Narrative:

Approximately 45 mins into the flight from bur to rdd, both the PIC and I observed a flickering left engine fire light. Both of us looked for visual indications to confirm an engine fire. None could be found. At one point, the light stayed on for about 10 seconds. The PIC asked center to deviation from course. The left engine fire light still illuminated even with a different angle to the sun. The PIC then called center and told them that there was no visual indication of a fire, but that we were declaring an emergency, because of the intermittent left engine fire light. During vectors to fat, the PIC informed the passenger that we needed to land in fresno to visually check the engine on the ground. The PIC also explained to me that he declared an emergency to get priority handling, just in case there actually was an engine fire. On the approach and vectors to fat, the left engine fire light had gone out. Also, ground crews indicated that there was no visual sign of an actual fire. We taxied to FBO where we exited the airplane. The PIC stayed with the aircraft and ground crews while I escorted the passenger to the FBO building away from the aircraft. From inside the FBO, I observed personnel on the ground inspecting the left engine as well as the PIC. While in the FBO, I called operations. I informed them that we had to divert to fat, because of an engine fire light. I also told him that the PIC would call the director of maintenance in a few mins when he had a free moment. After a few mins, the PIC called the director of maintenance from inside the FBO. At no time did I perceive there to be any danger to the passenger or crew during the flight. At one point, I also went outside to take a look at the engine. I also found no signs that a fire was ever present. We added fuel, reboarded the airplane and continued our trip to rdd. The left engine fire light did not illuminate at any time during the leg from fat to rdd. I agreed with the PIC that declaring an emergency was the best decision in the events of this situation. Supplemental information from acn 595646: as I currently understand the situation from my chief pilot and our director of maintenance, the FAA is telling the company that we may be in violation of the FARS having re-dispatched the flight after landing to inspect the aircraft, but finding no indication that there was anything wrong. The FAA are saying that as PIC, I should have written a mechanical discrepancy report, which would of course required a maintenance release. I'm also told that because an emergency was declared, there needed to be maintenance action taken. The beechcraft king air 200 has a well-known propensity for false fire warning lights due to sun reflections or bright light that enters the cowling through vents and holes and shines on the system sensors. Turning the aircraft 10-20 degrees to change the sun angle will usually stop the light from illuminating. In this case, that didn't cure the problem and I decided to land the aircraft and visually inspect the engine. On the ground, I found no indication of a problem, the fire warning system preflight test showed the system to be working properly, and the director of maintenance agreed the aircraft was suitable for flight. Given this, I see no need for a mechanical discrepancy report as there is no indication to me that there is a problem with the aircraft. Of more concern to me as a pilot is that my taking the action of declaring an emergency has affected the FAA's enforcement action. I want to be able to declare an emergency and avail myself of the added protection and attention of ATC without having to be concerned there will be any effect on enforcement action by the FAA. Anything that causes a pilot to hesitate to use the emergency declaration will have an impact on safety. Upon landing, I made an inspection of the left engine and found no sign of any problem. I contacted the director of maintenance, described the events that had transpired, and asked for direction. I was asked to run the preflight fire warning system test again. This was completed with no indication of a system problem. The director of maintenance cleared the flight to continue on the final destination. I prepared a new weight and balance, filed a new flight plan, and completed the flight to rdd without incident. Upon arrival at rdd, I was asked to write a mechanical discrepancy report for the fire light.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE FAA CITES A BE20 AIR TAXI FLT CREW FOR NOT WRITING UP A FLICKERING L ENG FIRE WARNING AFTER THE CREW DIVERTS TO FAT AFTER DECLARING AN EMER WHILE ON FREQ WITH ZOA, CA.

