Narrative:

I was in the forward lavatory when the engine flameout occurred. We were at FL390 in clear smooth air and had a direct clearance to laa. When I returned to the cockpit, the first officer informed me he had run the ECAM procedure to relight and asked permission to attempt a relight of the engine. He also informed me that he had declared an emergency and initiated a descent. He stated that we were presently at FL350 level and losing airspeed. I checked airspeed and we were in a very slow deceleration passing 230 KTS. I told him I had the airplane and to continue with what he was doing. He also told me he put the remaining engine in maximum continuous. We requested and received clearance for lower altitude. Final choice was to continue descent to FL200. The first officer reconfirmed his checklist procedures as he waited to enter the envelope for restart. In-flight engine start. He also suggested an APU start as a back-up generator. Generator was started and came on line. Passenger and fuel on board were relayed to ATC. They suggested laa or lbl as landing sites. I told them we were already leaning toward ama because we were more familiar with the airport. We had deemed it more suitable to safety. The first officer followed the checklists and attempted 2 restarts of the engine with no luck because of a lack of fuel flow. First attempt was at FL292 and the second attempt was made about FL240. We also had a fault light appear on the engine start and ignition panel during the second attempt. The first officer xrefed the applicable checklist in the book on fadec faults. As the first officer was running checklist, I concerned myself with my present position, possible diversion airports, and about aircraft drift down and where we were going to end up as a final altitude. As we diverted to ama, the first officer sent a message to dispatch to bring them up to speed on our situation. We received a reply from dispatch confirming that ama was notified and standing by for our arrival. ATC also asked if we would like equipment standing by, we said yes and to relay to them that we expected a normal approach and landing. When the first officer finished sending his message, he asked me if I wanted him to make an announcement. I told him I should do that and control of the aircraft was given to the first officer as I made an announcement to the passenger. Passenger were informed of engine failure, all other system being operational, good hydraulics, good brakes, and the fact the APU was presently running as a back-up generator. I told them we would have them on the ground in amarillo in approximately 20 mins. I then briefed the purser. I asked her if she had told the other flight attendants or any passenger. No passenger had been informed, but the other flight attendants had been. I gave her the NTSB list of items and asked if she had any questions or concerns. The purser asked me if I wanted her to prepare the cabin. I stated that we would do a cabin advisory. I told her that we expected a normal approach and landing and that we expected no further complications, although it was always a good idea to review their information just in case something unexpected occurred. I also informed her that we had emergency equipment standing by and that she may see trucks following the aircraft. We then loaded the computers and briefed the approach to runway 22 in ama. WX was clear with the wind out of the south at about 10 KTS. With time remaining, the first officer did one more glance through all checklists to make sure we had not missed any items. We had a normal approach and landing on centerline and in the touchdown zone. We arrived at the ramp with fire trucks following us and shutdown the remaining engine and did the checklist. An announcement