Narrative:

We departed runway 22 in laguardia on the SID, which brings us to 2.5 DME and then a left turn to a heading of 070 degrees. However, when we reached 2.5 DME, the captain ordered a right turn instead of a left, and I simply dialed in the right turn to 070 degrees on the mode C control panel. A few moments later new york departure told us to turn left to 040 degrees, and then just a moment later a somewhat panicked departure control voice told us to 'turn right, turn right to a heading of 360 degrees!' she then pointed out our conflicting traffic 600 ft below us (we were climbing and I believe he was descending), and just a moment later we got the TA. We obviously turned right instead of left as per the departure procedure. I still can't believe we did it, nor the near miss we almost caused. Here's what I did wrong: 1) I didn't properly read the departure procedure. I glanced at it, but it wasn't my takeoff, so I didn't study it. I won't do that again. From now on I'll study the departure (along with other procedures and the airport diagram) as though I'm flying them. 2) not only did the captain have less than 80 hours in the airplane, but he's only been a captain for less than 80 hours, and he was unfamiliar with laguardia departures. I'm used to flying with very experienced capts, and got too used to the capts knowing everything. 3) runway 22 departure. In 12 yrs I've probably taken off from this runway 3 times. At lga, we usually depart runway 13 or 31, and both of those runways are right hand turn departures. When the captain said right turn to 070 degrees, a right turn sounded ok. 4) the autothrottles kicked off at 800 ft and then at maybe 1500 ft. I initially ignored them, but the captain wanted them on so I was trying to get them on and was getting behind in the takeoff items. When the turn came at 2.5 DME, I was still working on my takeoff procedures that should have been done earlier. I should have ignored the captain's concern over the autothrottle, and I should have transitioned to the instruments and the procedures to insure someone was flying the airplane, as captain was playing with the autothrottle switch. 5) although I perceived something was not correct when the captain said he was turning right, I was behind in my duties because I was screwing with the autothrottles. I wanted to look at the departure sheet, but I felt behind and was using my time to catch up on the items I didn't do. I think this is what I feel worst about. I knew something was wrong, but I foolishly didn't stop and analyze the feeling. 6) I had the airport diagram in front of me, and not the departure procedure, as required. As we left the terminal area, the tower asked if we'd be ready for takeoff when we reached the departure end of the runway. We said yes, but I was really scrambling to get my items completed. If we had more time, I would have brought the departure plate to the front of my yoke clip. I detest getting rushed, and I'll work hard to slow things down. I'm sure I could have simply said to the captain that I won't be ready by the time we get to the runway. I'll do that next time. 7) I was tired and in pain. I woke up with unexpected back pain (this is unusual for me), which kept me up pretty much of the rest of the night. My wife even told me I should call in sick, but I knew with this short notice, crew scheduling probably couldn't get anyone to fly the trip, so I thought I'd tough it out. And the trip was only 2 short legs. What a mistake. I was so uncomfortable sitting, that I kept twisting and moving in my seat trying to minimize the pain. I must have taken 20 ibuprofen over an 8 hour period, and was so uncomfortable that concentrating was difficult. I called in sick for the next day. I think tiredness and fatigue are the greatest contributing factor to