Narrative:

Our flight departed london/luton (eggw) at approximately XA00. The first 2 legs that would end up in california. The flight time to teb was planned at 7 hours 49 mins and was staffed according to part 135 requirements for aloft times in excess of 12 hours. I was the second captain and was not the PIC for the operation conducted. The events and actions described were initiated by the PIC who was also the PF on this leg. The flight was planned in accordance with far 135 requirements and our operations specifications. The WX in the new york area was poor and an alternate was required. Ewr was our filed alternate. Adequate fuel was uplifted at eggw to complete the flight as planned. Approximately 3.5 hours from landing at teb, while still over the atlantic, the PIC expressed the belief that the fuel might be tighter than originally planned for a teb arrival. This belief was founded upon the assumption that we would be required to descend from more efficient high altitudes to less efficient low altitudes in the vicinity of albany, ny, approximately 130 mi from teb. The PIC used the aircraft's satcom to phone ZBW. He described the situation we were facing and asked if, with prior notice, some relief from having to descend early could be obtained. He further explained that if relief could not be obtained it would put us in a minimum fuel situation on arrival. He then offered the following to the person he was speaking with, 'you might even say we were minimum fuel when we took off.' upon concluding the phone call he placed another call -- this time to ZNY -- explaining the same issues and making the same requests. This conversation also included the quip about the minimum fuel condition already existing on departure. I did not think that there was any need to express (even once, let alone twice) anything critical about our fuel situation to ATC and thought it to be poor judgement to do so. To me, the solution was simple -- change the destination, if necessary, to one that either had better WX or one that was less flying time from our position at the time. There seemed to be no consideration on the PIC's part of doing either despite repeatedly expressed reservations about continuing to teb under the circumstances that were developing, both my myself, and by the first officer. As we entered bos airspace, they were aware of our situation and allowed us to remain high for a little while but soon we were required to descend. The PIC repeated his request to remain at cruise altitude and the controller indicated that this was not possible. The controller also asked if we were declaring minimum fuel. The PIC responded in the affirmative. Again, I found this to be a poor exercise of PIC discretion and said so. There were alternative destinations that could have been reached easily -- without a minimum fuel advisory -- that were much closer than the 200+ mi we had yet to travel when we received the first descent clearance. Eventually we were handed off to ZNY. The controller issued us a clearance to cross 10 mi north of huo at 14000 ft. We were cruising at FL240. The PIC was so preoccupied with remaining high that he misinterped the clearance and thought we were to cross 10 mi south of huo and began his descent accordingly. The result was that we were unable to make the crossing restr as instructed, even though the PIC had repeatedly replied that he would make it when queried by ATC. Though I was not on the flight deck at the time, I now believe I should have been so that I might have raised an objection to the PIC's conduct of the descent at this point. All throughout the descent and approach phase of the flight we were repeatedly asked about our minimum fuel status. We were also repeatedly asked if we were declaring an emergency. The answer was always no -- a judgement I agree with -- there was no existing emergency. However, there was also no consideration of changing destination evident in the PIC's handling of the flight. We arrived at teb without incident after conducting an ILS to a breakout at approximately 600 ft AGL. The remainder of the trip was uneventful. Despite repeatedly expressed reservations about the conduct of the flight, the PIC disregarded the advice of qualified crew members in the end. My role should perhaps have been to act as a more pwrful force in changing the thinking of the PIC but I, too, believe that waiting until a later time in the flight to make final decisions about where we would land was prudent. I believe that our landing in teb was, in the end, a safe operation. I do not believe that the way the flight was handled was representative of the best way to approach solving the problems that developed. I also believe, in retrospect, that this particular PIC set a tone several days earlier in the trip that made challenging his decisions more difficult. His response to an appropriate query from a crew member was arrogant and left little doubt that he believed himself to be infallible. His disinterest in the ideas of others is typical behavior for this individual and is a recognized problem. Company management, however, seems to be unable or unwilling to correct his attitude. In the future, I will approach my dealings with his person with a harder and more determined edge. My challenges will either be properly addressed or I will continue to pursue the matter. But they will not, however, be brushed aside. A good lesson in CRM, all in all.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GLF3 CREW DEPARTED EGGW FOR TEB WITHOUT FAR LEGAL FUEL TO FLY ALL THE INTENDED ATC ROUTING AND ALTS. THE CAPT DECLARED MINIMUM FUEL WITH ZNY AND ZBW. THE COMPANY SCHEDULED THE ACFT THAT HAD INSUFFICIENT FUEL CAPACITY TO FLY THE RTE WITH LEGAL FUEL.

