Narrative:

It was my first part 91 flight with the company since I started 5 months ago. We were a part 121 airline running an offline charter, repositioning the aircraft with no passenger to avp. On our first approach into the runway, I called 'minimums no contact,' and the PF descended just below DH as we were initiating a go around procedure. During the go around, the PF said 'darn it. I had the runway right there. I saw it at the last second.' we then initiated second ILS to runway 4 at avp. The WX was being reported by the tower as 200 ft overcast and 1/4 SM visibility. Winds were calm, and RVR was between 1000 ft and 800 ft. The WX was clear on top of the layer that appeared to be about 300 ft thick, as it was just a fog bank over the airport. At 600 ft MSL, we entered the clouds and descended towards DH. I was the PNF, calling out how many ft until minimums. Once the aircraft called DH at 300 ft AGL, I announced 'minimums no contact' per our airlines' SOP's. The captain, our airlines' chief pilot and my direct boss, did not respond, and I reached for the bottom of the power levers to aid once he stood the power levers up. They never came up. He continued down for what felt like an eternity, when the runway appeared, the radar altimeter was reading 50 ft. He maneuvered the aircraft slightly, and we touched down. Minimums for the approach were 300 ft AGL and 1/2 mi visibility. On roll-out, the tower reported to another aircraft that RVR was 700 ft. I was clearly a bit worked up. While taxiing, my first words when clear of the runway were 'holy $%#@!' I was practically in shock about what had just happened. I think the aircraft was flown about 250 ft below minimum published DH before we made any contact with runway environment. The chief pilot then discussed with me the importance of stabilized approachs, and the importance of 'determining visibility from the flight deck as a pilot' under part 91. Looking back, it was not worth the risk and stress to allow a weathered captain, and chief pilot to 'push me around,' and do that sort of thing without me verbalizing what exactly was happening, and how I felt about it. At least for the cvr. It was difficult for me to deviate from our SOP's, or take control of our aircraft, since this was only the second time I flew with our chief pilot. Considering the guy I was flying with was the entire airlines' chief pilot, I think fighting for controls would have only made matters more dangerous. I should have said more than just 'minimums no contact' to help persuade him into the missed. Or, perhaps I should have called missed approach over the radio. It is difficult for me to report this to our safety department, as we have a very small company, and the safety program manager is best friends with the chief pilot, therefore, rendering the safety reporting system other than 'anonymous.' I would fear losing my job or 'getting a name for myself.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B1900 D RPTED THAT THE CAPT, HIS CHIEF PLT, FLEW BELOW THE DH AT AVP WHEN THE RVR WAS 700 FT.

Narrative: IT WAS MY FIRST PART 91 FLT WITH THE COMPANY SINCE I STARTED 5 MONTHS AGO. WE WERE A PART 121 AIRLINE RUNNING AN OFFLINE CHARTER, REPOSITIONING THE ACFT WITH NO PAX TO AVP. ON OUR FIRST APCH INTO THE RWY, I CALLED 'MINIMUMS NO CONTACT,' AND THE PF DSNDED JUST BELOW DH AS WE WERE INITIATING A GAR PROC. DURING THE GAR, THE PF SAID 'DARN IT. I HAD THE RWY RIGHT THERE. I SAW IT AT THE LAST SECOND.' WE THEN INITIATED SECOND ILS TO RWY 4 AT AVP. THE WX WAS BEING RPTED BY THE TWR AS 200 FT OVCST AND 1/4 SM VISIBILITY. WINDS WERE CALM, AND RVR WAS BTWN 1000 FT AND 800 FT. THE WX WAS CLR ON TOP OF THE LAYER THAT APPEARED TO BE ABOUT 300 FT THICK, AS IT WAS JUST A FOG BANK OVER THE ARPT. AT 600 FT MSL, WE ENTERED THE CLOUDS AND DSNDED TOWARDS DH. I WAS THE PNF, CALLING OUT HOW MANY FT UNTIL MINIMUMS. ONCE THE ACFT CALLED DH AT 300 FT AGL, I ANNOUNCED 'MINIMUMS NO CONTACT' PER OUR AIRLINES' SOP'S. THE CAPT, OUR AIRLINES' CHIEF PLT AND MY DIRECT BOSS, DID NOT RESPOND, AND I REACHED FOR THE BOTTOM OF THE PWR LEVERS TO AID ONCE HE STOOD THE PWR LEVERS UP. THEY NEVER CAME UP. HE CONTINUED DOWN FOR WHAT FELT LIKE AN ETERNITY, WHEN THE RWY APPEARED, THE RADAR ALTIMETER WAS READING 50 FT. HE MANEUVERED THE ACFT SLIGHTLY, AND WE TOUCHED DOWN. MINIMUMS FOR THE APCH WERE 300 FT AGL AND 1/2 MI VISIBILITY. ON ROLL-OUT, THE TWR RPTED TO ANOTHER ACFT THAT RVR WAS 700 FT. I WAS CLRLY A BIT WORKED UP. WHILE TAXIING, MY FIRST WORDS WHEN CLR OF THE RWY WERE 'HOLY $%#@!' I WAS PRACTICALLY IN SHOCK ABOUT WHAT HAD JUST HAPPENED. I THINK THE ACFT WAS FLOWN ABOUT 250 FT BELOW MINIMUM PUBLISHED DH BEFORE WE MADE ANY CONTACT WITH RWY ENVIRONMENT. THE CHIEF PLT THEN DISCUSSED WITH ME THE IMPORTANCE OF STABILIZED APCHS, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 'DETERMINING VISIBILITY FROM THE FLT DECK AS A PLT' UNDER PART 91. LOOKING BACK, IT WAS NOT WORTH THE RISK AND STRESS TO ALLOW A WEATHERED CAPT, AND CHIEF PLT TO 'PUSH ME AROUND,' AND DO THAT SORT OF THING WITHOUT ME VERBALIZING WHAT EXACTLY WAS HAPPENING, AND HOW I FELT ABOUT IT. AT LEAST FOR THE CVR. IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO DEVIATE FROM OUR SOP'S, OR TAKE CTL OF OUR ACFT, SINCE THIS WAS ONLY THE SECOND TIME I FLEW WITH OUR CHIEF PLT. CONSIDERING THE GUY I WAS FLYING WITH WAS THE ENTIRE AIRLINES' CHIEF PLT, I THINK FIGHTING FOR CTLS WOULD HAVE ONLY MADE MATTERS MORE DANGEROUS. I SHOULD HAVE SAID MORE THAN JUST 'MINIMUMS NO CONTACT' TO HELP PERSUADE HIM INTO THE MISSED. OR, PERHAPS I SHOULD HAVE CALLED MISSED APCH OVER THE RADIO. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO RPT THIS TO OUR SAFETY DEPT, AS WE HAVE A VERY SMALL COMPANY, AND THE SAFETY PROGRAM MGR IS BEST FRIENDS WITH THE CHIEF PLT, THEREFORE, RENDERING THE SAFETY RPTING SYS OTHER THAN 'ANONYMOUS.' I WOULD FEAR LOSING MY JOB OR 'GETTING A NAME FOR MYSELF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.