Narrative:

Departed stansted airport (egss), a cpr airport near london, england, on an international IFR flight plan to goose bay, canada (cyyr). ATC assigned us the 'compton 3 romeo (cpt 3R) departure procedure' and we departed from runway 23 in VMC. The PIC was hand flying the aircraft from the left seat with the autothrottles engaged and the sic (me) was seated in the right seat. After takeoff, we were instructed by tower to contact stanstead director (ATC). After complying with the initial right turn on the departure procedure, I contacted stansted director and was instructed to continue our climb and disregard the initial altitude restr at 3000 ft (D5 bky). I believe we were instructed to climb to FL70, the transition altitude is 6000 ft. This is where our plan began to unravel. After takeoff our SOP requires the copilot to announce 'positive rate of climb' and for the PIC to verify it and announce 'gear up.' as the airplane accelerates (which it does quickly), the PIC announced, 'flaps up, 3 switches.' the 3 switches reference to the autoflt system. Usually the sic is prebriefed and selects heading, flight level change, and manual speed -- 200 KTS. However, this time the PIC surprised me and announced 'flaps 10 degrees, LNAV, and VNAV.' I asked him if he really wanted flaps 10 since he didn't brief it prior to takeoff and he confirmed that he wanted flaps 10 degrees. So I selected flaps 10 degrees, LNAV and VNAV as directed. After several seconds I also selected manual speed and 200 KTS to help the PIC avoid over speeding the flaps. The aircraft continued to accelerate and I retracted the flaps without direction to avoid damage and notified the PIC of my action and he acknowledged. When british ATC directed us to climb we didn't climb we maintained approximately 3000 ft and accelerated (eventually to 320 KTS, maximum 250 KTS below FL100). ATC concerned about other traffic in the area took us off the departure procedure and began vectoring us to the west. At 3000 ft we were in the clouds and in the way. We also received a TA from our TCASII while IMC. We were behind the aircraft and unfortunately, ATC added to our workload by assigning us approximately 7-8 additional headings to fly and reminding us to climb. Initially, I did not understand why the PIC wouldn't climb. I selected FL70 in the altitude preselect window and encouraged the PIC several times that we needed to climb. Although very polite, ATC also strongly encouraged us to climb and I replied, 'we're working on it.' as events continued to unfold I realized that with VNAV selected and the aircraft now heading away from our 3000 ft altitude restr (D5 bky) fix the command bars were not going to reflect a climb attitude only a level altitude in order to maintain 3000 ft. As the aircraft continued to accelerate (the autothrottles disconnected) the PIC desperately tried to keep the aircraft attitude symbol centered in the command bars and as a result of maintaining this attitude the aircraft remained close to 3000 ft. At this point I realized what was going on and I deselected all autoflt modes and gently pulled back on the yoke explaining to the PIC that we needed to climb and at that point he was back in the ball game and we were now complying with ATC's instructions. Later during the flight, the PIC and I discussed the departure event and he said he was unaware that he had called for the flaps to be set at 10 degrees on climb out. He said that it was a technique used in the g-iii (we were fling a g-iv). I have seen other pilots use this technique for a departure that required a turn right after takeoff. The flaps 10 degrees call did surprise me but it did not 'shock and awe' me. Normally, we don't use the VNAV feature on departure (although it's not prohibited) and in england where ATC prefers to vector aircraft around busy airspace, VNAV really limits your ability to maximize the effectiveness of the aircraft's automation (my opinion). The PIC admitted to me that he hadn't flown in about 6 weeks. All of the pilots in our cpr flight department have not flown much this past yr -- currency is an issue for all of us. When I flew for a major airline (prior to 9/11) the airline's training department talked about 'cognitive incapacitation' and the 3-CALL rule. What they meant was that after 3 attempts to get the other pilot's attention, they emphasized be prepared to assume control of the aircraft. The PIC's situational awareness had broken down as evidenced by his inability to respond to ATC's instructions or communicate with me. By disengaging the command bars, I removed the PIC's fixation source and I was able to refocus his attention on the present situation. The PIC is a pilot I like to fly with and someone I respect, so I did not want to insult him and my reluctance to be more decisive is probably an indication of excessive 'professional courtesy.' not flying for 6 weeks isn't good for any pilot and compound this challenge with working in a foreign country (language/accents and different ATC procedures), circadian rhythms and just plain fatigue make even minor events much more challenging to overcome. Thinking about yesterday's events today it's easy to analyze what went wrong but at the time it was a huge challenge -- this entire event began and ended in only a matter of mins!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LACK OF CURRENCY, DUAL ACFT QUALIFICATION, AND DEV FROM BRIEFED PROCS CONTRIBUTE TO A LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND NON COMPLIANCE WITH A CLRNC DEPARTING EGSS.