all the NASA forms that I've written throughout my flying career. I greatly appreciate this NASA aviation reporting program. Besides giving us pilots some protection, it's a tool that lets us think through the incident thoroughly, and work out potential solutions. Supplemental information from acn 587389: clearance -- as filed lga direct dca, lga 9 SID, runway 22. Runway 13/31 closed. All pretkof checklists completed. Executed a normal takeoff along with applicable company procedures on climb out. Autothrottles disengaged at some point during the initial climb out. Passing through 1500-2000 ft PNF checked in with departure control. Prior to the lga 2.5 NM fix, ATC cleared the aircraft to climb to 12000 ft. Both pilots confirmed the correct altitude was set in the altitude window. PNF called for the after takeoff checklist and was adjusting the throttles manually to control the rapid acceleration of the aircraft without the autothrottles operating. As per the SID at the lga 2.5 DME, PF called for heading of 070 degrees and momentarily initiated a hesitant right turn allowing the aircraft to drift right for approximately 30-40 degrees (heading 260 degrees approximately). ATC issued a left turn to 040 degrees immediately. PF commenced a left turn with again an immediate ATC corrected vector for a right turn to 040 degrees and to expedite our climb for traffic. Now a little confused, PF ceased the left turn and started an immediate right turn to 040 degrees and expedited our climb. At this time we received a TA on our TCASII. After stabilizing on a right turn, ATC issued a frequency change with no other instructions or comments. Remaining flight uneventful. Due to the fact of using a highly unusual departure runway/procedure, autothrottles disengaging, and receiving an altitude clearance just prior to the turn fix there was some initial hesitation in executing a timely turn to the left to the 070 degree heading as per the SID.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ALERT DEP CTLR PREVENTS A LOSS OF SEPARATION WHEN A DEP B737-300 TURNS THE WRONG WAY ON THE LGA 9 SID OFF RWY 22 AT LGA, NY.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED RWY 22 IN LAGUARDIA ON THE SID, WHICH BRINGS US TO 2.5 DME AND THEN A L TURN TO A HEADING OF 070 DEGS. HOWEVER, WHEN WE REACHED 2.5 DME, THE CAPT ORDERED A R TURN INSTEAD OF A L, AND I SIMPLY DIALED IN THE R TURN TO 070 DEGS ON THE MODE C CTL PANEL. A FEW MOMENTS LATER NEW YORK DEP TOLD US TO TURN L TO 040 DEGS, AND THEN JUST A MOMENT LATER A SOMEWHAT PANICKED DEP CTL VOICE TOLD US TO 'TURN R, TURN R TO A HEADING OF 360 DEGS!' SHE THEN POINTED OUT OUR CONFLICTING TFC 600 FT BELOW US (WE WERE CLBING AND I BELIEVE HE WAS DSNDING), AND JUST A MOMENT LATER WE GOT THE TA. WE OBVIOUSLY TURNED R INSTEAD OF L AS PER THE DEP PROC. I STILL CAN'T BELIEVE WE DID IT, NOR THE NEAR MISS WE ALMOST CAUSED. HERE'S WHAT I DID WRONG: 1) I DIDN'T PROPERLY READ THE DEP PROC. I GLANCED AT IT, BUT IT WASN'T MY TKOF, SO I DIDN'T STUDY IT. I WON'T DO THAT AGAIN. FROM NOW ON I'LL STUDY THE DEP (ALONG WITH OTHER PROCS AND THE ARPT DIAGRAM) AS THOUGH I'M FLYING THEM. 2) NOT ONLY DID THE CAPT HAVE LESS THAN 80 HRS IN THE AIRPLANE, BUT HE'S ONLY BEEN A CAPT FOR LESS THAN 80 HRS, AND HE WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH LAGUARDIA DEPS. I'M USED TO FLYING WITH VERY EXPERIENCED CAPTS, AND GOT TOO USED TO THE CAPTS KNOWING EVERYTHING. 3) RWY 22 DEP. IN 12 YRS I'VE PROBABLY TAKEN OFF FROM THIS RWY 3 TIMES. AT LGA, WE USUALLY DEPART RWY 13 OR 31, AND BOTH OF THOSE RWYS ARE R HAND TURN DEPS. WHEN THE CAPT SAID R TURN TO 070 DEGS, A R TURN SOUNDED OK. 4) THE AUTOTHROTTLES KICKED OFF AT 800 FT AND THEN AT MAYBE 1500 FT. I INITIALLY IGNORED THEM, BUT THE CAPT WANTED THEM ON SO I WAS TRYING TO GET THEM ON AND WAS GETTING BEHIND IN THE TKOF ITEMS. WHEN THE TURN CAME AT 2.5 DME, I WAS STILL WORKING ON MY TKOF PROCS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE EARLIER. I SHOULD HAVE IGNORED THE CAPT'S CONCERN OVER THE AUTOTHROTTLE, AND I SHOULD HAVE TRANSITIONED TO THE INSTS AND THE PROCS TO INSURE SOMEONE WAS FLYING THE AIRPLANE, AS CAPT WAS PLAYING WITH THE AUTOTHROTTLE SWITCH. 