Narrative:

This is a continuing problem with a procedure FAA management has forced controllers at phoenix sky harbor to operate under. This 'new' procedure is a continually changing departure runway status. 'You can depart, you can't depart, you have release authority/authorized, you don't have release authority/authorized.' what was reported this time was an airspace violation. The local south controller departed a northbound aircraft into local north's airspace without a release. With the old procedure that management has discarded, this would have been appropriate. However, the new procedure leads to constant confusion among the controllers and caused local south to believe they had release authority/authorized when they did not. Local north had release authority/authorized for northbound aircraft. There has already been one error that management blamed a controller for, this airspace deviation, and several other non-reported non-occurrences. In 2 yrs using the old procedure, no errors occurred. In a few months utilizing this new procedure, 2 errors and several incidents just not reported. Controllers do not like to 'tattle' on other controllers, so it is 'no harm-no foul.' this is a dangerous procedure as I have witnessed at least 20 of these events over the past few months. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter refers to 'recent' phx runway confign construction and runway number change. A few months ago, management and controllers attempted to improve runway acceptance rates for departures and arrs. Procedures were implemented to use runway 25R and runway 26 for departures, runway 25L for arrs. The previous procedure was to use runway 25L and runway 26 for arrs, runway 25R for departures. Specific intrafac coordination procedures are required for aircraft departing runway 25R to the north, requiring coordination and release from the runway 26 local north controller. Traffic departing runway 25R straight out or to the south are contained within local south controllers delegated airspace. The reporter alleges that he has observed aircraft departure to the north without complete coordination with local north prior to being airborne, thus an ATC operational deviation. Without a direct aircraft to aircraft conflict, the reporter alleges these 'opdevs' are classified as a 'non occurrence,' as in 'no harm-no foul.' the reporter believes this is in direct opposition to FAA handbook directives. The reporter alleges that this new runway confign departure procedure provides 'off gate to airborne' times improvement for only 1 air carrier, yet causes greater taxi-in times for everyone, which is not counted against the airlines as delays. Because of this on-demand, flexible runway confign usage, the reporter alleges confusion and concern from within the controller workforce which needs to be discontinued and return to the 'old' way. The reporter is aware of FAA hot line calls, and alleges that those concerns have not been correctly resolved at the facility level.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PHX LCL CTLR EXPRESSES CONCERN WITH RECENT PHX TWR PROC SPECIFYING MULTIPLE RWY ARR AND DEP USAGE WHICH HAS CAUSED CTLR CONFUSION AND ACFT CONFLICTION EVENTS.

Narrative: THIS IS A CONTINUING PROB WITH A PROC FAA MGMNT HAS FORCED CTLRS AT PHOENIX SKY HARBOR TO OPERATE UNDER. THIS 'NEW' PROC IS A CONTINUALLY CHANGING DEP RWY STATUS. 'YOU CAN DEPART, YOU CAN'T DEPART, YOU HAVE RELEASE AUTH, YOU DON'T HAVE RELEASE AUTH.' WHAT WAS RPTED THIS TIME WAS AN AIRSPACE VIOLATION. THE LCL S CTLR DEPARTED A NBOUND ACFT INTO LCL NORTH'S AIRSPACE WITHOUT A RELEASE. WITH THE OLD PROC THAT MGMNT HAS DISCARDED, THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE. HOWEVER, THE NEW PROC LEADS TO CONSTANT CONFUSION AMONG THE CTLRS AND CAUSED LCL S TO BELIEVE THEY HAD RELEASE AUTH WHEN THEY DID NOT. LCL N HAD RELEASE AUTH FOR NBOUND ACFT. THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN ONE ERROR THAT MGMNT BLAMED A CTLR FOR, THIS AIRSPACE DEV, AND SEVERAL OTHER NON-RPTED NON-OCCURRENCES. IN 2 YRS USING THE OLD PROC, NO ERRORS OCCURRED. IN A FEW MONTHS UTILIZING THIS NEW PROC, 2 ERRORS AND SEVERAL INCIDENTS JUST NOT RPTED. CTLRS DO NOT LIKE TO 'TATTLE' ON OTHER CTLRS, SO IT IS 'NO HARM-NO FOUL.' THIS IS A DANGEROUS PROC AS I HAVE WITNESSED AT LEAST 20 OF THESE EVENTS OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR REFERS TO 'RECENT' PHX RWY CONFIGN CONSTRUCTION AND RWY NUMBER CHANGE. A FEW MONTHS AGO, MGMNT AND CTLRS ATTEMPTED TO IMPROVE RWY ACCEPTANCE RATES FOR DEPS AND ARRS. PROCS WERE IMPLEMENTED TO USE RWY 25R AND RWY 26 FOR DEPS, RWY 25L FOR ARRS. THE PREVIOUS PROC WAS TO USE RWY 25L AND RWY 26 FOR ARRS, RWY 25R FOR DEPS. SPECIFIC INTRAFAC COORD PROCS ARE REQUIRED FOR ACFT DEPARTING RWY 25R TO THE N, REQUIRING COORD AND RELEASE FROM THE RWY 26 LCL N CTLR. TFC DEPARTING RWY 25R STRAIGHT OUT OR TO THE S ARE CONTAINED WITHIN LCL S CTLRS DELEGATED AIRSPACE. THE RPTR ALLEGES THAT HE HAS OBSERVED ACFT DEP TO THE N WITHOUT COMPLETE COORD WITH LCL N PRIOR TO BEING AIRBORNE, THUS AN ATC OPDEV. WITHOUT A DIRECT ACFT TO ACFT CONFLICT, THE RPTR ALLEGES THESE 'OPDEVS' ARE CLASSIFIED AS A 'NON OCCURRENCE,' AS IN 'NO HARM-NO FOUL.' THE RPTR BELIEVES THIS IS IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO FAA HANDBOOK DIRECTIVES. THE RPTR ALLEGES THAT THIS NEW RWY CONFIGN DEP PROC PROVIDES 'OFF GATE TO AIRBORNE' TIMES IMPROVEMENT FOR ONLY 1 ACR, YET CAUSES GREATER TAXI-IN TIMES FOR EVERYONE, WHICH IS NOT COUNTED AGAINST THE AIRLINES AS DELAYS. BECAUSE OF THIS ON-DEMAND, FLEXIBLE RWY CONFIGN USAGE, THE RPTR ALLEGES CONFUSION AND CONCERN FROM WITHIN THE CTLR WORKFORCE WHICH NEEDS TO BE DISCONTINUED AND RETURN TO THE 'OLD' WAY. THE RPTR IS AWARE OF FAA HOT LINE CALLS, AND ALLEGES THAT THOSE CONCERNS HAVE NOT BEEN CORRECTLY RESOLVED AT THE FACILITY LEVEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.