Narrative: APPROX 45 MINS INTO THE FLT FROM BUR TO RDD, BOTH THE PIC AND I OBSERVED A FLICKERING L ENG FIRE LIGHT. BOTH OF US LOOKED FOR VISUAL INDICATIONS TO CONFIRM AN ENG FIRE. NONE COULD BE FOUND. AT ONE POINT, THE LIGHT STAYED ON FOR ABOUT 10 SECONDS. THE PIC ASKED CTR TO DEV FROM COURSE. THE L ENG FIRE LIGHT STILL ILLUMINATED EVEN WITH A DIFFERENT ANGLE TO THE SUN. THE PIC THEN CALLED CTR AND TOLD THEM THAT THERE WAS NO VISUAL INDICATION OF A FIRE, BUT THAT WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER, BECAUSE OF THE INTERMITTENT L ENG FIRE LIGHT. DURING VECTORS TO FAT, THE PIC INFORMED THE PAX THAT WE NEEDED TO LAND IN FRESNO TO VISUALLY CHK THE ENG ON THE GND. THE PIC ALSO EXPLAINED TO ME THAT HE DECLARED AN EMER TO GET PRIORITY HANDLING, JUST IN CASE THERE ACTUALLY WAS AN ENG FIRE. ON THE APCH AND VECTORS TO FAT, THE L ENG FIRE LIGHT HAD GONE OUT. ALSO, GND CREWS INDICATED THAT THERE WAS NO VISUAL SIGN OF AN ACTUAL FIRE. WE TAXIED TO FBO WHERE WE EXITED THE AIRPLANE. THE PIC STAYED WITH THE ACFT AND GND CREWS WHILE I ESCORTED THE PAX TO THE FBO BUILDING AWAY FROM THE ACFT. FROM INSIDE THE FBO, I OBSERVED PERSONNEL ON THE GND INSPECTING THE L ENG AS WELL AS THE PIC. WHILE IN THE FBO, I CALLED OPS. I INFORMED THEM THAT WE HAD TO DIVERT TO FAT, BECAUSE OF AN ENG FIRE LIGHT. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT THE PIC WOULD CALL THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT IN A FEW MINS WHEN HE HAD A FREE MOMENT. AFTER A FEW MINS, THE PIC CALLED THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT FROM INSIDE THE FBO. AT NO TIME DID I PERCEIVE THERE TO BE ANY DANGER TO THE PAX OR CREW DURING THE FLT. AT ONE POINT, I ALSO WENT OUTSIDE TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE ENG. I ALSO FOUND NO SIGNS THAT A FIRE WAS EVER PRESENT. WE ADDED FUEL, REBOARDED THE AIRPLANE AND CONTINUED OUR TRIP TO RDD. THE L ENG FIRE LIGHT DID NOT ILLUMINATE AT ANY TIME DURING THE LEG FROM FAT TO RDD. I AGREED WITH THE PIC THAT DECLARING AN EMER WAS THE BEST DECISION IN THE EVENTS OF THIS SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 595646: AS I CURRENTLY UNDERSTAND THE SIT FROM MY CHIEF PLT AND OUR DIRECTOR OF MAINT, THE FAA IS TELLING THE COMPANY THAT WE MAY BE IN VIOLATION OF THE FARS HAVING RE-DISPATCHED THE FLT AFTER LNDG TO INSPECT THE ACFT, BUT FINDING NO INDICATION THAT THERE WAS ANYTHING WRONG. THE FAA ARE SAYING THAT AS PIC, I SHOULD HAVE WRITTEN A MECHANICAL DISCREPANCY RPT, WHICH WOULD OF COURSE REQUIRED A MAINT RELEASE. I'M ALSO TOLD THAT BECAUSE AN EMER WAS DECLARED, THERE NEEDED TO BE MAINT ACTION TAKEN. THE BEECHCRAFT KING AIR 200 HAS A WELL-KNOWN PROPENSITY FOR FALSE FIRE WARNING LIGHTS DUE TO SUN REFLECTIONS OR BRIGHT LIGHT THAT ENTERS THE COWLING THROUGH VENTS AND HOLES AND SHINES ON THE SYS SENSORS. TURNING THE ACFT 10-20 DEGS TO CHANGE THE SUN ANGLE WILL USUALLY STOP THE LIGHT FROM ILLUMINATING. IN THIS CASE, THAT DIDN'T CURE THE PROB AND I DECIDED TO LAND THE ACFT AND VISUALLY INSPECT THE ENG. ON THE GND, I FOUND NO INDICATION OF A PROB, THE FIRE WARNING SYS PREFLT TEST SHOWED THE SYS TO BE WORKING PROPERLY, AND THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT AGREED THE ACFT WAS SUITABLE FOR FLT. GIVEN THIS, I SEE NO NEED FOR A MECHANICAL DISCREPANCY RPT AS THERE IS NO INDICATION TO ME THAT THERE IS A PROB WITH THE ACFT. OF MORE CONCERN TO ME AS A PLT IS THAT MY TAKING THE ACTION OF DECLARING AN EMER HAS AFFECTED THE FAA'S ENFORCEMENT ACTION. I WANT TO BE ABLE TO DECLARE AN EMER AND AVAIL MYSELF OF THE ADDED PROTECTION AND ATTN OF ATC WITHOUT HAVING TO BE CONCERNED THERE WILL BE ANY EFFECT ON ENFORCEMENT ACTION BY THE FAA. ANYTHING THAT CAUSES A PLT TO HESITATE TO USE THE EMER DECLARATION WILL HAVE AN IMPACT ON SAFETY. UPON LNDG, I MADE AN INSPECTION OF THE L ENG AND FOUND NO SIGN OF ANY PROB. I CONTACTED THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT, DESCRIBED THE EVENTS THAT HAD TRANSPIRED, AND ASKED FOR DIRECTION. I WAS ASKED TO RUN THE PREFLT FIRE WARNING SYS TEST AGAIN. THIS WAS COMPLETED WITH NO INDICATION OF A SYS PROB. THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT CLRED THE FLT TO CONTINUE ON THE FINAL DEST. I PREPARED A NEW WT AND BAL, FILED A NEW FLT PLAN, AND COMPLETED THE FLT TO RDD WITHOUT INCIDENT. UPON ARR AT RDD, I WAS ASKED TO WRITE A MECHANICAL DISCREPANCY RPT FOR THE FIRE LIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.