Narrative: DEPARTED STANSTED ARPT (EGSS), A CPR ARPT NEAR LONDON, ENGLAND, ON AN INTL IFR FLT PLAN TO GOOSE BAY, CANADA (CYYR). ATC ASSIGNED US THE 'COMPTON 3 ROMEO (CPT 3R) DEP PROC' AND WE DEPARTED FROM RWY 23 IN VMC. THE PIC WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT FROM THE L SEAT WITH THE AUTOTHROTTLES ENGAGED AND THE SIC (ME) WAS SEATED IN THE R SEAT. AFTER TKOF, WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY TWR TO CONTACT STANSTEAD DIRECTOR (ATC). AFTER COMPLYING WITH THE INITIAL R TURN ON THE DEP PROC, I CONTACTED STANSTED DIRECTOR AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO CONTINUE OUR CLB AND DISREGARD THE INITIAL ALT RESTR AT 3000 FT (D5 BKY). I BELIEVE WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CLB TO FL70, THE TRANSITION ALT IS 6000 FT. THIS IS WHERE OUR PLAN BEGAN TO UNRAVEL. AFTER TKOF OUR SOP REQUIRES THE COPLT TO ANNOUNCE 'POSITIVE RATE OF CLB' AND FOR THE PIC TO VERIFY IT AND ANNOUNCE 'GEAR UP.' AS THE AIRPLANE ACCELERATES (WHICH IT DOES QUICKLY), THE PIC ANNOUNCED, 'FLAPS UP, 3 SWITCHES.' THE 3 SWITCHES REF TO THE AUTOFLT SYS. USUALLY THE SIC IS PREBRIEFED AND SELECTS HDG, FLT LEVEL CHANGE, AND MANUAL SPD -- 200 KTS. HOWEVER, THIS TIME THE PIC SURPRISED ME AND ANNOUNCED 'FLAPS 10 DEGS, LNAV, AND VNAV.' I ASKED HIM IF HE REALLY WANTED FLAPS 10 SINCE HE DIDN'T BRIEF IT PRIOR TO TKOF AND HE CONFIRMED THAT HE WANTED FLAPS 10 DEGS. SO I SELECTED FLAPS 10 DEGS, LNAV AND VNAV AS DIRECTED. AFTER SEVERAL SECONDS I ALSO SELECTED MANUAL SPD AND 200 KTS TO HELP THE PIC AVOID OVER SPDING THE FLAPS. THE ACFT CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE AND I RETRACTED THE FLAPS WITHOUT DIRECTION TO AVOID DAMAGE AND NOTIFIED THE PIC OF MY ACTION AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED. WHEN BRITISH ATC DIRECTED US TO CLB WE DIDN'T CLB WE MAINTAINED APPROX 3000 FT AND ACCELERATED (EVENTUALLY TO 320 KTS, MAX 250 KTS BELOW FL100). ATC CONCERNED ABOUT OTHER TFC IN THE AREA TOOK US OFF THE DEP PROC AND BEGAN VECTORING US TO THE W. AT 3000 FT WE WERE IN THE CLOUDS AND IN THE WAY. WE ALSO RECEIVED A TA FROM OUR TCASII WHILE IMC. WE WERE BEHIND THE ACFT AND UNFORTUNATELY, ATC ADDED TO OUR WORKLOAD BY ASSIGNING US APPROX 7-8 ADDITIONAL HDGS TO FLY AND REMINDING US TO CLB. INITIALLY, I DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE PIC WOULDN'T CLB. I SELECTED FL70 IN THE ALT PRESELECT WINDOW AND ENCOURAGED THE PIC SEVERAL TIMES THAT WE NEEDED TO CLB. ALTHOUGH VERY POLITE, ATC ALSO STRONGLY ENCOURAGED US TO CLB AND I REPLIED, 'WE'RE WORKING ON IT.' AS EVENTS CONTINUED TO UNFOLD I REALIZED THAT WITH VNAV SELECTED AND THE ACFT NOW HDG AWAY FROM OUR 3000 FT ALT RESTR (D5 