Narrative:

Flight X en route from evv to dtw along mizar arrival in contact with ZOB frequency 120.45. Flight crew listening to other flts ahead in particular Y also en route to dtw and noting what frequencys they were being handed off to. The first officer also had all the frequencys on his arrival chart for they fly this route daily. There were quite a few other company aircraft on this frequency and the controller was quite busy. He cleared flight X direct mizar with descent down to FL190 handing off the flight to the next frequency. Dtw approach 124.97 which is the corridor approach frequency for dtw. The first officer repeated back the clearance, 'descend to FL190 direct mizar, good afternoon.' controller replied 'good afternoon.' first officer then swapped to frequency 124.97 and used his technique that he teaches newer first officer's to help them avoid mistakes by not removing his fingertip from the radio knob until the next controller acknowledges he has checked in. As briefed, he checked in with dtw approach descending out of FL210 for FL190 and was told to expect dtw runway 22R. They were not cleared any further below FL190. For a time there was an ebb in chatter on the frequency of about 2 mins and then the controller of 124.97 asked flight Y, 10 mi ahead, if they had any way to get in touch with their company flight 10 mi behind. Flight Y quickly responded before flight X could jump. The first officer of flight X responded 'dtw approach flight X is here, we checked in on frequency 3 mins ago and we are now direct mizar.' the controller responded 'you need to go back to 120.45, they're looking for you there.' the first officer responded 'we were handed off to you but we'll go back to 120.45.' flight X rechked back with 120.45 of whom said 'I've been looking for you for the past 40 mi, left heading 270 degrees. We responded 'left heading 270 degrees.' we began monitoring our fuel more since we had only 45 mins of plan contingency fuel. We felt it prudent at this time to not have a discussion of the handoff in the respect for the safety of the other aircraft the controller was dealing with on frequency. The vector west away from dtw with incremental step-downs and 10 degree turns left was using quite a bit of fuel. Compared to frequency seen on TCASII it did not seem to warrant vectoring that far out. We were conservative in manipulation of the power levers 250 KTS as assigned. As time went on keeping in mind the clear skies, our fuel calculations were showing our efoa (expected fuel on arrival) to be getting close to our decision fuel of 1300 pounds. The first officer queried the controller 'ZOB, aircraft X what are your vectoring intentions? -- We are close to our decision fuel.' the controller rattled off 'well, if you hadn't got lost of frequencys you were right in line, left turn (from 230 degrees) to 150 degrees and down to 14000 ft.' the first officer replied 'left turn to 150 degrees and descend and maintain 14000 ft and we were monitoring guard in accordance with the fdc advisory circular 991C if you were looking for us.' the controller replied 'we're not required to try you on that frequency, descend and maintain mizar.' first officer replied 'down to 12000 ft direct mizar.' the controller then handed flight X over to 124.97 dtw approach. The first officer did not feel it prudent at that moment to argue with the controller that he had originally handed flight X over to 124.97 dtw before. The flight crew called dispatch on company phone patch frequency to advise that flight X's efoa was nearing decision fuel during vectoring and would be landing close to that amount in dtw in clear skies. We pointed out that instead of the previous controller simply contact us on guard frequency in spirit with fdc 1/0329, the ZOB controller's judgement was to spend valuable time with dealing with other flts to contact our dispatcher and other aircraft to ACARS us instead of simply making a call on guard. We've heard all ctrs contacting commercial flts on guard 121.5 4 or 5 times a day. Checking in with dtw approach the second time now the controller said 'I'm sorry you were vectored out of line, I tried to keep you. You were fine right in line where you had been sequenced in 10 mi behind your company.' first officer replied 'yes and we only needed 12 mins to get down to 12000 ft from FL190 and we are now close to decision fuel.' even crossing mizar at FL190 we could have sequenced into downwind at 12000 ft.again when 120.45 had handed us off to dtw approach the first time we were in descent to FL190 direct mizar as cleared, at no time any altitude other than as assigned and we had checked on to all frequencys as assigned. The rouge attitude evidenced by penalty vectoring of some controllers who feel that they can do no wrong and whom expect pilots to be detrimental to good judgement where they should reasonably expect in today's economy that flts especially in clear skies are running close to contingency fuel is intolerable. This particular controller's stubborn deference to use the SOP seems to be contrary to the spirit and intent of fdc 1/0329 as well as advisory circular 99-1C and aim section 6, 5-6-2. In keeping with the guidelines of this NASA report, the author's belief of remedy action would be: there should be an advisory to controllers about penalty vectoring to discourage this sort of situation which ended up with flight landing with 1300 pounds, approximately X gallons of fuel in a canadair regional jet CL65 in a needless attempt to penalize pilots at the expense of safety to innocent passenger.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL-65 FO'S LAMENT OVER CTLR'S ATTITUDE WHEN ZOB CTLR FELT PUT OUT AFTER 'LOSING' RPTR'S FLT AFTER A FREQ CHANGE TO DTW APCH 50 NM SW OF DXO, MI.

