Narrative:

Checked in with acy approach and then got ATIS which reported 1 1/2 mi visibility. Received vectors for ILS runway 13 at acy, approach flaps out. Outside of the LOM, intercepted the localizer (coupled) checked ATIS again, now stating that the visibility was 3/4 mi, but the tower was telling me that they had 6000 ft visibility on runway 13. I said that I could see the whole runway/airport from where I was -- approach lights, runway lights, from end to end. Autoplt captured the GS, gear down, 3 green, adjusted power to maintain 130 KTS. When landing was assured, I turned off the autoplt and added full flaps. I eased the power to idle as I crossed the threshold and leveled the nose. I felt the aircraft start to sink, so I added a little power to arrest the rate of descent. Right after that power adjustment, I punched into the fog. When I came out a second or so later, the left wing was high, the nose was pitched up and to the right. I rolled left to level the wings and pushed forward to lower the nose before we hit and left rudder/brake to pull the plane back to the left when we touched down. The plane hit right wing first. From talking with the FAA inspector, this probably bounced the aircraft up onto the nose and left main wheels resulting in the propeller strike. The aircraft started to skid to the right with the nose pointing left. I believed that the landing gear had failed and that I was now sliding on the fuselage. I started to shut down the engines (including feathering the propellers). When the aircraft stopped, I ensured the battery, magnetos, and fuel were off and exited the aircraft. Once the passenger were clear of the aircraft, I returned to it to call for assistance. I messed up. Plain and simple. One factor in this incident was that I confused the part 91 and 135 operating rules on instrument approachs. First, I believed the visibility was the controling factor ('landing minimums') for the approach. With 3/4 mi visibility reported with an RVR of 6000 ft, I figured I could commence with the approach. Second, I was outside the marker and had the lights in sight meeting several of the descent below decision ht/MDA criteria, in part 91. From this point, I believed I was legal to execute the approach, but from what I saw, I also believed it was safe to proceed. I had passed over the fog and it appeared very thin. I could easily see terrain, roads, and houses. From outside the LOM, I could see the runway and airport lights. I believed I was both safe and legal. Luckily, my passenger and I walked away uninjured from this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE58 PLT DSNDS BELOW THE DECISION HT DURING IMC CONDITIONS, LOSES CTL OF ACFT, HAS A RWY EXCURSION AND DAMAGES THE ACFT AT ACY.

Narrative: CHKED IN WITH ACY APCH AND THEN GOT ATIS WHICH RPTED 1 1/2 MI VISIBILITY. RECEIVED VECTORS FOR ILS RWY 13 AT ACY, APCH FLAPS OUT. OUTSIDE OF THE LOM, INTERCEPTED THE LOC (COUPLED) CHKED ATIS AGAIN, NOW STATING THAT THE VISIBILITY WAS 3/4 MI, BUT THE TWR WAS TELLING ME THAT THEY HAD 6000 FT VISIBILITY ON RWY 13. I SAID THAT I COULD SEE THE WHOLE RWY/ARPT FROM WHERE I WAS -- APCH LIGHTS, RWY LIGHTS, FROM END TO END. AUTOPLT CAPTURED THE GS, GEAR DOWN, 3 GREEN, ADJUSTED PWR TO MAINTAIN 130 KTS. WHEN LNDG WAS ASSURED, I TURNED OFF THE AUTOPLT AND ADDED FULL FLAPS. I EASED THE PWR TO IDLE AS I CROSSED THE THRESHOLD AND LEVELED THE NOSE. I FELT THE ACFT START TO SINK, SO I ADDED A LITTLE PWR TO ARREST THE RATE OF DSCNT. RIGHT AFTER THAT PWR ADJUSTMENT, I PUNCHED INTO THE FOG. WHEN I CAME OUT A SECOND OR SO LATER, THE L WING WAS HIGH, THE NOSE WAS PITCHED UP AND TO THE R. I ROLLED L TO LEVEL THE WINGS AND PUSHED FORWARD TO LOWER THE NOSE BEFORE WE HIT AND L RUDDER/BRAKE TO PULL THE PLANE BACK TO THE L WHEN WE TOUCHED DOWN. THE PLANE HIT R WING FIRST. FROM TALKING WITH THE FAA INSPECTOR, THIS PROBABLY BOUNCED THE ACFT UP ONTO THE NOSE AND L MAIN WHEELS RESULTING IN THE PROP STRIKE. THE ACFT STARTED TO SKID TO THE R WITH THE NOSE POINTING L. I BELIEVED THAT THE LNDG GEAR HAD FAILED AND THAT I WAS NOW SLIDING ON THE FUSELAGE. I STARTED TO SHUT DOWN THE ENGS (INCLUDING FEATHERING THE PROPS). WHEN THE ACFT STOPPED, I ENSURED THE BATTERY, MAGNETOS, AND FUEL WERE OFF AND EXITED THE ACFT. ONCE THE PAX WERE CLR OF THE ACFT, I RETURNED TO IT TO CALL FOR ASSISTANCE. I MESSED UP. PLAIN AND SIMPLE. ONE FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT WAS THAT I CONFUSED THE PART 91 AND 135 OPERATING RULES ON INST APCHS. FIRST, I BELIEVED THE VISIBILITY WAS THE CTLING FACTOR ('LNDG MINIMUMS') FOR THE APCH. WITH 3/4 MI VISIBILITY RPTED WITH AN RVR OF 6000 FT, I FIGURED I COULD COMMENCE WITH THE APCH. SECOND, I WAS OUTSIDE THE MARKER AND HAD THE LIGHTS IN SIGHT MEETING SEVERAL OF THE DSCNT BELOW DECISION HT/MDA CRITERIA, IN PART 91. FROM THIS POINT, I BELIEVED I WAS LEGAL TO EXECUTE THE APCH, BUT FROM WHAT I SAW, I ALSO BELIEVED IT WAS SAFE TO PROCEED. I HAD PASSED OVER THE FOG AND IT APPEARED VERY THIN. I COULD EASILY SEE TERRAIN, ROADS, AND HOUSES. FROM OUTSIDE THE LOM, I COULD SEE THE RWY AND ARPT LIGHTS. I BELIEVED I WAS BOTH SAFE AND LEGAL. LUCKILY, MY PAX AND I WALKED AWAY UNINJURED FROM THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.