Narrative: OUR FLT DEPARTED LONDON/LUTON (EGGW) AT APPROX XA00. THE FIRST 2 LEGS THAT WOULD END UP IN CALIFORNIA. THE FLT TIME TO TEB WAS PLANNED AT 7 HRS 49 MINS AND WAS STAFFED ACCORDING TO PART 135 REQUIREMENTS FOR ALOFT TIMES IN EXCESS OF 12 HRS. I WAS THE SECOND CAPT AND WAS NOT THE PIC FOR THE OP CONDUCTED. THE EVENTS AND ACTIONS DESCRIBED WERE INITIATED BY THE PIC WHO WAS ALSO THE PF ON THIS LEG. THE FLT WAS PLANNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH FAR 135 REQUIREMENTS AND OUR OPS SPECS. THE WX IN THE NEW YORK AREA WAS POOR AND AN ALTERNATE WAS REQUIRED. EWR WAS OUR FILED ALTERNATE. ADEQUATE FUEL WAS UPLIFTED AT EGGW TO COMPLETE THE FLT AS PLANNED. APPROX 3.5 HRS FROM LNDG AT TEB, WHILE STILL OVER THE ATLANTIC, THE PIC EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT THE FUEL MIGHT BE TIGHTER THAN ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR A TEB ARR. THIS BELIEF WAS FOUNDED UPON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WE WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DSND FROM MORE EFFICIENT HIGH ALTS TO LESS EFFICIENT LOW ALTS IN THE VICINITY OF ALBANY, NY, APPROX 130 MI FROM TEB. THE PIC USED THE ACFT'S SATCOM TO PHONE ZBW. HE DESCRIBED THE SIT WE WERE FACING AND ASKED IF, WITH PRIOR NOTICE, SOME RELIEF FROM HAVING TO DSND EARLY COULD BE OBTAINED. HE FURTHER EXPLAINED THAT IF RELIEF COULD NOT BE OBTAINED IT WOULD PUT US IN A MINIMUM FUEL SIT ON ARR. HE THEN OFFERED THE FOLLOWING TO THE PERSON HE WAS SPEAKING WITH, 'YOU MIGHT EVEN SAY WE WERE MINIMUM FUEL WHEN WE TOOK OFF.' UPON CONCLUDING THE PHONE CALL HE PLACED ANOTHER CALL -- THIS TIME TO ZNY -- EXPLAINING THE SAME ISSUES AND MAKING THE SAME REQUESTS. THIS CONVERSATION ALSO INCLUDED THE QUIP ABOUT THE MINIMUM FUEL CONDITION ALREADY EXISTING ON DEP. I DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WAS ANY NEED TO EXPRESS (EVEN ONCE, LET ALONE TWICE) ANYTHING CRITICAL ABOUT OUR FUEL SIT TO ATC AND THOUGHT IT TO BE POOR JUDGEMENT TO DO SO. TO ME, THE SOLUTION WAS SIMPLE -- CHANGE THE DEST, IF NECESSARY, TO ONE THAT EITHER HAD BETTER WX OR ONE THAT WAS LESS FLYING TIME FROM OUR POS AT THE TIME. THERE SEEMED TO BE NO CONSIDERATION ON THE PIC'S PART OF DOING EITHER DESPITE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT CONTINUING TO TEB UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WERE DEVELOPING, BOTH MY MYSELF, AND BY THE FO. AS WE ENTERED BOS AIRSPACE, THEY WERE AWARE OF OUR SIT AND ALLOWED US TO REMAIN HIGH FOR A LITTLE WHILE BUT SOON WE WERE REQUIRED TO DSND. THE PIC REPEATED HIS REQUEST TO REMAIN AT CRUISE ALT AND THE CTLR INDICATED THAT THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE. THE CTLR ALSO ASKED IF WE WERE DECLARING MINIMUM FUEL. THE PIC RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. AGAIN, I FOUND THIS TO BE A POOR EXERCISE OF PIC DISCRETION AND SAID SO. THERE WERE ALTERNATIVE