|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : lga.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||landing : roll|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : instrument|
pilot : commercial
pilot : multi engine
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : critical|
non adherence : published procedure
|Independent Detector||aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : spoiler indicator|
other flight crewa
other flight crewb
|Resolutory Action||flight crew : overcame equipment problem|
|Problem Areas||Flight Crew Human Performance|
Upon landing our spoilers deployed and then immediately closed. The captain (who was the PF) redeployed the spoilers. They stayed out for a split second and then closed again. He then deployed them again and waited to see if they would stay out. They would not stay out so he had to hold them in the deployed position. After witnessing all this I (the first officer) felt like a helpless observer to an intense, time-consuming, juggling act. I'd like to bring what I think are some valid safety concerns to your attention. 1) because of the large amount of time the captain had to spend on this spoiler distraction, the captain's (and mine) focus shifted from applying the brakes to getting the spoilers to stay out. 2) because the captain and I were spending so much time focusing inside the cockpit our situational awareness suffered and neither of us noticed how fast we were 'eating up' the remaining runway. The result was a very delayed and hard application of our brakes because the end of the runway was now upon us. 3) of less importance, the captain was not able to deploy the thrust reversers because his right hand was tied up the entire time with the spoiler handle. How important would this be if we had landed a 'little fast,' on a short, slippery runway with a good crosswind, ie, murphy's law? Luckily this happened in the daytime, calm winds, blue sky, and a long, long runway. But change the circumstances to not so favorable conditions and I foresee a potentially very dangerous situation (the end of that long, long runway came upon us way too quick). The first thing I thought of when we taxied off the runway was a past unfortunate aviation scenario. So my #1 question for you is this, why not have the PNF be responsible for ensuring the spoilers deploy and stay deployed? I simulated, role played this with the captain (at the gate) who acted as the PF and had no problem deploying and keeping the spoilers deployed while the captain kept his hands on the throttles. This way only the PNF is 'heads down' focusing inside the cockpit while the PF is keeping their primary focus outside and on maintenance control of the aircraft, getting the aircraft stopped, and maintaining situational awareness.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MD80 FLT CREW HAS SPOILERS MALFUNCTION DURING LNDG AT LGA.
Narrative: UPON LNDG OUR SPOILERS DEPLOYED AND THEN IMMEDIATELY CLOSED. THE CAPT (WHO WAS THE PF) REDEPLOYED THE SPOILERS. THEY STAYED OUT FOR A SPLIT SECOND AND THEN CLOSED AGAIN. HE THEN DEPLOYED THEM AGAIN AND WAITED TO SEE IF THEY WOULD STAY OUT. THEY WOULD NOT STAY OUT SO HE HAD TO HOLD THEM IN THE DEPLOYED POS. AFTER WITNESSING ALL THIS I (THE FO) FELT LIKE A HELPLESS OBSERVER TO AN INTENSE, TIME-CONSUMING, JUGGLING ACT. I'D LIKE TO BRING WHAT I THINK ARE SOME VALID SAFETY CONCERNS TO YOUR ATTN. 1) BECAUSE OF THE LARGE AMOUNT OF TIME THE CAPT HAD TO SPEND ON THIS SPOILER DISTR, THE CAPT'S (AND MINE) FOCUS SHIFTED FROM APPLYING THE BRAKES TO GETTING THE SPOILERS TO STAY OUT. 2) BECAUSE THE CAPT AND I WERE SPENDING SO MUCH TIME FOCUSING INSIDE THE COCKPIT OUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS SUFFERED AND NEITHER OF US NOTICED HOW FAST WE WERE 'EATING UP' THE REMAINING RWY. THE RESULT WAS A VERY DELAYED AND HARD APPLICATION OF OUR BRAKES BECAUSE THE END OF THE RWY WAS NOW UPON US. 3) OF LESS IMPORTANCE, THE CAPT WAS NOT ABLE TO DEPLOY THE THRUST REVERSERS BECAUSE HIS R HAND WAS TIED UP THE ENTIRE TIME WITH THE SPOILER HANDLE. HOW IMPORTANT WOULD THIS BE IF WE HAD LANDED A 'LITTLE FAST,' ON A SHORT, SLIPPERY RWY WITH A GOOD XWIND, IE, MURPHY'S LAW? LUCKILY THIS HAPPENED IN THE DAYTIME, CALM WINDS, BLUE SKY, AND A LONG, LONG RWY. BUT CHANGE THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO NOT SO FAVORABLE CONDITIONS AND I FORESEE A POTENTIALLY VERY DANGEROUS SIT (THE END OF THAT LONG, LONG RWY CAME UPON US WAY TOO QUICK). THE FIRST THING I THOUGHT OF WHEN WE TAXIED OFF THE RWY WAS A PAST UNFORTUNATE AVIATION SCENARIO. SO MY #1 QUESTION FOR YOU IS THIS, WHY NOT HAVE THE PNF BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THE SPOILERS DEPLOY AND STAY DEPLOYED? I SIMULATED, ROLE PLAYED THIS WITH THE CAPT (AT THE GATE) WHO ACTED AS THE PF AND HAD NO PROB DEPLOYING AND KEEPING THE SPOILERS DEPLOYED WHILE THE CAPT KEPT HIS HANDS ON THE THROTTLES. THIS WAY ONLY THE PNF IS 'HEADS DOWN' FOCUSING INSIDE THE COCKPIT WHILE THE PF IS KEEPING THEIR PRIMARY FOCUS OUTSIDE AND ON MAINT CTL OF THE ACFT, GETTING THE ACFT STOPPED, AND MAINTAINING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.