Narrative: FLT X ENRTE FROM EVV TO DTW ALONG MIZAR ARR IN CONTACT WITH ZOB FREQ 120.45. FLT CREW LISTENING TO OTHER FLTS AHEAD IN PARTICULAR Y ALSO ENRTE TO DTW AND NOTING WHAT FREQS THEY WERE BEING HANDED OFF TO. THE FO ALSO HAD ALL THE FREQS ON HIS ARR CHART FOR THEY FLY THIS RTE DAILY. THERE WERE QUITE A FEW OTHER COMPANY ACFT ON THIS FREQ AND THE CTLR WAS QUITE BUSY. HE CLRED FLT X DIRECT MIZAR WITH DSCNT DOWN TO FL190 HANDING OFF THE FLT TO THE NEXT FREQ. DTW APCH 124.97 WHICH IS THE CORRIDOR APCH FREQ FOR DTW. THE FO REPEATED BACK THE CLRNC, 'DSND TO FL190 DIRECT MIZAR, GOOD AFTERNOON.' CTLR REPLIED 'GOOD AFTERNOON.' FO THEN SWAPPED TO FREQ 124.97 AND USED HIS TECHNIQUE THAT HE TEACHES NEWER FO'S TO HELP THEM AVOID MISTAKES BY NOT REMOVING HIS FINGERTIP FROM THE RADIO KNOB UNTIL THE NEXT CTLR ACKNOWLEDGES HE HAS CHKED IN. AS BRIEFED, HE CHKED IN WITH DTW APCH DSNDING OUT OF FL210 FOR FL190 AND WAS TOLD TO EXPECT DTW RWY 22R. THEY WERE NOT CLRED ANY FURTHER BELOW FL190. FOR A TIME THERE WAS AN EBB IN CHATTER ON THE FREQ OF ABOUT 2 MINS AND THEN THE CTLR OF 124.97 ASKED FLT Y, 10 MI AHEAD, IF THEY HAD ANY WAY TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THEIR COMPANY FLT 10 MI BEHIND. FLT Y QUICKLY RESPONDED BEFORE FLT X COULD JUMP. THE FO OF FLT X RESPONDED 'DTW APCH FLT X IS HERE, WE CHKED IN ON FREQ 3 MINS AGO AND WE ARE NOW DIRECT MIZAR.' THE CTLR RESPONDED 'YOU NEED TO GO BACK TO 120.45, THEY'RE LOOKING FOR YOU THERE.' THE FO RESPONDED 'WE WERE HANDED OFF TO YOU BUT WE'LL GO BACK TO 120.45.' FLT X RECHKED BACK WITH 120.45 OF WHOM SAID 'I'VE BEEN LOOKING FOR YOU FOR THE PAST 40 MI, L HDG 270 DEGS. WE RESPONDED 'L HDG 270 DEGS.' WE BEGAN MONITORING OUR FUEL MORE SINCE WE HAD ONLY 45 MINS OF PLAN CONTINGENCY FUEL. WE FELT IT PRUDENT AT THIS TIME TO NOT HAVE A DISCUSSION OF THE HDOF IN THE RESPECT FOR THE SAFETY OF THE OTHER ACFT THE CTLR WAS DEALING WITH ON FREQ. THE VECTOR W AWAY FROM DTW WITH INCREMENTAL STEP-DOWNS AND 10 DEG TURNS L WAS USING QUITE A BIT OF FUEL. COMPARED TO FREQ SEEN ON TCASII IT DID NOT SEEM TO WARRANT VECTORING THAT FAR OUT. WE WERE CONSERVATIVE IN MANIPULATION OF THE PWR LEVERS 250 KTS AS ASSIGNED. AS TIME WENT ON KEEPING IN MIND THE CLR SKIES, OUR FUEL CALCULATIONS WERE SHOWING OUR EFOA (EXPECTED FUEL ON ARR) TO BE GETTING CLOSE TO OUR DECISION FUEL OF 1300 LBS. THE FO QUERIED THE CTLR 'ZOB, ACFT X WHAT ARE YOUR VECTORING INTENTIONS? -- WE ARE CLOSE TO OUR DECISION FUEL.' THE CTLR RATTLED OFF 'WELL, IF YOU HADN'T GOT LOST OF FREQS YOU WERE RIGHT IN LINE, L TURN (FROM 230 DEGS) TO 150 DEGS AND DOWN TO 14000 