Narrative:

Den ATIS information 'X' was obtained via commercial radio and stated 'expect visual approachs to runway 35L and runway 35R, runway 16L GS OTS and runway 16R/34L closed.' on initial contact with approach, we were told to expect runway 35L visual approach. On subsequent handoff to another approach controller, I thought we were told to expect runway 35R visual approach. We both set up for runway 35R visual approach, and selected the ILS runway 35R approach in the FMS. In the base turn, rj traffic was pointed out to us on a visual approach to runway 35L. We had the traffic in sight, and both wondered aloud why we were going to runway 35R, and the rj was going to runway 35L (since we'd cross paths). The approach controller asked us if we were in our turn to the runway. The atomic lightbulb went off, and we realized the controller must have cleared us for a visual to runway 34R! I increased my turn rate, and lined up for the visual to runway 34R, and landed uneventfully. Problem arose -- initially told to expect visual runway 35L and ATIS did not say visual approachs to runway 34R being used. Contributing factor -- ATIS information and me expecting a landing to the east complex (runway 35L or runway 35R). Not listening on my part, close to controller (locked on runway 35L/right. Discovered by -- situational awareness. Corrective actions -- increased turn rate, and performed visual to runway 34R.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF MD90 MISHEARD APCH CLRNC, AND BEGAN APCH TO THE WRONG RWY AT DEN. MISCOMPREHENSION EXACERBATED BY ATIS ADVERTISING LNDG RWYS OTHER THAN THE ONE TO WHICH THEY HAD BEEN CLRED.

Narrative: DEN ATIS INFO 'X' WAS OBTAINED VIA COMMERCIAL RADIO AND STATED 'EXPECT VISUAL APCHS TO RWY 35L AND RWY 35R, RWY 16L GS OTS AND RWY 16R/34L CLOSED.' ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH APCH, WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 35L VISUAL APCH. ON SUBSEQUENT HDOF TO ANOTHER APCH CTLR, I THOUGHT WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 35R VISUAL APCH. WE BOTH SET UP FOR RWY 35R VISUAL APCH, AND SELECTED THE ILS RWY 35R APCH IN THE FMS. IN THE BASE TURN, RJ TFC WAS POINTED OUT TO US ON A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 35L. WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT, AND BOTH WONDERED ALOUD WHY WE WERE GOING TO RWY 35R, AND THE RJ WAS GOING TO RWY 35L (SINCE WE'D CROSS PATHS). THE APCH CTLR ASKED US IF WE WERE IN OUR TURN TO THE RWY. THE ATOMIC LIGHTBULB WENT OFF, AND WE REALIZED THE CTLR MUST HAVE CLRED US FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 34R! I INCREASED MY TURN RATE, AND LINED UP FOR THE VISUAL TO RWY 34R, AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. PROB AROSE -- INITIALLY TOLD TO EXPECT VISUAL RWY 35L AND ATIS DID NOT SAY VISUAL APCHS TO RWY 34R BEING USED. CONTRIBUTING FACTOR -- ATIS INFO AND ME EXPECTING A LNDG TO THE E COMPLEX (RWY 35L OR RWY 35R). NOT LISTENING ON MY PART, CLOSE TO CTLR (LOCKED ON RWY 35L/R. DISCOVERED BY -- SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS -- INCREASED TURN RATE, AND PERFORMED VISUAL TO RWY 34R.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.