Narrative:

We departed reagan national, assigned runway 1, P-56 avoidance procedure. The P-56 avoidance procedure requires an intercept and track outbound on the 328 degree radial off the dca VOR. Prior to pushback, the radios were set up in error, where idca was in the primary and dca was in the standby. After takeoff, and climbing through approximately 400 ft AGL, a left turn was initiated to a heading of 330 degrees. The NAVAID was indicating that we were far west off course, (full scale). I felt this was a normal indication since we rotated and began our turn at or before crossing the dca VOR, and that we were inside or west of the 328 degree radial. As we climbed out, I started a gradual turn to a heading of approximately 340 degrees, to intercept the 328 degree radial. As we continued to climb out on the 340 degree heading, ATC queried us as to what heading we were on. We advised them 'three-forty.' ATC then asked why we were on that heading. It was at this time that I noticed idca had been improperly selected, and dca was still in standby. I began an immediate turn to the left to avoid P-56. I believe that at the time ATC was inquiring about our heading, we were heading toward the naval observatory, until immediate corrective action was taken. I believe we did not penetrate P-56. A major factor in this incident was due to the closeness in station identifiers between the localizer for runway 1, and the dca VOR, (idca, dca). I would highly recommend renaming possibly the localizer identifier so as to differentiate it from the VOR, (for example, irea). Another factor contributing to this incident were the winds aloft. They were indicating approximately 20-25 KTS out of the west. No correction was given to this, since we were receiving erroneous navigation information. Lastly, pilot error in setting up departure navigation radios. While I was setting up the radio, I knew I had the dca VOR dialed in, and I saw 'dca' as the selected NAVAID, however I didn't notice the 'I' in front of it. I never xferred the standby dca frequency to the primary navigation position, thus it remained in the standby position. Supplemental information from acn 600726: contributing factors include both pilots' complacency and a long day of work. Preventive actions could include less pilot complacency, better instrument set-up and xchk, and better crew coordination.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF CL65 NEARLY PENETRATE P-56 DUE TO IMPROPERLY CONFIGURED VOR RECEIVERS.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED REAGAN NATIONAL, ASSIGNED RWY 1, P-56 AVOIDANCE PROC. THE P-56 AVOIDANCE PROC REQUIRES AN INTERCEPT AND TRACK OUTBOUND ON THE 328 DEG RADIAL OFF THE DCA VOR. PRIOR TO PUSHBACK, THE RADIOS WERE SET UP IN ERROR, WHERE IDCA WAS IN THE PRIMARY AND DCA WAS IN THE STANDBY. AFTER TKOF, AND CLBING THROUGH APPROX 400 FT AGL, A L TURN WAS INITIATED TO A HEADING OF 330 DEGS. THE NAVAID WAS INDICATING THAT WE WERE FAR W OFF COURSE, (FULL SCALE). I FELT THIS WAS A NORMAL INDICATION SINCE WE ROTATED AND BEGAN OUR TURN AT OR BEFORE XING THE DCA VOR, AND THAT WE WERE INSIDE OR W OF THE 328 DEG RADIAL. AS WE CLBED OUT, I STARTED A GRADUAL TURN TO A HEADING OF APPROX 340 DEGS, TO INTERCEPT THE 328 DEG RADIAL. AS WE CONTINUED TO CLB OUT ON THE 340 DEG HEADING, ATC QUERIED US AS TO WHAT HEADING WE WERE ON. WE ADVISED THEM 'THREE-FORTY.' ATC THEN ASKED WHY WE WERE ON THAT HEADING. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT I NOTICED IDCA HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY SELECTED, AND DCA WAS STILL IN STANDBY. I BEGAN AN IMMEDIATE TURN TO THE L TO AVOID P-56. I BELIEVE THAT AT THE TIME ATC WAS INQUIRING ABOUT OUR HEADING, WE WERE HEADING TOWARD THE NAVAL OBSERVATORY, UNTIL IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN. I BELIEVE WE DID NOT PENETRATE P-56. A MAJOR FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT WAS DUE TO THE CLOSENESS IN STATION IDENTIFIERS BTWN THE LOC FOR RWY 1, AND THE DCA VOR, (IDCA, DCA). I WOULD HIGHLY RECOMMEND RENAMING POSSIBLY THE LOC IDENTIFIER SO AS TO DIFFERENTIATE IT FROM THE VOR, (FOR EXAMPLE, IREA). ANOTHER FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT WERE THE WINDS ALOFT. THEY WERE INDICATING APPROX 20-25 KTS OUT OF THE W. NO CORRECTION WAS GIVEN TO THIS, SINCE WE WERE RECEIVING ERRONEOUS NAV INFO. LASTLY, PLT ERROR IN SETTING UP DEP NAV RADIOS. WHILE I WAS SETTING UP THE RADIO, I KNEW I HAD THE DCA VOR DIALED IN, AND I SAW 'DCA' AS THE SELECTED NAVAID, HOWEVER I DIDN'T NOTICE THE 'I' IN FRONT OF IT. I NEVER XFERRED THE STANDBY DCA FREQ TO THE PRIMARY NAV POS, THUS IT REMAINED IN THE STANDBY POS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 600726: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE BOTH PLTS' COMPLACENCY AND A LONG DAY OF WORK. PREVENTIVE ACTIONS COULD INCLUDE LESS PLT COMPLACENCY, BETTER INST SET-UP AND XCHK, AND BETTER CREW COORD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.