was made to the passenger asking them to be patient as would now contact company to find out what they had planned for us. The first officer and I then started a debriefing after he handed me the flameout/compressor stall/thrust loss report page. I wanted to get on the phone with maintenance to give them a brief as fast as possible. So I asked the first officer to debrief me on all that happened while I was not in the cockpit during the engine flameout. He debriefed me as I took notes. During this debrief, I noticed that the fire department was still parked around the aircraft with the local police department. I told ground control that they could release the fire department. A conference call took place between me, dispatcher, safety officer, and a maintenance controller representative. Debrief was based on the flameout report and I then answered all questions they each had. The first officer later filled in other details to both the main representative and the safety officer. At this point, many items in relation to passenger care, crew assignments and maintenance coordination took place. Passenger were taken care of. Our crew assignment was known shortly after the conference call I had with all the other departments and confirmed through the crew desk. The plan of attack was for the first officer and I to remain overnight with the aircraft and possibly fly it out or just deadhead the following day. The safety officer at my request had verified with the FAA that we were ok for a return to flight status. The air carrier poi was in a meeting but informed, as was the chief pilot. My mind set at this point was to prioritize the passenger and coordination of the incoming flight as well as coordinate a problem we were having with the passenger and the tsa. All problems were resolved. As the plane arrived, we assisted as best we could in getting the airplane and people ready to go. Supplemental information from acn 584958: on the ground, we called our maintenance and debriefed them on what had occurred and downloaded information from the aircraft system to facsimile to them. We also worked numerous passenger issues and coordinated with local personnel. We worried more about getting the spare airplane in with mechanics, and the passenger out of ama since we were told we would spend the night. At the last min, we were told the captain would be illegal to fly in the morning and we were to get on the spare aircraft and head to den. This was a problem, since the only airstairs were no longer at our aircraft where our bags were. The spare aircraft was working a weight and balance problem, so we moved the stairs and retrieved our bags. In our haste to depart, we miscommunicated and forgot to fill out a logbook coupon relating to our event. We had thoroughly debriefed maintenance, but we failed to do the standard paperwork. In hindsight, this paperwork could have been accomplished at an earlier point in the process. If this had been done, the paperwork would have been complete before we were told to leave in a hurry, and would not have been an oversight. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter indicated the engine electronic fuel control failed and would not schedule fuel to the engine. There was no way for the engine to be restarted in that condition. The captain reports landing at an off-line station is taxing to the extreme. All the things normally handled by on-line station personnel fall on the crew's shoulders. He said the engine failure and an emergency landing were the easy part. After arriving at the gate, things got complicated. One of the things that slipped through the cracks was the maintenance log entry of the engine failure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A-320 CREW HAD #1 ENG FLAMEOUT.

