Narrative:

While on a left downwind to runway 19R at dulles, potomac approach cleared us for a visual approach and instructed us to maintain 3000 ft until turning base. We saw an airliner on final to runway 19L, so I stayed closer to the airport and higher than normal to make sure we didn't fly into the wake of the heavy jet. Since I wasn't flying a standard pattern, I was a little bit more focused on getting the airplane down in the touchdown zone than normal. After landing and slowing down, I went to turn off the runway and noticed that the communication radio was still set to the approach controller's frequency. At that same moment, my copilot realized we hadn't been cleared to land, and immediately called the tower. The tower first responded by issuing us a landing clearance, then he saw that we were already on the runway, and instructed us where to turn off and to contact ground. There were no other airplanes impacted and none of the controllers indicated that any conflicts had taken place as there was very little traffic at the airport at the time of the incident. I believe the small volume of traffic to be a significant contributing factor as both pilots in the airplane, as well as the approach and tower controller were probably a little more laid back than we would have been had there been more activity over the radios. The approach controller never handed us off to the tower, and the tower who clearly was expecting our arrival, apparently wasn't watching closely enough to notice that we were arriving without talking to him. And since both pilots became involved in the non standard traffic pattern, we failed to take the initiative to make the frequency change ourselves. Somehow 4 people all got a little bit complacent at the same time due to the quiet level of activity. Supplemental information from acn 599352: we should have questioned potomac approach to see if they wanted us to switch to tower or just switched over ourselves.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A LEAR 35 FLT LWOC AT IAD, VA.

Narrative: WHILE ON A L DOWNWIND TO RWY 19R AT DULLES, POTOMAC APCH CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH AND INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT UNTIL TURNING BASE. WE SAW AN AIRLINER ON FINAL TO RWY 19L, SO I STAYED CLOSER TO THE ARPT AND HIGHER THAN NORMAL TO MAKE SURE WE DIDN'T FLY INTO THE WAKE OF THE HVY JET. SINCE I WASN'T FLYING A STANDARD PATTERN, I WAS A LITTLE BIT MORE FOCUSED ON GETTING THE AIRPLANE DOWN IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE THAN NORMAL. AFTER LNDG AND SLOWING DOWN, I WENT TO TURN OFF THE RWY AND NOTICED THAT THE COM RADIO WAS STILL SET TO THE APCH CTLR'S FREQ. AT THAT SAME MOMENT, MY COPLT REALIZED WE HADN'T BEEN CLRED TO LAND, AND IMMEDIATELY CALLED THE TWR. THE TWR FIRST RESPONDED BY ISSUING US A LNDG CLRNC, THEN HE SAW THAT WE WERE ALREADY ON THE RWY, AND INSTRUCTED US WHERE TO TURN OFF AND TO CONTACT GND. THERE WERE NO OTHER AIRPLANES IMPACTED AND NONE OF THE CTLRS INDICATED THAT ANY CONFLICTS HAD TAKEN PLACE AS THERE WAS VERY LITTLE TFC AT THE ARPT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. I BELIEVE THE SMALL VOLUME OF TFC TO BE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTING FACTOR AS BOTH PLTS IN THE AIRPLANE, AS WELL AS THE APCH AND TWR CTLR WERE PROBABLY A LITTLE MORE LAID BACK THAN WE WOULD HAVE BEEN HAD THERE BEEN MORE ACTIVITY OVER THE RADIOS. THE APCH CTLR NEVER HANDED US OFF TO THE TWR, AND THE TWR WHO CLRLY WAS EXPECTING OUR ARR, APPARENTLY WASN'T WATCHING CLOSELY ENOUGH TO NOTICE THAT WE WERE ARRIVING WITHOUT TALKING TO HIM. AND SINCE BOTH PLTS BECAME INVOLVED IN THE NON STANDARD TFC PATTERN, WE FAILED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO MAKE THE FREQ CHANGE OURSELVES. SOMEHOW 4 PEOPLE ALL GOT A LITTLE BIT COMPLACENT AT THE SAME TIME DUE TO THE QUIET LEVEL OF ACTIVITY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 599352: WE SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED POTOMAC APCH TO SEE IF THEY WANTED US TO SWITCH TO TWR OR JUST SWITCHED OVER OURSELVES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.