|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||navaid : ccc.vor|
|Altitude||msl single value : 6000|
|Controlling Facilities||tracon : n90.tracon|
|Operator||general aviation : personal|
|Make Model Name||Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 91|
|Navigation In Use||other|
|Flight Phase||cruise : level|
|Function||observation : observer|
|Qualification||pilot : commercial|
pilot : instrument
pilot : multi engine
pilot : cfi
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 42|
flight time total : 1175
flight time type : 450
|Function||oversight : pic|
|Anomaly||non adherence : clearance|
other spatial deviation
|Independent Detector||other controllera|
|Resolutory Action||controller : issued new clearance|
|Consequence||faa : reviewed incident with flight crew|
|Problem Areas||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
A friend and I fly together on a regular basis and utilize crew coordination in my C172 to fly safely. On a leg from groton, ct (gon) to old bridge, nj (3n6), I was serving as the PNF, taking care of communications and navigational tasks. This was the last leg of the trip. I had flown approximately 4.5 hours the previous day and 3.0 hours on the date in question. Our ATC clearance read 'tmu V374 cream V16 jfk col 3n6.' we had flown this route together many times, so I knew the route, the frequencys along the way (in fact, they were still on my chart from the last time I flew this route), and the 'local' routing issues. About 6 months ago we initiated an IFR approved GPS navigation system and I had accumulated approximately 65 hours of IFR operational experience with the unit by the time of this incident. This unit had one significant limitation, it does not support the entry of a route via victor airway. All waypoints that form a change in course along a given airway must be entered. This process is familiar to me, as I have approximately 600 hours of operational experience with other GPS units that require similar programming procedures. When I programmed the GPS for the clearance, I was quite diligent about looking for these 'critical' waypoints and entering them in the flight plan (fpl) page. In this case, the programmed route should have been identical to the clearance route, with the exception of adding the kurty intersection (mandated by a dogleg in V374). It was unseasonably warm and muggy this day, so I definitely found myself rushing a bit to takeoff. The departure went as planned. We intercepted V374 outbound from tmu, with a VOR receiver backing up this critical information. We then used the GPS to make a smooth turn over kurty en route to cream. After we leveled off and completed the cruise checklist, I started calculating the ETA's for the remaining legs. The GPS moving map was set to a scale that allowed us to see the course between tmu, kurty, and cream. Sometime during my calculations, we crossed over cream and the GPS automatically sequenced to the next waypoint. When I looked up at the GPS to validate our course and saw 'dpk.' I did not question it because I assumed we had crossed CCC already. Just as I finished my calculations (which did include CCC, incidentally), the new york approach controller asked us whether we were proceeding to dpk and questioned the route we had been given. I replied 'yes, we're direct dpk,' and in mid-sentence I realized something wasn't right. The controller, who was obviously very busy with other traffic. To the point that he was refusing VFR advisories, and irritated by a couple errors made by other pilots on frequency in the last few mins, immediately came back with a vector to intercept V16 west of CCC. At that time, I increased the range of the moving map display to 50 NM and saw the error. Somehow I had neglected to enter CCC in the route, so the GPS plotted our course as cream direct dpk, a route that placed us about 5 mi northwest of CCC, or about 1 mi outside the airway boundary. As we neared V16, the controller sent us over to the next sector. The remainder of the route was flown without incident. Factors I see as contributing to this incident: complacency on my part brought on by fatigue, familiarity with the specific route and GPS unit, which decreased my normal tendency to validate all data concerning the flight. I take pride in flying professionally and as accurately as possible, but I was simply caught being complacent for a short period of time. Distraction by other cockpit tasks. If I had not been focusing on calculating the route ETA's, I may have seen the error as the GPS sequenced from cream directly to dpk. Lack of VOR backup, I had neglected to configure our VOR receivers as a backup to this route segment, in part because I was distraction by other cockpit tasks. If I had, the course deviation would have become obvious before we strayed outside of the airway boundary. Uncomfortable surface temperatures and humidity levels that encouraged me to rush pre-departure procedures to get us airborne and into more comfortable conditions as soon as possible. I neglected to compare the programmed route with the clearance route I normally do as a matter of practice, and my departure briefing did not review the route beyond cream, aside from mentioning 'V16 to jfk.' had I mentioned specific waypoints, the PF may have caught on to the error while I was busy performing other tasks. I now plan to incorporate the programmed GPS route pages into my departure briefing to ensure the programmed route matches the clearance route and the PF is fully aware of the route. The lack of victor airway support on the GPS. This is not to suggest that this feature would cure the underlying problem (lack of proper validation and backup on the part of the pilot) but would have prevented this specific route excursion. My delay in switching the GPS moving map display scale from a departure range (10 NM) to 50 NM or greater, which would have more clearly outlined the route and highlighted the fact that CCC had been omitted from the programmed route.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: 2 PLTS SHARING PF AND PNF ROLES IN A C172 INCORRECTLY ENTERED THEIR RTE IN THE IFR APPROVED GPS SYS. A TRACK DEV IN BUSY N90 AIRSPACE RESULTED.