5) ALTHOUGH I PERCEIVED SOMETHING WAS NOT CORRECT WHEN THE CAPT SAID HE WAS TURNING R, I WAS BEHIND IN MY DUTIES BECAUSE I WAS SCREWING WITH THE AUTOTHROTTLES. I WANTED TO LOOK AT THE DEP SHEET, BUT I FELT BEHIND AND WAS USING MY TIME TO CATCH UP ON THE ITEMS I DIDN'T DO. I THINK THIS IS WHAT I FEEL WORST ABOUT. I KNEW SOMETHING WAS WRONG, BUT I FOOLISHLY DIDN'T STOP AND ANALYZE THE FEELING. 6) I HAD THE ARPT DIAGRAM IN FRONT OF ME, AND NOT THE DEP PROC, AS REQUIRED. AS WE LEFT THE TERMINAL AREA, THE TWR ASKED IF WE'D BE READY FOR TKOF WHEN WE REACHED THE DEP END OF THE RWY. WE SAID YES, BUT I WAS REALLY SCRAMBLING TO GET MY ITEMS COMPLETED. IF WE HAD MORE TIME, I WOULD HAVE BROUGHT THE DEP PLATE TO THE FRONT OF MY YOKE CLIP. I DETEST GETTING RUSHED, AND I'LL WORK HARD TO SLOW THINGS DOWN. I'M SURE I COULD HAVE SIMPLY SAID TO THE CAPT THAT I WON'T BE READY BY THE TIME WE GET TO THE RWY. I'LL DO THAT NEXT TIME. 7) I WAS TIRED AND IN PAIN. I WOKE UP WITH UNEXPECTED BACK PAIN (THIS IS UNUSUAL FOR ME), WHICH KEPT ME UP PRETTY MUCH OF THE REST OF THE NIGHT. MY WIFE EVEN TOLD ME I SHOULD CALL IN SICK, BUT I KNEW WITH THIS SHORT NOTICE, CREW SCHEDULING PROBABLY COULDN'T GET ANYONE TO FLY THE TRIP, SO I THOUGHT I'D TOUGH IT OUT. AND THE TRIP WAS ONLY 2 SHORT LEGS. WHAT A MISTAKE. I WAS SO UNCOMFORTABLE SITTING, THAT I KEPT TWISTING AND MOVING IN MY SEAT TRYING TO MINIMIZE THE PAIN. I MUST HAVE TAKEN 20 IBUPROFEN OVER AN 8 HR PERIOD, AND WAS SO UNCOMFORTABLE THAT CONCENTRATING WAS DIFFICULT. I CALLED IN SICK FOR THE NEXT DAY. I THINK TIREDNESS AND FATIGUE ARE THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO ALL THE NASA FORMS THAT I'VE WRITTEN THROUGHOUT MY FLYING CAREER. I GREATLY APPRECIATE THIS NASA AVIATION RPTING PROGRAM. BESIDES GIVING US PLTS SOME PROTECTION, IT'S A TOOL THAT LETS US THINK THROUGH THE INCIDENT THOROUGHLY, AND WORK OUT POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 587389: CLRNC -- AS FILED LGA DIRECT DCA, LGA 9 SID, RWY 22. RWY 13/31 CLOSED. ALL PRETKOF CHKLISTS COMPLETED. EXECUTED A NORMAL TKOF ALONG WITH APPLICABLE COMPANY PROCS ON CLBOUT. AUTOTHROTTLES DISENGAGED AT SOME POINT DURING THE INITIAL CLBOUT. PASSING THROUGH 1500-2000 FT PNF CHKED IN WITH DEP CTL. PRIOR TO THE LGA 2.5 NM FIX, ATC CLRED THE ACFT TO CLB TO 12000 FT. BOTH PLTS CONFIRMED THE CORRECT ALT WAS SET IN THE ALT WINDOW. PNF CALLED FOR THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST AND WAS ADJUSTING THE THROTTLES MANUALLY TO CTL THE RAPID ACCELERATION OF THE ACFT WITHOUT THE AUTOTHROTTLES OPERATING. AS PER THE SID AT THE LGA 2.5 DME, PF CALLED FOR HEADING OF 070 DEGS AND MOMENTARILY INITIATED A HESITANT R TURN ALLOWING THE ACFT TO DRIFT R FOR APPROX 30-40 DEGS (HEADING 260 DEGS APPROX). ATC ISSUED A L TURN TO 040 DEGS IMMEDIATELY. PF COMMENCED A L TURN WITH AGAIN AN IMMEDIATE ATC CORRECTED VECTOR FOR A R TURN TO 040 DEGS AND TO EXPEDITE OUR CLB FOR TFC. NOW A LITTLE CONFUSED, PF CEASED THE L TURN AND STARTED AN IMMEDIATE R TURN TO 040 DEGS AND EXPEDITED OUR CLB. AT THIS TIME WE RECEIVED A TA ON OUR TCASII. AFTER STABILIZING ON A R TURN, ATC ISSUED A FREQ CHANGE WITH NO OTHER INSTRUCTIONS OR COMMENTS. REMAINING FLT UNEVENTFUL. DUE TO THE FACT OF USING A HIGHLY UNUSUAL DEP RWY/PROC, AUTOTHROTTLES DISENGAGING, AND RECEIVING AN ALT CLRNC JUST PRIOR TO THE TURN FIX THERE WAS SOME INITIAL HESITATION IN EXECUTING A TIMELY TURN TO THE L TO THE 070 DEG HDG AS PER THE SID.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.