Narrative:

The captain and I received the aircraft, ran all appropriate checklists and no discrepancies were noted. We performed the before takeoff checklist and takeoff confign test -- everything checked ok. As we were cleared for takeoff, I advanced the thrust levers to the takeoff setting. As the aircraft began to move under power, we received an EICAS warning -- 'takeoff confign.' there was no aural warning, all parameters were normal. We aborted the takeoff as per company SOP. The message cleared and we could not duplicate the message. We again ran all the appropriate checklists and taxied back for takeoff. Again we conducted all pre-takeoff checks and procedures -- everything checked normal, and the takeoff confign test checked ok. We were again cleared for takeoff. We began the takeoff and again the takeoff confign warning sounded. We aborted the takeoff as per SOP ran all checklists, notified maintenance personnel and returned to the gate. After removing the passenger, maintenance personnel and an FAA inspector came onboard. The FAA inspector wanted to know why we aborted twice, and did not return to the gate after the first abort. We explained what had happened and that all parameters checked normal and we could not duplicate the warning. We also explained that these 'electric jets' are much like our home computers and sometimes get electrical glitches. Maintenance personnel pwred down the aircraft, pwred it back up -- and we conducted a high speed taxi test to see if we could duplicate the situation. Everything operationally checked ok. The maintenance write up was cleared and the aircraft was returned to service. We reboarded and continued our scheduled service without incidence. You are probably wondering why I am even submitting this form. First, I'm sure the 2 aborts got the FAA inspector's attention as it should have. 2ND, it made me second guess myself after the fact. Did we do the right thing. 3RD, it made me aware that I need to become more familiar with our SOP and gom procedures. The captain and I discussed this event at great length. I reviewed our gom and SOP procedures as well as our pilot read file and it reinstated that we had acted correctly in our actions. The lesson I learned from this was just don't be familiar with gom procedures, take the time to fully understand them. Review them -- I believe this will only make me a safer pilot, and a well prepared captain.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB145 FLT CREW EXPERIENCED 2 TKOF CONFIGN WARNINGS ON TKOF.

Narrative: THE CAPT AND I RECEIVED THE ACFT, RAN ALL APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS AND NO DISCREPANCIES WERE NOTED. WE PERFORMED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AND TKOF CONFIGN TEST -- EVERYTHING CHKED OK. AS WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF, I ADVANCED THE THRUST LEVERS TO THE TKOF SETTING. AS THE ACFT BEGAN TO MOVE UNDER PWR, WE RECEIVED AN EICAS WARNING -- 'TKOF CONFIGN.' THERE WAS NO AURAL WARNING, ALL PARAMETERS WERE NORMAL. WE ABORTED THE TKOF AS PER COMPANY SOP. THE MESSAGE CLRED AND WE COULD NOT DUPLICATE THE MESSAGE. WE AGAIN RAN ALL THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS AND TAXIED BACK FOR TKOF. AGAIN WE CONDUCTED ALL PRE-TKOF CHKS AND PROCS -- EVERYTHING CHKED NORMAL, AND THE TKOF CONFIGN TEST CHKED OK. WE WERE AGAIN CLRED FOR TKOF. WE BEGAN THE TKOF AND AGAIN THE TKOF CONFIGN WARNING SOUNDED. WE ABORTED THE TKOF AS PER SOP RAN ALL CHKLISTS, NOTIFIED MAINT PERSONNEL AND RETURNED TO THE GATE. AFTER REMOVING THE PAX, MAINT PERSONNEL AND AN FAA INSPECTOR CAME ONBOARD. THE FAA INSPECTOR WANTED TO KNOW WHY WE ABORTED TWICE, AND DID NOT RETURN TO THE GATE AFTER THE FIRST ABORT. WE EXPLAINED WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND THAT ALL PARAMETERS CHKED NORMAL AND WE COULD NOT DUPLICATE THE WARNING. WE ALSO EXPLAINED THAT THESE 'ELECTRIC JETS' ARE MUCH LIKE OUR HOME COMPUTERS AND SOMETIMES GET ELECTRICAL GLITCHES. MAINT PERSONNEL PWRED DOWN THE ACFT, PWRED IT BACK UP -- AND WE CONDUCTED A HIGH SPD TAXI TEST TO SEE IF WE COULD DUPLICATE THE SIT. EVERYTHING OPERATIONALLY CHKED OK. THE MAINT WRITE UP WAS CLRED AND THE ACFT WAS RETURNED TO SVC. WE REBOARDED AND CONTINUED OUR SCHEDULED SVC WITHOUT INCIDENCE. YOU ARE PROBABLY WONDERING WHY I AM EVEN SUBMITTING THIS FORM. FIRST, I'M SURE THE 2 ABORTS GOT THE FAA INSPECTOR'S ATTN AS IT SHOULD HAVE. 2ND, IT MADE ME SECOND GUESS MYSELF AFTER THE FACT. DID WE DO THE RIGHT THING. 3RD, IT MADE ME AWARE THAT I NEED TO BECOME MORE FAMILIAR WITH OUR SOP AND GOM PROCS. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THIS EVENT AT GREAT LENGTH. I REVIEWED OUR GOM AND SOP PROCS AS WELL AS OUR PLT READ FILE AND IT REINSTATED THAT WE HAD ACTED CORRECTLY IN OUR ACTIONS. THE LESSON I LEARNED FROM THIS WAS JUST DON'T BE FAMILIAR WITH GOM PROCS, TAKE THE TIME TO FULLY UNDERSTAND THEM. REVIEW THEM -- I BELIEVE THIS WILL ONLY MAKE ME A SAFER PLT, AND A WELL PREPARED CAPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.