BKY) FIX THE COMMAND BARS WERE NOT GOING TO REFLECT A CLB ATTITUDE ONLY A LEVEL ALT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT. AS THE ACFT CONTINUED TO ACCELERATE (THE AUTOTHROTTLES DISCONNECTED) THE PIC DESPERATELY TRIED TO KEEP THE ACFT ATTITUDE SYMBOL CTRED IN THE COMMAND BARS AND AS A RESULT OF MAINTAINING THIS ATTITUDE THE ACFT REMAINED CLOSE TO 3000 FT. AT THIS POINT I REALIZED WHAT WAS GOING ON AND I DESELECTED ALL AUTOFLT MODES AND GENTLY PULLED BACK ON THE YOKE EXPLAINING TO THE PIC THAT WE NEEDED TO CLB AND AT THAT POINT HE WAS BACK IN THE BALL GAME AND WE WERE NOW COMPLYING WITH ATC'S INSTRUCTIONS. LATER DURING THE FLT, THE PIC AND I DISCUSSED THE DEP EVENT AND HE SAID HE WAS UNAWARE THAT HE HAD CALLED FOR THE FLAPS TO BE SET AT 10 DEGS ON CLBOUT. HE SAID THAT IT WAS A TECHNIQUE USED IN THE G-III (WE WERE FLING A G-IV). I HAVE SEEN OTHER PLTS USE THIS TECHNIQUE FOR A DEP THAT REQUIRED A TURN RIGHT AFTER TKOF. THE FLAPS 10 DEGS CALL DID SURPRISE ME BUT IT DID NOT 'SHOCK AND AWE' ME. NORMALLY, WE DON'T USE THE VNAV FEATURE ON DEP (ALTHOUGH IT'S NOT PROHIBITED) AND IN ENGLAND WHERE ATC PREFERS TO VECTOR ACFT AROUND BUSY AIRSPACE, VNAV REALLY LIMITS YOUR ABILITY TO MAXIMIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ACFT'S AUTOMATION (MY OPINION). THE PIC ADMITTED TO ME THAT HE HADN'T FLOWN IN ABOUT 6 WKS. ALL OF THE PLTS IN OUR CPR FLT DEPT HAVE NOT FLOWN MUCH THIS PAST YR -- CURRENCY IS AN ISSUE FOR ALL OF US. WHEN I FLEW FOR A MAJOR AIRLINE (PRIOR TO 9/11) THE AIRLINE'S TRAINING DEPT TALKED ABOUT 'COGNITIVE INCAPACITATION' AND THE 3-CALL RULE. WHAT THEY MEANT WAS THAT AFTER 3 ATTEMPTS TO GET THE OTHER PLT'S ATTN, THEY EMPHASIZED BE PREPARED TO ASSUME CTL OF THE ACFT. THE PIC'S SITUATIONAL AWARENESS HAD BROKEN DOWN AS EVIDENCED BY HIS INABILITY TO RESPOND TO ATC'S INSTRUCTIONS OR COMMUNICATE WITH ME. BY DISENGAGING THE COMMAND BARS, I REMOVED THE PIC'S FIXATION SOURCE AND I WAS ABLE TO REFOCUS HIS ATTN ON THE PRESENT SIT. THE PIC IS A PLT I LIKE TO FLY WITH AND SOMEONE I RESPECT, SO I DID NOT WANT TO INSULT HIM AND MY RELUCTANCE TO BE MORE DECISIVE IS PROBABLY AN INDICATION OF EXCESSIVE 'PROFESSIONAL COURTESY.' NOT FLYING FOR 6 WKS ISN'T GOOD FOR ANY PLT AND COMPOUND THIS CHALLENGE WITH WORKING IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY (LANGUAGE/ACCENTS AND DIFFERENT ATC PROCS), CIRCADIAN RHYTHMS AND JUST PLAIN FATIGUE MAKE EVEN MINOR EVENTS MUCH MORE CHALLENGING TO OVERCOME. THINKING ABOUT YESTERDAY'S EVENTS TODAY IT'S EASY TO ANALYZE WHAT WENT WRONG BUT AT THE TIME IT WAS A HUGE CHALLENGE -- THIS ENTIRE EVENT BEGAN AND ENDED IN ONLY A MATTER OF MINS!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.