Narrative:

The flight had been uneventful until this point with all checklist and flows performed as required. Our dispatch release had us flying the majic nine arrival into clt and I entered the required 'expect' crossing restrs at mayos, majic, and sudsy on the FMS. We were given further descent clearance and a left turn to intercept the localizer to runway 23. I pressed localizer on the autoplt control panel. The final controller told us to reduce our speed from 250 KTS to 180 KTS because he had put a dash 8 in front of us and we were much faster. The final controller gave us a final heading number, maintain 4000 ft until established, cleared for the ILS runway 23 approach. I pressed 'appr' on the autoplt control panel and we intercepted the localizer and the GS from above. Then the final controller told us that he needed the speed first before the altitude and to further slow to 170 KTS. We were still decelerating through about 200 KTS. By now, the autoplt had captured both localizer and GS. Spoilers were deployed throughout the final descent and flap extensions called as soon as structural speed limits were reached, and the landing gear was extended to help us decelerate. Then the final controller called back and told us again to slow to 170 KTS. As we got too close to the dash 8, we were given a right turn to a northwesterly heading to break us out of the localizer. We turned to our assigned heading and stopped the descent at 4000 ft. As I increased thrust several things happened at once. The captain retracted the spoilers, I moved the thrust levers forward but I mistakenly hit the go around buttons on side of the power levers. The autoplt disconnected, the command bars went to go around attitude and the annunciator on the pfd displayed 'GA' and also a 1 second warbler annunciator for the stick shaker. Our altitude was 4000 ft and no deviation from this altitude occurred, even though the command bars were at the go around attitude. The captain inquired why the bars were at go around attitude and at the same time, the controller was calling us to make a further right turn to a northerly heading followed back another turn back to the south to re-intercept the localizer to runway 23 and to descend to 3000 ft. As we made our left turn, the final controller cleared us again for the ILS runway 23 approach with a very, very tight turn right over the final approach fix at lecar intersection. We finished configuring the aircraft and called for landing checks. The aircraft landed normally and landing flows and checklist were completed. At the gate, the captain and I spoke about the approach and we both felt that we got boxed into the situation because of the descent with a close turn into the localizer, with a large amount of speed to lose because of the new landing runway and with ATC putting a much slower aircraft in front of us, being told to stop our descent once established on the GS, and then being broken off to the right with an immediate left turn back around right over the final approach fix. I asked the captain on the way back to iad if we needed to write a report about what had happened and he said no because it was not a safety issue, but if I wanted to write one about ATC procedure it was ok with him. Once we arrived at iad, I flew to chs with another captain but the whole situation was still bothering me. I contacted crew scheduling once I arrived at my hotel room and they xferred me to his voice mail and I left a message for him to call me back. The captain called my cellular phone, I apologized for the intrusion and inquired about the stick shaker. The captain told me that he was not sure what disconnected the autoplt, if it was an erroneous stick shaker activation or if it was when I accidentally hit the go around buttons on the side of the trust levers. The captain told me that the speed tape looked normal and no red was showing on the speed tape at the moment of autoplt and stick shaker 1-SECOND activation. He told me that it was not a safety issue and not to worry about it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CREW OF CL65 ABANDONED APCH AT CLT ACCOUNT TOO CLOSE TO PRECEDING ACFT. DURING MANEUVER THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECTED AND A SHORT DURATION STICK SHAKER STALL WARNING OCCURRED.