Narrative: A FRIEND AND I FLY TOGETHER ON A REGULAR BASIS AND UTILIZE CREW COORD IN MY C172 TO FLY SAFELY. ON A LEG FROM GROTON, CT (GON) TO OLD BRIDGE, NJ (3N6), I WAS SERVING AS THE PNF, TAKING CARE OF COMS AND NAVIGATIONAL TASKS. THIS WAS THE LAST LEG OF THE TRIP. I HAD FLOWN APPROX 4.5 HRS THE PREVIOUS DAY AND 3.0 HRS ON THE DATE IN QUESTION. OUR ATC CLRNC READ 'TMU V374 CREAM V16 JFK COL 3N6.' WE HAD FLOWN THIS RTE TOGETHER MANY TIMES, SO I KNEW THE RTE, THE FREQS ALONG THE WAY (IN FACT, THEY WERE STILL ON MY CHART FROM THE LAST TIME I FLEW THIS RTE), AND THE 'LCL' ROUTING ISSUES. ABOUT 6 MONTHS AGO WE INITIATED AN IFR APPROVED GPS NAV SYS AND I HAD ACCUMULATED APPROX 65 HRS OF IFR OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH THE UNIT BY THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT. THIS UNIT HAD ONE SIGNIFICANT LIMITATION, IT DOES NOT SUPPORT THE ENTRY OF A RTE VIA VICTOR AIRWAY. ALL WAYPOINTS THAT FORM A CHANGE IN COURSE ALONG A GIVEN AIRWAY MUST BE ENTERED. THIS PROCESS IS FAMILIAR TO ME, AS I HAVE APPROX 600 HRS OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH OTHER GPS UNITS THAT REQUIRE SIMILAR PROGRAMMING PROCS. WHEN I PROGRAMMED THE GPS FOR THE CLRNC, I WAS QUITE DILIGENT ABOUT LOOKING FOR THESE 'CRITICAL' WAYPOINTS AND ENTERING THEM IN THE FLT PLAN (FPL) PAGE. IN THIS CASE, THE PROGRAMMED RTE SHOULD HAVE BEEN IDENTICAL TO THE CLRNC RTE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ADDING THE KURTY INTXN (MANDATED BY A DOGLEG IN V374). IT WAS UNSEASONABLY WARM AND MUGGY THIS DAY, SO I DEFINITELY FOUND MYSELF RUSHING A BIT TO TAKEOFF. THE DEP WENT AS PLANNED. WE INTERCEPTED V374 OUTBOUND FROM TMU, WITH A VOR RECEIVER BACKING UP THIS CRITICAL INFO. WE THEN USED THE GPS TO MAKE A SMOOTH TURN OVER KURTY ENRTE TO CREAM. AFTER WE LEVELED OFF AND COMPLETED THE CRUISE CHKLIST, I STARTED CALCULATING THE ETA'S FOR THE REMAINING LEGS. THE GPS MOVING MAP WAS SET TO A SCALE THAT ALLOWED US TO SEE THE COURSE BTWN TMU, KURTY, AND CREAM. SOMETIME DURING MY CALCULATIONS, WE CROSSED OVER CREAM AND THE GPS AUTOMATICALLY SEQUENCED TO THE NEXT WAYPOINT. WHEN I LOOKED UP AT THE GPS TO VALIDATE OUR COURSE AND SAW 'DPK.' I DID NOT QUESTION IT BECAUSE I ASSUMED WE HAD CROSSED CCC ALREADY. JUST AS I FINISHED MY CALCULATIONS (WHICH DID INCLUDE CCC, INCIDENTALLY), THE NEW YORK APCH CTLR ASKED US WHETHER WE WERE PROCEEDING TO DPK AND QUESTIONED THE RTE WE HAD BEEN GIVEN. I REPLIED 'YES, WE'RE DIRECT DPK,' AND IN MID-SENTENCE I REALIZED SOMETHING WASN'T RIGHT. THE CTLR, WHO WAS OBVIOUSLY VERY BUSY WITH OTHER TFC. TO THE POINT THAT HE WAS REFUSING VFR ADVISORIES, AND