Narrative:

On takeoff from runway 9R, we received a right prv warning shortly after applying takeoff power. The aircraft speed was low enough (about 50 KTS) to simply reduce power to idle and allow the speed to bleed off, while approaching a conservative runway turnoff, ie, not the first that could easily have been made with appropriate braking application. Brakes were applied more as an adjustment for safe taxi speed as we approached the chosen turnoff as opposed to any kind of emergency measure. The appropriate operating procedures were consulted. No special procedures were required for brake cooling. Since the prv warning had disappeared, a static engine run-up to takeoff power was conducted. The warning did not reappear. Another takeoff was attempted with identical results -- including prudent brake application. We requested taxi instructions back to the gate. The taxi back involved a long down hill stretch giving way to various other aircraft on the way. At the gate, over the next 1 1/2 hours, 3 main gear tires on the right side deflated -- reasonably assumed to be due to excessive heat. Total taxi time including the 2 takeoff attempts was 53 mins over some fairly abrupt sea level changes (for an airfield) on a warm day at a heavy weight. It is my feeling that the exercise as a whole, caused the overheat condition.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B767 REJECTED 2 TKOFS AT LOW SPEED DUE TO ENG BLEED EICAS MESSAGE. RETURNED TO GATE AT LFPG WHERE 3 TIRES DEFLATED DUE TO EXCESSIVE TEMPS.

Narrative: ON TKOF FROM RWY 9R, WE RECEIVED A R PRV WARNING SHORTLY AFTER APPLYING TKOF PWR. THE ACFT SPD WAS LOW ENOUGH (ABOUT 50 KTS) TO SIMPLY REDUCE PWR TO IDLE AND ALLOW THE SPD TO BLEED OFF, WHILE APCHING A CONSERVATIVE RWY TURNOFF, IE, NOT THE FIRST THAT COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN MADE WITH APPROPRIATE BRAKING APPLICATION. BRAKES WERE APPLIED MORE AS AN ADJUSTMENT FOR SAFE TAXI SPD AS WE APCHED THE CHOSEN TURNOFF AS OPPOSED TO ANY KIND OF EMER MEASURE. THE APPROPRIATE OPERATING PROCS WERE CONSULTED. NO SPECIAL PROCS WERE REQUIRED FOR BRAKE COOLING. SINCE THE PRV WARNING HAD DISAPPEARED, A STATIC ENG RUN-UP TO TKOF PWR WAS CONDUCTED. THE WARNING DID NOT REAPPEAR. ANOTHER TKOF WAS ATTEMPTED WITH IDENTICAL RESULTS -- INCLUDING PRUDENT BRAKE APPLICATION. WE REQUESTED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS BACK TO THE GATE. THE TAXI BACK INVOLVED A LONG DOWN HILL STRETCH GIVING WAY TO VARIOUS OTHER ACFT ON THE WAY. AT THE GATE, OVER THE NEXT 1 1/2 HRS, 3 MAIN GEAR TIRES ON THE R SIDE DEFLATED -- REASONABLY ASSUMED TO BE DUE TO EXCESSIVE HEAT. TOTAL TAXI TIME INCLUDING THE 2 TKOF ATTEMPTS WAS 53 MINS OVER SOME FAIRLY ABRUPT SEA LEVEL CHANGES (FOR AN AIRFIELD) ON A WARM DAY AT A HVY WT. IT IS MY FEELING THAT THE EXERCISE AS A WHOLE, CAUSED THE OVERHEAT CONDITION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.