Narrative: THE FLT HAD BEEN UNEVENTFUL UNTIL THIS POINT WITH ALL CHKLIST AND FLOWS PERFORMED AS REQUIRED. OUR DISPATCH RELEASE HAD US FLYING THE MAJIC NINE ARR INTO CLT AND I ENTERED THE REQUIRED 'EXPECT' XING RESTRS AT MAYOS, MAJIC, AND SUDSY ON THE FMS. WE WERE GIVEN FURTHER DSCNT CLRNC AND A L TURN TO INTERCEPT THE LOC TO RWY 23. I PRESSED LOC ON THE AUTOPLT CTL PANEL. THE FINAL CTLR TOLD US TO REDUCE OUR SPD FROM 250 KTS TO 180 KTS BECAUSE HE HAD PUT A DASH 8 IN FRONT OF US AND WE WERE MUCH FASTER. THE FINAL CTLR GAVE US A FINAL HEADING NUMBER, MAINTAIN 4000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED, CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 23 APCH. I PRESSED 'APPR' ON THE AUTOPLT CTL PANEL AND WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND THE GS FROM ABOVE. THEN THE FINAL CTLR TOLD US THAT HE NEEDED THE SPD FIRST BEFORE THE ALT AND TO FURTHER SLOW TO 170 KTS. WE WERE STILL DECELERATING THROUGH ABOUT 200 KTS. BY NOW, THE AUTOPLT HAD CAPTURED BOTH LOC AND GS. SPOILERS WERE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE FINAL DSCNT AND FLAP EXTENSIONS CALLED AS SOON AS STRUCTURAL SPD LIMITS WERE REACHED, AND THE LNDG GEAR WAS EXTENDED TO HELP US DECELERATE. THEN THE FINAL CTLR CALLED BACK AND TOLD US AGAIN TO SLOW TO 170 KTS. AS WE GOT TOO CLOSE TO THE DASH 8, WE WERE GIVEN A R TURN TO A NORTHWESTERLY HEADING TO BREAK US OUT OF THE LOC. WE TURNED TO OUR ASSIGNED HEADING AND STOPPED THE DSCNT AT 4000 FT. AS I INCREASED THRUST SEVERAL THINGS HAPPENED AT ONCE. THE CAPT RETRACTED THE SPOILERS, I MOVED THE THRUST LEVERS FORWARD BUT I MISTAKENLY HIT THE GAR BUTTONS ON SIDE OF THE PWR LEVERS. THE AUTOPLT DISCONNECTED, THE COMMAND BARS WENT TO GAR ATTITUDE AND THE ANNUNCIATOR ON THE PFD DISPLAYED 'GA' AND ALSO A 1 SECOND WARBLER ANNUNCIATOR FOR THE STICK SHAKER. OUR ALT WAS 4000 FT AND NO DEV FROM THIS ALT OCCURRED, EVEN THOUGH THE COMMAND BARS WERE AT THE GAR ATTITUDE. THE CAPT INQUIRED WHY THE BARS WERE AT GAR ATTITUDE AND AT THE SAME TIME, THE CTLR WAS CALLING US TO MAKE A FURTHER R TURN TO A NORTHERLY HEADING FOLLOWED BACK ANOTHER TURN BACK TO THE S TO RE-INTERCEPT THE LOC TO RWY 23 AND TO DSND TO 3000 FT. AS WE MADE OUR L TURN, THE FINAL CTLR CLRED US AGAIN FOR THE ILS RWY 23 APCH WITH A VERY, VERY TIGHT TURN RIGHT OVER THE FINAL APCH FIX AT LECAR INTXN. WE FINISHED CONFIGURING THE ACFT AND CALLED FOR LNDG CHKS. THE ACFT LANDED NORMALLY AND LNDG FLOWS AND CHKLIST WERE COMPLETED. AT THE GATE, THE CAPT AND I SPOKE ABOUT THE APCH AND WE BOTH FELT THAT WE GOT BOXED INTO THE SIT BECAUSE OF THE DSCNT WITH A CLOSE TURN INTO THE LOC, WITH A LARGE AMOUNT OF SPD TO LOSE BECAUSE OF THE NEW LNDG RWY AND WITH ATC PUTTING A MUCH SLOWER ACFT IN FRONT OF US, BEING TOLD TO STOP OUR DSCNT ONCE ESTABLISHED ON THE GS, AND THEN BEING BROKEN OFF TO THE R WITH AN IMMEDIATE L TURN BACK AROUND RIGHT OVER THE FINAL APCH FIX. I ASKED THE CAPT ON THE WAY BACK TO IAD IF WE NEEDED TO WRITE A RPT ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND HE SAID NO BECAUSE IT WAS NOT A SAFETY ISSUE, BUT IF I WANTED TO WRITE ONE ABOUT ATC PROC IT WAS OK WITH HIM. ONCE WE ARRIVED AT IAD, I FLEW TO CHS WITH ANOTHER CAPT BUT THE WHOLE SIT WAS STILL BOTHERING ME. I CONTACTED CREW SCHEDULING ONCE I ARRIVED AT MY HOTEL ROOM AND THEY XFERRED ME TO HIS VOICE MAIL AND I LEFT A MESSAGE FOR HIM TO CALL ME BACK. THE CAPT CALLED MY CELLULAR PHONE, I APOLOGIZED FOR THE INTRUSION AND INQUIRED ABOUT THE STICK SHAKER. THE CAPT TOLD ME THAT HE WAS NOT SURE WHAT DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT, IF IT WAS AN ERRONEOUS STICK SHAKER ACTIVATION OR IF IT WAS WHEN I ACCIDENTALLY HIT THE GAR BUTTONS ON THE SIDE OF THE TRUST LEVERS. THE CAPT TOLD ME THAT THE SPD TAPE LOOKED NORMAL AND NO RED WAS SHOWING ON THE SPD TAPE AT THE MOMENT OF AUTOPLT AND STICK SHAKER 1-SECOND ACTIVATION. HE TOLD ME THAT IT WAS NOT A SAFETY ISSUE AND NOT TO WORRY ABOUT IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.