|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : zzz.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Controlling Facilities||tower : zzz.tower|
|Operator||general aviation : personal|
|Make Model Name||Baron 55/Cochise|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 91|
|Flight Phase||landing : roll|
|Route In Use||approach : traffic pattern|
|Function||flight crew : single pilot|
|Qualification||pilot : commercial|
pilot : multi engine
pilot : instrument
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 33|
flight time total : 939
flight time type : 233
|Function||controller : local|
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : critical|
non adherence : published procedure
other anomaly other
|Independent Detector||other flight crewb|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : detected after the fact|
|Problem Areas||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
I planned to fly a somewhat wider than normal pattern in order to have sufficient time to double-check everything and to set up accurate approach speeds, but made the pattern tighter when I heard the tower tell another plane reporting on the ILS to runway 3 that they were second to my baron in the pattern. I judged I was somewhat high, and so I decreased manifold pressure to 12 inches and pitched up so that I would be at 100 KTS on short final. The landing was a 'squeaker' and was right on the ILS landing bars. I had checked the gear panel light and also mechanical indicator located on the floor as I lowered the landing gear when parallel to the numbers on downwind, and again when repeating the 'gumps check' turning base and final. I did a final check of the gear panel light at 200 ft AGL, at the same time I went to full propeller and mixture. Proud of 'rescuing' the less-than-ideal approach, I noted on the rollout that the overhauled fuel injection system now idled both engines at 625 RPM and that the right wheel brake functioned properly. (Prior to overhaul, the left engine had to stay at 1000 RPM to avoid stopping, and the right toe brake needed to be pumped to prevent it from going to the floor.) I was coming up on taxiway D, which is halfway down the 6000 ft runway and would lead me quickly back to our hangar. In a mental lapse that is still astounding to me after 5 days of almost constant reflection, I reached down to retract the flaps, as I had found to be effective in short field landing practice in a C172. I felt the plane jump slightly, which I think may have unloaded the squat switch, and then first the nose and then the left wing dropped. The speed had already dropped to about 20 KTS, and the resulting slide was short. I cut the magnetos and master and turned both fuel handles to off and exited the plane. After smelling no spilt fuel, I went back into the cockpit to check the switches. I turned on the master to see if I could call the tower. The transmitter did not work, but I could see that crash truck already coming. I had been so concerned about what I had read about inadvertent gear retraction in a baron and bonanza, that I had obtained (but unfortunately not yet installed) a plastic device that blocks moving the gear lever upwards until it is pushed aside. I think the 3-MONTH lapse and my concentrating on not missing any checklist item led me to forget my habit of keeping my l-hand on the control horn and the r-hand locked on the throttle until off the runway. In retrospect, I feel the accident was perhaps the result of my concentrating on the checklist details when flying a more complex aircraft, and also on how the plane was functioning after the overhaul. I feel I should have been focusing more on some of the essentials of flying a retractable twin -- like keeping the r-hand on the throttles until off the runway and fully stopped. Finally, I think that being somewhat rushed also contributed to the mental lapse. I have noted that errors and omissions tend to occur when I am rushing, but in the past they were all minor, not this embarrassing and expensive.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: BE55 PLT INADVERTENTLY RAISES THE LNDG GEAR AFTER CLRING THE RWY AT ZZZ.
