCTED US TO HOLD AN AIRSPD OF 180 KTS. WE COMPLIED WITH ATC INSTRUCTIONS AND RPTED RWY IN SIGHT. THE CTLR POINTED OUT TFC AT OUR 11 O'CLOCK POS. WE RPTED TFC IN SIGHT, A B737. THE CTLR THEN CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 9L TO FOLLOW A B737. HE INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 170 KTS UNTIL 5 MI OUT AND ADDED THAT 170 KTS SHOULD BE GOOD FOR TFC SEPARATION. WE PERCEIVED THE 170 KT CLRNC AS AN ADVISORY INSTRUCTION DUE TO THE CTLR'S PHRASEOLOGY WITH THE WORD 'SHOULD,' AS WELL AS THE VISUAL APCH CLRNC BEHIND THE TFC. AS WE TURNED ONTO FINAL APCH, WE BEGAN TO CLOSE ON THE B737. THE TCASII SHOWED THE TFC IN FRONT OF US TO BE APPROX 4 MI AND CLOSING AT OUR SPD OF 170 KTS. WE ALSO HAD WAKE TURB CONSIDERATIONS TO DEAL WITH. WE BEGAN A SPD REDUCTION OF ABOUT 10-15 KTS AT 7 MI FINAL. WE THEN CONTACTED TWR AS INSTRUCTED AND THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND #2 BEHIND THE B737. AT THE MARKER, WE CONFIGURED FOR LNDG AND BEGAN TO SLOW TO OUR FINAL APCH SPD, AS OUR COMPANY APCH PROFILE INDICATES. WE COMPLETED ALL APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS AND LANDED AT FLL ON RWY 9L. AFTER CLRING THE RWY, WE WRE GIVEN OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GATE. WHILE TAXIING TO THE GATE, THE GND CTLR GAVE US A PHONE NUMBER AND INSTRUCTED US TO CALL MIAMI APCH TRACON. AFTER SHUTTING DOWN THE ACFT AND COMPLETING ALL APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS, I CALLED THE NUMBER AS INSTRUCTED. I SPOKE TO A CTLR WHO WANTED TO KNOW IF WE SLOWED DOWN AND WHY WE SLOWED DOWN. I TOLD HIM OUR SIT AND THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT WE RECEIVED, AND HOW WE PERCEIVED THE INSTRUCTIONS. HE INFORMED ME THAT THE TAPES WERE GOING TO BE PULLED, BECAUSE HE HAD TO INSTRUCT A CPR JET TO GO MISSED APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.