|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Locale Reference||airport : zzz.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Anomaly||non adherence : published procedure|
non adherence : company policies
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
This is a general, non-specific report. I would like to address 2 areas that I have observed over the last 1-2 yrs, and I feel there a is trend developing here. The first area I feel is a potential problem is first officer's programming and typing away on the FMC CDU on taxi-in. With all the current emphasis on preventing runway incursions, I feel that this activity can increase the chance of a runway incursion. I need the first officer 'heads up, eyes out' during taxi-in to back me up. I am to the point now that this is part of my briefing. The chance on an incursion is just as great on taxi-in as it is on taxi-out. The second area I would like to address is improper (or no) checklist usage. I have observed this to be more prevalent among more senior first officer's. Complacency, perhaps? Particularly before start/originating, after-start, and most critically, the pre-takeoff checklist. In many cases these are read from memory, with the checklist card still in its holder on the glare shield, or laying flat in front of the first officer on the glare shield. The reader not even reading it. After all, isn't the purpose of a checklist to prevent reliance on memory for critical items?
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 CAPT RPTS SHORT CUTS AND SOP VIOLATIONS BY FO'S HE FLIES WITH. HE INDICATES THIS IS AN INCREASING PROB.
Narrative: THIS IS A GENERAL, NON-SPECIFIC RPT. I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS 2 AREAS THAT I HAVE OBSERVED OVER THE LAST 1-2 YRS, AND I FEEL THERE A IS TREND DEVELOPING HERE. THE FIRST AREA I FEEL IS A POTENTIAL PROB IS FO'S PROGRAMMING AND TYPING AWAY ON THE FMC CDU ON TAXI-IN. WITH ALL THE CURRENT EMPHASIS ON PREVENTING RWY INCURSIONS, I FEEL THAT THIS ACTIVITY CAN INCREASE THE CHANCE OF A RWY INCURSION. I NEED THE FO 'HEADS UP, EYES OUT' DURING TAXI-IN TO BACK ME UP. I AM TO THE POINT NOW THAT THIS IS PART OF MY BRIEFING. THE CHANCE ON AN INCURSION IS JUST AS GREAT ON TAXI-IN AS IT IS ON TAXI-OUT. THE SECOND AREA I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS IS IMPROPER (OR NO) CHKLIST USAGE. I HAVE OBSERVED THIS TO BE MORE PREVALENT AMONG MORE SENIOR FO'S. COMPLACENCY, PERHAPS? PARTICULARLY BEFORE START/ORIGINATING, AFTER-START, AND MOST CRITICALLY, THE PRE-TKOF CHKLIST. IN MANY CASES THESE ARE READ FROM MEMORY, WITH THE CHKLIST CARD STILL IN ITS HOLDER ON THE GLARE SHIELD, OR LAYING FLAT IN FRONT OF THE FO ON THE GLARE SHIELD. THE READER NOT EVEN READING IT. AFTER ALL, ISN'T THE PURPOSE OF A CHKLIST TO PREVENT RELIANCE ON MEMORY FOR CRITICAL ITEMS?
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.