FT.' THE FO REPLIED 'L TURN TO 150 DEGS AND DSND AND MAINTAIN 14000 FT AND WE WERE MONITORING GUARD IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FDC ADVISORY CIRCULAR 991C IF YOU WERE LOOKING FOR US.' THE CTLR REPLIED 'WE'RE NOT REQUIRED TO TRY YOU ON THAT FREQ, DSND AND MAINTAIN MIZAR.' FO REPLIED 'DOWN TO 12000 FT DIRECT MIZAR.' THE CTLR THEN HANDED FLT X OVER TO 124.97 DTW APCH. THE FO DID NOT FEEL IT PRUDENT AT THAT MOMENT TO ARGUE WITH THE CTLR THAT HE HAD ORIGINALLY HANDED FLT X OVER TO 124.97 DTW BEFORE. THE FLT CREW CALLED DISPATCH ON COMPANY PHONE PATCH FREQ TO ADVISE THAT FLT X'S EFOA WAS NEARING DECISION FUEL DURING VECTORING AND WOULD BE LNDG CLOSE TO THAT AMOUNT IN DTW IN CLR SKIES. WE POINTED OUT THAT INSTEAD OF THE PREVIOUS CTLR SIMPLY CONTACT US ON GUARD FREQ IN SPIRIT WITH FDC 1/0329, THE ZOB CTLR'S JUDGEMENT WAS TO SPEND VALUABLE TIME WITH DEALING WITH OTHER FLTS TO CONTACT OUR DISPATCHER AND OTHER ACFT TO ACARS US INSTEAD OF SIMPLY MAKING A CALL ON GUARD. WE'VE HEARD ALL CTRS CONTACTING COMMERCIAL FLTS ON GUARD 121.5 4 OR 5 TIMES A DAY. CHKING IN WITH DTW APCH THE SECOND TIME NOW THE CTLR SAID 'I'M SORRY YOU WERE VECTORED OUT OF LINE, I TRIED TO KEEP YOU. YOU WERE FINE RIGHT IN LINE WHERE YOU HAD BEEN SEQUENCED IN 10 MI BEHIND YOUR COMPANY.' FO REPLIED 'YES AND WE ONLY NEEDED 12 MINS TO GET DOWN TO 12000 FT FROM FL190 AND WE ARE NOW CLOSE TO DECISION FUEL.' EVEN XING MIZAR AT FL190 WE COULD HAVE SEQUENCED INTO DOWNWIND AT 12000 FT.AGAIN WHEN 120.45 HAD HANDED US OFF TO DTW APCH THE FIRST TIME WE WERE IN DSCNT TO FL190 DIRECT MIZAR AS CLRED, AT NO TIME ANY ALT OTHER THAN AS ASSIGNED AND WE HAD CHKED ON TO ALL FREQS AS ASSIGNED. THE ROUGE ATTITUDE EVIDENCED BY PENALTY VECTORING OF SOME CTLRS WHO FEEL THAT THEY CAN DO NO WRONG AND WHOM EXPECT PLTS TO BE DETRIMENTAL TO GOOD JUDGEMENT WHERE THEY SHOULD REASONABLY EXPECT IN TODAY'S ECONOMY THAT FLTS ESPECIALLY IN CLR SKIES ARE RUNNING CLOSE TO CONTINGENCY FUEL IS INTOLERABLE. THIS PARTICULAR CTLR'S STUBBORN DEFERENCE TO USE THE SOP SEEMS TO BE CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF FDC 1/0329 AS WELL AS ADVISORY CIRCULAR 99-1C AND AIM SECTION 6, 5-6-2. IN KEEPING WITH THE GUIDELINES OF THIS NASA RPT, THE AUTHOR'S BELIEF OF REMEDY ACTION WOULD BE: THERE SHOULD BE AN ADVISORY TO CTLRS ABOUT PENALTY VECTORING TO DISCOURAGE THIS SORT OF SIT WHICH ENDED UP WITH FLT LNDG WITH 1300 LBS, APPROX X GALLONS OF FUEL IN A CANADAIR REGIONAL JET CL65 IN A NEEDLESS ATTEMPT TO PENALIZE PLTS AT THE EXPENSE OF SAFETY TO INNOCENT PAX.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.