Narrative:

Msp international was departing and arriving runway 30L and runway 30R with intersecting departures runway 22 at taxiway M-7. WX was overcast with thunderstorms and rainshowers in the vicinity. Traffic was congested due to the WX, the hour of the day, and the fact a runway change had just occurred. It required us nearly 40 mins of taxi to reach the runway. Tower cleared us into position and hold runway 22 at taxiway M7, and we did so. I set the parking brake and began analyzing the radar returns from rainshowers within about 10 NM of the runway centerline extending southwest. We (the first officer and I) discussed briefly getting a 180 degree heading or departure as the preceding 2 aircraft from runway 22 had done to avoid the WX. We then received a takeoff clearance using our call sign to maintain runway heading, cleared for takeoff. I had keyed my attention to the call sign and 'runway heading,' as we had discussed the 180 degree heading (about 40 degrees left) for an initial heading. Instead of questioning the heading, the first officer responded to the clearance. I decided we had enough room to get the heading after we were airborne, and so released the brakes and departed. We got the headings we needed from departure control, and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. The next day, I was contacted by the company that msp tower was filing a pilot deviation for departing without a clearance. It turns out they had an aircraft holding in position runway 30L at the same time as us on runway 22 at taxiway M7. Tower had mistakenly stated our call sign in the clearance, 'runway 30 left, fly runway heading, cleared for takeoff,' intending to clear the other aircraft for takeoff. Both the other aircraft holding and we responded to the clearance and departed. We could not see the other aircraft holding from our position while holding, nor did we on takeoff, but we estimate we crossed the intersection approximately 3000 ft ahead of them. Tower realized what was occurring, determined we had the other aircraft beat through the intersection, and wisely decided not to call an abort as we may have stopped in the intersection. No other xmissions were made except to call departure. I believe this runway setup is a textbook case for poor design and implementation, especially as it is used only when the radios and traffic are most congested. Not being able to see other aircraft holding on the intersecting runway is also an inherent problem. From our perspective, by the time a crew is in position for takeoff and hold, we have proceeded in deliberate, measured steps to this point. We have completed all the checks required to takeoff. We have a departure plan relative to WX, mechanical malfunctions, and sids, and are prepared to execute it. This is a point when the anticipation can allow you to think you heard what you expected to hear.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LCL CTLR AT MSP USED INCORRECT CALL SIGN AND CAUSED 2 ACFT IN POS ON XING RWYS TO DEPART AT THE SAME TIME.

Narrative: MSP INTL WAS DEPARTING AND ARRIVING RWY 30L AND RWY 30R WITH INTERSECTING DEPS RWY 22 AT TXWY M-7. WX WAS OVCST WITH TSTMS AND RAINSHOWERS IN THE VICINITY. TFC WAS CONGESTED DUE TO THE WX, THE HR OF THE DAY, AND THE FACT A RWY CHANGE HAD JUST OCCURRED. IT REQUIRED US NEARLY 40 MINS OF TAXI TO REACH THE RWY. TWR CLRED US INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 22 AT TXWY M7, AND WE DID SO. I SET THE PARKING BRAKE AND BEGAN ANALYZING THE RADAR RETURNS FROM RAINSHOWERS WITHIN ABOUT 10 NM OF THE RWY CTRLINE EXTENDING SW. WE (THE FO AND I) DISCUSSED BRIEFLY GETTING A 180 DEG HDG OR DEP AS THE PRECEDING 2 ACFT FROM RWY 22 HAD DONE TO AVOID THE WX. WE THEN RECEIVED A TKOF CLRNC USING OUR CALL SIGN TO MAINTAIN RWY HDG, CLRED FOR TKOF. I HAD KEYED MY ATTN TO THE CALL SIGN AND 'RWY HDG,' AS WE HAD DISCUSSED THE 180 DEG HDG (ABOUT 40 DEGS L) FOR AN INITIAL HDG. INSTEAD OF QUESTIONING THE HDG, THE FO RESPONDED TO THE CLRNC. I DECIDED WE HAD ENOUGH ROOM TO GET THE HDG AFTER WE WERE AIRBORNE, AND SO RELEASED THE BRAKES AND DEPARTED. WE GOT THE HDGS WE NEEDED FROM DEP CTL, AND THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE NEXT DAY, I WAS CONTACTED BY THE COMPANY THAT MSP TWR WAS FILING A PLT DEV FOR DEPARTING WITHOUT A CLRNC. IT TURNS OUT THEY HAD AN ACFT HOLDING IN POS RWY 30L AT THE SAME TIME AS US ON RWY 22 AT TXWY M7. TWR HAD MISTAKENLY STATED OUR CALL SIGN IN THE CLRNC, 'RWY 30 L, FLY RWY HDG, CLRED FOR TKOF,' INTENDING TO CLR THE OTHER ACFT FOR TKOF. BOTH THE OTHER ACFT HOLDING AND WE RESPONDED TO THE CLRNC AND DEPARTED. WE COULD NOT SEE THE OTHER ACFT HOLDING FROM OUR POS WHILE HOLDING, NOR DID WE ON TKOF, BUT WE ESTIMATE WE CROSSED THE INTXN APPROX 3000 FT AHEAD OF THEM. TWR REALIZED WHAT WAS OCCURRING, DETERMINED WE HAD THE OTHER ACFT BEAT THROUGH THE INTXN, AND WISELY DECIDED NOT TO CALL AN ABORT AS WE MAY HAVE STOPPED IN THE INTXN. NO OTHER XMISSIONS WERE MADE EXCEPT TO CALL DEP. I BELIEVE THIS RWY SETUP IS A TEXTBOOK CASE FOR POOR DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION, ESPECIALLY AS IT IS USED ONLY WHEN THE RADIOS AND TFC ARE MOST CONGESTED. NOT BEING ABLE TO SEE OTHER ACFT HOLDING ON THE INTERSECTING RWY IS ALSO AN INHERENT PROB. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, BY THE TIME A CREW IS IN POS FOR TKOF AND HOLD, WE HAVE PROCEEDED IN DELIBERATE, MEASURED STEPS TO THIS POINT. WE HAVE COMPLETED ALL THE CHKS REQUIRED TO TKOF. WE HAVE A DEP PLAN RELATIVE TO WX, MECHANICAL MALFUNCTIONS, AND SIDS, AND ARE PREPARED TO EXECUTE IT. THIS IS A POINT WHEN THE ANTICIPATION CAN ALLOW YOU TO THINK YOU HEARD WHAT YOU EXPECTED TO HEAR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.