IRRITATED BY A COUPLE ERRORS MADE BY OTHER PLTS ON FREQ IN THE LAST FEW MINS, IMMEDIATELY CAME BACK WITH A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT V16 W OF CCC. AT THAT TIME, I INCREASED THE RANGE OF THE MOVING MAP DISPLAY TO 50 NM AND SAW THE ERROR. SOMEHOW I HAD NEGLECTED TO ENTER CCC IN THE RTE, SO THE GPS PLOTTED OUR COURSE AS CREAM DIRECT DPK, A RTE THAT PLACED US ABOUT 5 MI NW OF CCC, OR ABOUT 1 MI OUTSIDE THE AIRWAY BOUNDARY. AS WE NEARED V16, THE CTLR SENT US OVER TO THE NEXT SECTOR. THE REMAINDER OF THE RTE WAS FLOWN WITHOUT INCIDENT. FACTORS I SEE AS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT: COMPLACENCY ON MY PART BROUGHT ON BY FATIGUE, FAMILIARITY WITH THE SPECIFIC RTE AND GPS UNIT, WHICH DECREASED MY NORMAL TENDENCY TO VALIDATE ALL DATA CONCERNING THE FLT. I TAKE PRIDE IN FLYING PROFESSIONALLY AND AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE, BUT I WAS SIMPLY CAUGHT BEING COMPLACENT FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. DISTR BY OTHER COCKPIT TASKS. IF I HAD NOT BEEN FOCUSING ON CALCULATING THE RTE ETA'S, I MAY HAVE SEEN THE ERROR AS THE GPS SEQUENCED FROM CREAM DIRECTLY TO DPK. LACK OF VOR BACKUP, I HAD NEGLECTED TO CONFIGURE OUR VOR RECEIVERS AS A BACKUP TO THIS RTE SEGMENT, IN PART BECAUSE I WAS DISTR BY OTHER COCKPIT TASKS. IF I HAD, THE COURSE DEV WOULD HAVE BECOME OBVIOUS BEFORE WE STRAYED OUTSIDE OF THE AIRWAY BOUNDARY. UNCOMFORTABLE SURFACE TEMPS AND HUMIDITY LEVELS THAT ENCOURAGED ME TO RUSH PRE-DEP PROCS TO GET US AIRBORNE AND INTO MORE COMFORTABLE CONDITIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I NEGLECTED TO COMPARE THE PROGRAMMED RTE WITH THE CLRNC RTE I NORMALLY DO AS A MATTER OF PRACTICE, AND MY DEP BRIEFING DID NOT REVIEW THE RTE BEYOND CREAM, ASIDE FROM MENTIONING 'V16 TO JFK.' HAD I MENTIONED SPECIFIC WAYPOINTS, THE PF MAY HAVE CAUGHT ON TO THE ERROR WHILE I WAS BUSY PERFORMING OTHER TASKS. I NOW PLAN TO INCORPORATE THE PROGRAMMED GPS RTE PAGES INTO MY DEP BRIEFING TO ENSURE THE PROGRAMMED RTE MATCHES THE CLRNC RTE AND THE PF IS FULLY AWARE OF THE RTE. THE LACK OF VICTOR AIRWAY SUPPORT ON THE GPS. THIS IS NOT TO SUGGEST THAT THIS FEATURE WOULD CURE THE UNDERLYING PROB (LACK OF PROPER VALIDATION AND BACKUP ON THE PART OF THE PLT) BUT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS SPECIFIC RTE EXCURSION. MY DELAY IN SWITCHING THE GPS MOVING MAP DISPLAY SCALE FROM A DEP RANGE (10 NM) TO 50 NM OR GREATER, WHICH WOULD HAVE MORE CLRLY OUTLINED THE RTE AND HIGHLIGHTED THE FACT THAT CCC HAD BEEN OMITTED FROM THE PROGRAMMED RTE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.