Narrative: I WAS IN THE FORWARD LAVATORY WHEN THE ENGINE FLAMEOUT OCCURRED. WE WERE AT FL390 IN CLR SMOOTH AIR AND HAD A DIRECT CLRNC TO LAA. WHEN I RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT, THE FO INFORMED ME HE HAD RUN THE ECAM PROC TO RELIGHT AND ASKED PERMISSION TO ATTEMPT A RELIGHT OF THE ENG. HE ALSO INFORMED ME THAT HE HAD DECLARED AN EMER AND INITIATED A DSCNT. HE STATED THAT WE WERE PRESENTLY AT FL350 LEVEL AND LOSING AIRSPD. I CHKED AIRSPD AND WE WERE IN A VERY SLOW DECELERATION PASSING 230 KTS. I TOLD HIM I HAD THE AIRPLANE AND TO CONTINUE WITH WHAT HE WAS DOING. HE ALSO TOLD ME HE PUT THE REMAINING ENG IN MAX CONTINUOUS. WE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED CLRNC FOR LOWER ALT. FINAL CHOICE WAS TO CONTINUE DSCNT TO FL200. THE FO RECONFIRMED HIS CHKLIST PROCS AS HE WAITED TO ENTER THE ENVELOPE FOR RESTART. INFLT ENG START. HE ALSO SUGGESTED AN APU START AS A BACK-UP GENERATOR. GENERATOR WAS STARTED AND CAME ON LINE. PAX AND FUEL ON BOARD WERE RELAYED TO ATC. THEY SUGGESTED LAA OR LBL AS LNDG SITES. I TOLD THEM WE WERE ALREADY LEANING TOWARD AMA BECAUSE WE WERE MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT. WE HAD DEEMED IT MORE SUITABLE TO SAFETY. THE FO FOLLOWED THE CHKLISTS AND ATTEMPTED 2 RESTARTS OF THE ENG WITH NO LUCK BECAUSE OF A LACK OF FUEL FLOW. FIRST ATTEMPT WAS AT FL292 AND THE SECOND ATTEMPT WAS MADE ABOUT FL240. WE ALSO HAD A FAULT LIGHT APPEAR ON THE ENG START AND IGNITION PANEL DURING THE SECOND ATTEMPT. THE FO XREFED THE APPLICABLE CHKLIST IN THE BOOK ON FADEC FAULTS. AS THE FO WAS RUNNING CHKLIST, I CONCERNED MYSELF WITH MY PRESENT POS, POSSIBLE DIVERSION ARPTS, AND ABOUT ACFT DRIFT DOWN AND WHERE WE WERE GOING TO END UP AS A FINAL ALT. AS WE DIVERTED TO AMA, THE FO SENT A MESSAGE TO DISPATCH TO BRING THEM UP TO SPD ON OUR SIT. WE RECEIVED A REPLY FROM DISPATCH CONFIRMING THAT AMA WAS NOTIFIED AND STANDING BY FOR OUR ARR. ATC ALSO ASKED IF WE WOULD LIKE EQUIP STANDING BY, WE SAID YES AND TO RELAY TO THEM THAT WE EXPECTED A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG. WHEN THE FO FINISHED SENDING HIS MESSAGE, HE ASKED ME IF I WANTED HIM TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT. I TOLD HIM I SHOULD DO THAT AND CTL OF THE ACFT WAS GIVEN TO THE FO AS I MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX. PAX WERE INFORMED OF ENG FAILURE, ALL OTHER SYS BEING OPERATIONAL, GOOD HYDS, GOOD BRAKES, AND THE FACT THE APU WAS PRESENTLY RUNNING AS A BACK-UP GENERATOR. I TOLD THEM WE WOULD HAVE THEM ON THE GND IN AMARILLO IN APPROX 20 MINS. I THEN BRIEFED THE PURSER. I ASKED HER IF SHE HAD TOLD THE OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS OR ANY PAX. NO PAX HAD BEEN INFORMED, BUT THE OTHER FLT ATTENDANTS HAD BEEN. I GAVE HER THE NTSB LIST OF ITEMS AND ASKED IF SHE HAD ANY QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS. THE PURSER ASKED ME IF I WANTED HER TO PREPARE THE CABIN. I STATED THAT WE WOULD DO A CABIN ADVISORY. I TOLD HER THAT WE EXPECTED A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG AND THAT WE EXPECTED NO FURTHER COMPLICATIONS, ALTHOUGH IT WAS ALWAYS A GOOD IDEA TO REVIEW THEIR INFO JUST IN CASE SOMETHING UNEXPECTED OCCURRED. I ALSO INFORMED HER THAT WE HAD EMER EQUIP STANDING BY AND THAT SHE MAY SEE TRUCKS FOLLOWING THE ACFT. WE THEN LOADED THE COMPUTERS AND BRIEFED THE APCH TO RWY 22 IN AMA. WX WAS CLR WITH THE WIND OUT OF THE S AT ABOUT 10 KTS. WITH TIME REMAINING, THE FO DID ONE MORE GLANCE THROUGH ALL CHKLISTS TO MAKE SURE WE HAD NOT MISSED ANY ITEMS. WE HAD A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG ON CTRLINE AND IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. WE ARRIVED AT THE RAMP WITH FIRE TRUCKS FOLLOWING US AND SHUTDOWN THE REMAINING ENG AND DID THE CHKLIST. AN ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE TO THE PAX ASKING THEM TO BE PATIENT AS WOULD NOW CONTACT COMPANY TO FIND OUT WHAT THEY HAD PLANNED FOR US. THE FO AND I THEN STARTED A DEBRIEFING AFTER HE HANDED ME THE FLAMEOUT/COMPRESSOR STALL/THRUST LOSS RPT PAGE. I WANTED TO GET ON THE PHONE WITH MAINT TO GIVE THEM A BRIEF AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. SO I ASKED THE FO TO DEBRIEF ME ON ALL THAT HAPPENED WHILE I WAS NOT IN THE COCKPIT DURING THE ENG FLAMEOUT. HE DEBRIEFED ME AS I TOOK NOTES. DURING THIS DEBRIEF, I NOTICED THAT THE FIRE DEPT WAS STILL PARKED AROUND THE ACFT WITH THE LOCAL POLICE DEPT. I TOLD GND CTL THAT THEY COULD RELEASE THE FIRE DEPT. A CONFERENCE CALL TOOK PLACE BTWN ME, DISPATCHER, SAFETY OFFICER, AND A MAINT CTLR REPRESENTATIVE. DEBRIEF WAS BASED ON THE FLAMEOUT RPT AND I THEN ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS THEY EACH HAD. THE FO LATER FILLED IN OTHER DETAILS TO BOTH THE MAIN REPRESENTATIVE AND THE SAFETY OFFICER. AT THIS POINT, MANY ITEMS IN RELATION TO PAX CARE, CREW ASSIGNMENTS AND MAINT COORD TOOK PLACE. PAX WERE TAKEN CARE OF. OUR CREW ASSIGNMENT WAS KNOWN SHORTLY AFTER THE CONFERENCE CALL I HAD WITH ALL THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND CONFIRMED THROUGH THE CREW DESK. THE PLAN OF ATTACK WAS FOR THE FO AND I TO REMAIN OVERNIGHT WITH THE ACFT AND POSSIBLY FLY IT OUT OR JUST DEADHEAD THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE SAFETY OFFICER AT MY REQUEST HAD VERIFIED WITH THE FAA THAT WE WERE OK FOR A RETURN TO FLT STATUS. THE ACR POI WAS IN A MEETING BUT INFORMED, AS WAS THE CHIEF PLT. MY MIND SET AT THIS POINT WAS TO PRIORITIZE THE PAX AND COORD OF THE INCOMING FLT AS WELL AS COORDINATE A PROB WE WERE HAVING WITH THE PAX AND THE TSA. ALL PROBS WERE RESOLVED. AS THE PLANE ARRIVED, WE ASSISTED AS BEST WE COULD IN GETTING THE AIRPLANE AND PEOPLE READY TO GO. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 584958: ON THE GND, WE CALLED OUR MAINT AND DEBRIEFED THEM ON WHAT HAD OCCURRED AND DOWNLOADED INFO FROM THE ACFT SYS TO FAX TO THEM. WE ALSO WORKED NUMEROUS PAX ISSUES AND COORDINATED WITH LOCAL PERSONNEL. WE WORRIED MORE ABOUT GETTING THE SPARE AIRPLANE IN WITH MECHS, AND THE PAX OUT OF AMA SINCE WE WERE TOLD WE WOULD SPEND THE NIGHT. AT THE LAST MIN, WE WERE TOLD THE CAPT WOULD BE ILLEGAL TO FLY IN THE MORNING AND WE WERE TO GET ON THE SPARE ACFT AND HEAD TO DEN. THIS WAS A PROB, SINCE THE ONLY AIRSTAIRS WERE NO LONGER AT OUR ACFT WHERE OUR BAGS WERE. THE SPARE ACFT WAS WORKING A WT AND BALANCE PROB, SO WE MOVED THE STAIRS AND RETRIEVED OUR BAGS. IN OUR HASTE TO DEPART, WE MISCOMMUNICATED AND FORGOT TO FILL OUT A LOGBOOK COUPON RELATING TO OUR EVENT. WE HAD THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED MAINT, BUT WE FAILED TO DO THE STANDARD PAPERWORK. IN HINDSIGHT, THIS PAPERWORK COULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AT AN EARLIER POINT IN THE PROCESS. IF THIS HAD BEEN DONE, THE PAPERWORK WOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETE BEFORE WE WERE TOLD TO LEAVE IN A HURRY, AND WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AN OVERSIGHT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR INDICATED THE ENG ELECTRONIC FUEL CTL FAILED AND WOULD NOT SCHEDULE FUEL TO THE ENG. THERE WAS NO WAY FOR THE ENG TO BE RESTARTED IN THAT CONDITION. THE CAPT RPTS LNDG AT AN OFF-LINE STATION IS TAXING TO THE EXTREME. ALL THE THINGS NORMALLY HANDLED BY ON-LINE STATION PERSONNEL FALL ON THE CREW'S SHOULDERS. HE SAID THE ENG FAILURE AND AN EMER LNDG WERE THE EASY PART. AFTER ARRIVING AT THE GATE, THINGS GOT COMPLICATED. ONE OF THE THINGS THAT SLIPPED THROUGH THE CRACKS WAS THE MAINT LOG ENTRY OF THE ENG FAILURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.