Narrative:

Shortly after leveloff at FL370, we smelled what initially smelled to me like a hot air conditioning duct. We checked cockpit cabin temperature and saw 77 degrees (a normal indication). I then saw smoke in the first officer's map light beam. I called the purser and asked if he had anything overheating or burning in the galley oven because we had smoke in the cockpit. He said no but he shut off the ovens. We donned our oxygen masks and goggles and pulled out the qrc which called for the utility busses to be turned off. We declared an emergency and turned toward ZZZ. Shortly thereafter, the purser called and said he now had a smoke alarm sounding in the forward aft lavatory. I asked that the purser discharge a halon extinguisher into the water heater compartment of that lavatory. The purser called back and said that the smoke was now getting worse in the cabin. The smoke was also getting stronger (more acrid) in the cockpit, so we decided to land at the nearest suitable alternate (ZZZ2) versus our ETOPS alternate (ZZZ). During descent, we decided to land straight in to runway 20, but when we got updated winds with a 12 KT tailwind, we requested runway 2 and advised that we would make a tight turn and short final to expedite our approach. We maintained 330 KTS until 4000 ft on downwind. During the slowing and as we made the turn to a visual right base, I got slightly low on profile. As I corrected we got a GPWS warning 'too low terrain.' I steepened the turn to final and continued configuring for landing. At 500 ft, the first officer gave the brace command to the passenger and crew. We previously advised the purser to expect a land evacuate/evacuation. On touchdown, I taxied clear of the runway and we ran the evacuate/evacuation qrc, ordering a land evacuate/evacuation. When all passenger and crew had evacuate/evacuationed, I grabbed the mega-phone from the 1A overhead compartment and exited on the 1L slide. We used the mega-phone to gather all passenger at the upwind nose side of the aircraft. There were minor injuries on evacuate/evacuation. One flight attendant had an ankle injury, and another had back pain after lifting the overwing exit out of the main aisle during the evacuate/evacuation. We landed approximately 2000 pounds over the maximum landing weight. I determined it safer to land overweight than to delay. The 5 working flight attendants and 2 deadheading flight attendants are to be commended for a safe evacuate/evacuation of all 119 souls on board.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 ON LEVELOFF AT FL370 DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO SMOKE IN COCKPIT AND FORWARD CABIN. ACFT EVACED ON GND.

Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER LEVELOFF AT FL370, WE SMELLED WHAT INITIALLY SMELLED TO ME LIKE A HOT AIR CONDITIONING DUCT. WE CHKED COCKPIT CABIN TEMP AND SAW 77 DEGS (A NORMAL INDICATION). I THEN SAW SMOKE IN THE FO'S MAP LIGHT BEAM. I CALLED THE PURSER AND ASKED IF HE HAD ANYTHING OVERHEATING OR BURNING IN THE GALLEY OVEN BECAUSE WE HAD SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT. HE SAID NO BUT HE SHUT OFF THE OVENS. WE DONNED OUR OXYGEN MASKS AND GOGGLES AND PULLED OUT THE QRC WHICH CALLED FOR THE UTILITY BUSSES TO BE TURNED OFF. WE DECLARED AN EMER AND TURNED TOWARD ZZZ. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE PURSER CALLED AND SAID HE NOW HAD A SMOKE ALARM SOUNDING IN THE FORWARD AFT LAVATORY. I ASKED THAT THE PURSER DISCHARGE A HALON EXTINGUISHER INTO THE WATER HEATER COMPARTMENT OF THAT LAVATORY. THE PURSER CALLED BACK AND SAID THAT THE SMOKE WAS NOW GETTING WORSE IN THE CABIN. THE SMOKE WAS ALSO GETTING STRONGER (MORE ACRID) IN THE COCKPIT, SO WE DECIDED TO LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ALTERNATE (ZZZ2) VERSUS OUR ETOPS ALTERNATE (ZZZ). DURING DSCNT, WE DECIDED TO LAND STRAIGHT IN TO RWY 20, BUT WHEN WE GOT UPDATED WINDS WITH A 12 KT TAILWIND, WE REQUESTED RWY 2 AND ADVISED THAT WE WOULD MAKE A TIGHT TURN AND SHORT FINAL TO EXPEDITE OUR APCH. WE MAINTAINED 330 KTS UNTIL 4000 FT ON DOWNWIND. DURING THE SLOWING AND AS WE MADE THE TURN TO A VISUAL R BASE, I GOT SLIGHTLY LOW ON PROFILE. AS I CORRECTED WE GOT A GPWS WARNING 'TOO LOW TERRAIN.' I STEEPENED THE TURN TO FINAL AND CONTINUED CONFIGURING FOR LNDG. AT 500 FT, THE FO GAVE THE BRACE COMMAND TO THE PAX AND CREW. WE PREVIOUSLY ADVISED THE PURSER TO EXPECT A LAND EVAC. ON TOUCHDOWN, I TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY AND WE RAN THE EVAC QRC, ORDERING A LAND EVAC. WHEN ALL PAX AND CREW HAD EVACED, I GRABBED THE MEGA-PHONE FROM THE 1A OVERHEAD COMPARTMENT AND EXITED ON THE 1L SLIDE. WE USED THE MEGA-PHONE TO GATHER ALL PAX AT THE UPWIND NOSE SIDE OF THE ACFT. THERE WERE MINOR INJURIES ON EVAC. ONE FLT ATTENDANT HAD AN ANKLE INJURY, AND ANOTHER HAD BACK PAIN AFTER LIFTING THE OVERWING EXIT OUT OF THE MAIN AISLE DURING THE EVAC. WE LANDED APPROX 2000 LBS OVER THE MAX LNDG WT. I DETERMINED IT SAFER TO LAND OVERWT THAN TO DELAY. THE 5 WORKING FLT ATTENDANTS AND 2 DEADHEADING FLT ATTENDANTS ARE TO BE COMMENDED FOR A SAFE EVAC OF ALL 119 SOULS ON BOARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.