Narrative: I PLANNED TO FLY A SOMEWHAT WIDER THAN NORMAL PATTERN IN ORDER TO HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME TO DOUBLE-CHK EVERYTHING AND TO SET UP ACCURATE APCH SPDS, BUT MADE THE PATTERN TIGHTER WHEN I HEARD THE TWR TELL ANOTHER PLANE RPTING ON THE ILS TO RWY 3 THAT THEY WERE SECOND TO MY BARON IN THE PATTERN. I JUDGED I WAS SOMEWHAT HIGH, AND SO I DECREASED MANIFOLD PRESSURE TO 12 INCHES AND PITCHED UP SO THAT I WOULD BE AT 100 KTS ON SHORT FINAL. THE LNDG WAS A 'SQUEAKER' AND WAS RIGHT ON THE ILS LNDG BARS. I HAD CHKED THE GEAR PANEL LIGHT AND ALSO MECHANICAL INDICATOR LOCATED ON THE FLOOR AS I LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR WHEN PARALLEL TO THE NUMBERS ON DOWNWIND, AND AGAIN WHEN REPEATING THE 'GUMPS CHK' TURNING BASE AND FINAL. I DID A FINAL CHK OF THE GEAR PANEL LIGHT AT 200 FT AGL, AT THE SAME TIME I WENT TO FULL PROP AND MIXTURE. PROUD OF 'RESCUING' THE LESS-THAN-IDEAL APCH, I NOTED ON THE ROLLOUT THAT THE OVERHAULED FUEL INJECTION SYS NOW IDLED BOTH ENGS AT 625 RPM AND THAT THE R WHEEL BRAKE FUNCTIONED PROPERLY. (PRIOR TO OVERHAUL, THE L ENG HAD TO STAY AT 1000 RPM TO AVOID STOPPING, AND THE R TOE BRAKE NEEDED TO BE PUMPED TO PREVENT IT FROM GOING TO THE FLOOR.) I WAS COMING UP ON TXWY D, WHICH IS HALFWAY DOWN THE 6000 FT RWY AND WOULD LEAD ME QUICKLY BACK TO OUR HANGAR. IN A MENTAL LAPSE THAT IS STILL ASTOUNDING TO ME AFTER 5 DAYS OF ALMOST CONSTANT REFLECTION, I REACHED DOWN TO RETRACT THE FLAPS, AS I HAD FOUND TO BE EFFECTIVE IN SHORT FIELD LNDG PRACTICE IN A C172. I FELT THE PLANE JUMP SLIGHTLY, WHICH I THINK MAY HAVE UNLOADED THE SQUAT SWITCH, AND THEN FIRST THE NOSE AND THEN THE L WING DROPPED. THE SPD HAD ALREADY DROPPED TO ABOUT 20 KTS, AND THE RESULTING SLIDE WAS SHORT. I CUT THE MAGNETOS AND MASTER AND TURNED BOTH FUEL HANDLES TO OFF AND EXITED THE PLANE. AFTER SMELLING NO SPILT FUEL, I WENT BACK INTO THE COCKPIT TO CHK THE SWITCHES. I TURNED ON THE MASTER TO SEE IF I COULD CALL THE TWR. THE XMITTER DID NOT WORK, BUT I COULD SEE THAT CRASH TRUCK ALREADY COMING. I HAD BEEN SO CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT I HAD READ ABOUT INADVERTENT GEAR RETRACTION IN A BARON AND BONANZA, THAT I HAD OBTAINED (BUT UNFORTUNATELY NOT YET INSTALLED) A PLASTIC DEVICE THAT BLOCKS MOVING THE GEAR LEVER UPWARDS UNTIL IT IS PUSHED ASIDE. I THINK THE 3-MONTH LAPSE AND MY CONCENTRATING ON NOT MISSING ANY CHKLIST ITEM LED ME TO FORGET MY HABIT OF KEEPING MY L-HAND ON THE CTL HORN AND THE R-HAND LOCKED ON THE THROTTLE UNTIL OFF THE RWY. IN RETROSPECT, I FEEL THE ACCIDENT WAS PERHAPS THE RESULT OF MY CONCENTRATING ON THE CHKLIST DETAILS WHEN FLYING A MORE COMPLEX ACFT, AND ALSO ON HOW THE PLANE WAS FUNCTIONING AFTER THE OVERHAUL. I FEEL I SHOULD HAVE BEEN FOCUSING MORE ON SOME OF THE ESSENTIALS OF FLYING A RETRACTABLE TWIN -- LIKE KEEPING THE R-HAND ON THE THROTTLES UNTIL OFF THE RWY AND FULLY STOPPED. FINALLY, I THINK THAT BEING SOMEWHAT RUSHED ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE MENTAL LAPSE. I HAVE NOTED THAT ERRORS AND OMISSIONS TEND TO OCCUR WHEN I AM RUSHING, BUT IN THE PAST THEY WERE ALL MINOR, NOT THIS EMBARRASSING AND EXPENSIVE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.