DESTS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN REACHED EASILY -- WITHOUT A MINIMUM FUEL ADVISORY -- THAT WERE MUCH CLOSER THAN THE 200+ MI WE HAD YET TO TRAVEL WHEN WE RECEIVED THE FIRST DSCNT CLRNC. EVENTUALLY WE WERE HANDED OFF TO ZNY. THE CTLR ISSUED US A CLRNC TO CROSS 10 MI N OF HUO AT 14000 FT. WE WERE CRUISING AT FL240. THE PIC WAS SO PREOCCUPIED WITH REMAINING HIGH THAT HE MISINTERPED THE CLRNC AND THOUGHT WE WERE TO CROSS 10 MI S OF HUO AND BEGAN HIS DSCNT ACCORDINGLY. THE RESULT WAS THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO MAKE THE XING RESTR AS INSTRUCTED, EVEN THOUGH THE PIC HAD REPEATEDLY REPLIED THAT HE WOULD MAKE IT WHEN QUERIED BY ATC. THOUGH I WAS NOT ON THE FLT DECK AT THE TIME, I NOW BELIEVE I SHOULD HAVE BEEN SO THAT I MIGHT HAVE RAISED AN OBJECTION TO THE PIC'S CONDUCT OF THE DSCNT AT THIS POINT. ALL THROUGHOUT THE DSCNT AND APCH PHASE OF THE FLT WE WERE REPEATEDLY ASKED ABOUT OUR MINIMUM FUEL STATUS. WE WERE ALSO REPEATEDLY ASKED IF WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER. THE ANSWER WAS ALWAYS NO -- A JUDGEMENT I AGREE WITH -- THERE WAS NO EXISTING EMER. HOWEVER, THERE WAS ALSO NO CONSIDERATION OF CHANGING DEST EVIDENT IN THE PIC'S HANDLING OF THE FLT. WE ARRIVED AT TEB WITHOUT INCIDENT AFTER CONDUCTING AN ILS TO A BREAKOUT AT APPROX 600 FT AGL. THE REMAINDER OF THE TRIP WAS UNEVENTFUL. DESPITE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE CONDUCT OF THE FLT, THE PIC DISREGARDED THE ADVICE OF QUALIFIED CREW MEMBERS IN THE END. MY ROLE SHOULD PERHAPS HAVE BEEN TO ACT AS A MORE PWRFUL FORCE IN CHANGING THE THINKING OF THE PIC BUT I, TOO, BELIEVE THAT WAITING UNTIL A LATER TIME IN THE FLT TO MAKE FINAL DECISIONS ABOUT WHERE WE WOULD LAND WAS PRUDENT. I BELIEVE THAT OUR LNDG IN TEB WAS, IN THE END, A SAFE OP. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE WAY THE FLT WAS HANDLED WAS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BEST WAY TO APCH SOLVING THE PROBS THAT DEVELOPED. I ALSO BELIEVE, IN RETROSPECT, THAT THIS PARTICULAR PIC SET A TONE SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER IN THE TRIP THAT MADE CHALLENGING HIS DECISIONS MORE DIFFICULT. HIS RESPONSE TO AN APPROPRIATE QUERY FROM A CREW MEMBER WAS ARROGANT AND LEFT LITTLE DOUBT THAT HE BELIEVED HIMSELF TO BE INFALLIBLE. HIS DISINTEREST IN THE IDEAS OF OTHERS IS TYPICAL BEHAVIOR FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL AND IS A RECOGNIZED PROB. COMPANY MGMNT, HOWEVER, SEEMS TO BE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO CORRECT HIS ATTITUDE. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL APCH MY DEALINGS WITH HIS PERSON WITH A HARDER AND MORE DETERMINED EDGE. MY CHALLENGES WILL EITHER BE PROPERLY ADDRESSED OR I WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE MATTER. BUT THEY WILL NOT, HOWEVER, BE BRUSHED ASIDE. A GOOD LESSON IN CRM, ALL IN ALL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.