Narrative:

Due to prior aircraft landing and slowly rolling to the end of the runway, tower instructed us to 'go around' over the approach end of the runway. While we were executing the go around procedures, she was barking orders at a time when we didn't have a chance to fully comprehend or reply. The orders (which filtered into my thoughts after a while when the go around was stabilized) included a turn 'within 1.5 mi' and leveloff at 'not above' 1500 ft for the visual left downwind. (We had 2000 ft set in the window for ILS GA.) I did not comprehend at the time how difficult it would be to remain within 1.5 mi, and 1.5 mi of what? Shoreline, runway, tower, VOR? I either didn't hear or she never specified the reference. In the scramble of the go around, we didn't have a chance to retune the VOR's from the ILS, so we had no DME. In accordance with the fom procedures, the first officer was flying the GA, but seemed oblivious to the 1.5 mi requirement and how to do it. He was 'hard-wired' into the procedure and when he called for flaps 'one,' I told him we needed to remain with '5 degrees' and around 170-180 KTS. His angle of bank was only 20 degrees and I directed him to use 30 degrees or we would encroach on sfo's airspace. He didn't seem to immediately grasp the reason I was directing this and was slow to respond, allowing the speed to build up in accordance with the book go around procedures to 210-220 KTS. I was about to take the airplane from him when the tower controller starting yelling at us that we had exceeded our 1.5 mi limit and 'turn left immediately.' I informed her that we were already in a 30 degree turn to the left. She did not say anything else except 'cleared to land.' I did not take the airplane because the first officer was at 30 degrees and slowing his speed, and since the damage was already done, there really wasn't any point in humiliating him further. Several factors contributed to this situation exceeding the limits imposed by the controller: 1) she gave us a fairly complex clearance in the middle of a go around procedure and we were more intent on flying the airplane during a critical phase of flight. 2) a 1.5 mi radius turn is very tight for a B737 when you are not prepared for it, or inexperienced. The first officer has about 1 yr with the company, and although his skills and procedures are very good, he had no experience in this type of maneuver in line flying. 3) the fom procedures, and all training evolutions, are done as a straight out go around to 210 KTS clean to the missed approach altitude. In 16 yrs with the company and the previous 9 yrs with another carrier, I never once did a VFR go around in the simulator with a tight turn and short climb necessitating slow speeds and flaps 5 degrees to meet a 1.5 mi radius limitation. Perhaps the training department can add this to the syllabus instead of one of the instrument missed approachs. I've probably done 80% of my go around in VMC conditions over my 25+ yrs of airline flying, yet only IMC procedures are practiced in training. 4) since I was focused on making sure the first officer made a safe go around, I heard the controller's instructions, but wasn't able to think about them until it was too late. We made the left turn, but didn't comprehend how tight we needed to be until later when I interrupted the go around procedure to keep the flaps at '5 degrees.' this undoubtedly confused the first officer because he had not heard or comprehended that we needed to make a slow and tight turn to stay within the 1.5 mi limit. He was also in conflict because I was directing something different from the 'canned' go around in the fom. 5) I should have taken more positive control and the aircraft when it was obvious the first officer didn't understand the necessity of the tight, slow turn. It was a complex situation and he was clearly way behind the power curve and not catching on fast enough. 6) the tower controller could have helped us out by giving us instructions a little later in the go around and calling sfo for some relief on that very tight 1.5 mi radius.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 CREW WAS ISSUED A CLRNC NOT TO EXCEED 1 PT 5 MI WHEN ISSUED A GAR AT OAK RWY 29.

Narrative: DUE TO PRIOR ACFT LNDG AND SLOWLY ROLLING TO THE END OF THE RWY, TWR INSTRUCTED US TO 'GAR' OVER THE APCH END OF THE RWY. WHILE WE WERE EXECUTING THE GAR PROCS, SHE WAS BARKING ORDERS AT A TIME WHEN WE DIDN'T HAVE A CHANCE TO FULLY COMPREHEND OR REPLY. THE ORDERS (WHICH FILTERED INTO MY THOUGHTS AFTER A WHILE WHEN THE GAR WAS STABILIZED) INCLUDED A TURN 'WITHIN 1.5 MI' AND LEVELOFF AT 'NOT ABOVE' 1500 FT FOR THE VISUAL L DOWNWIND. (WE HAD 2000 FT SET IN THE WINDOW FOR ILS GA.) I DID NOT COMPREHEND AT THE TIME HOW DIFFICULT IT WOULD BE TO REMAIN WITHIN 1.5 MI, AND 1.5 MI OF WHAT? SHORELINE, RWY, TWR, VOR? I EITHER DIDN'T HEAR OR SHE NEVER SPECIFIED THE REF. IN THE SCRAMBLE OF THE GAR, WE DIDN'T HAVE A CHANCE TO RETUNE THE VOR'S FROM THE ILS, SO WE HAD NO DME. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOM PROCS, THE FO WAS FLYING THE GA, BUT SEEMED OBLIVIOUS TO THE 1.5 MI REQUIREMENT AND HOW TO DO IT. HE WAS 'HARD-WIRED' INTO THE PROC AND WHEN HE CALLED FOR FLAPS 'ONE,' I TOLD HIM WE NEEDED TO REMAIN WITH '5 DEGS' AND AROUND 170-180 KTS. HIS ANGLE OF BANK WAS ONLY 20 DEGS AND I DIRECTED HIM TO USE 30 DEGS OR WE WOULD ENCROACH ON SFO'S AIRSPACE. HE DIDN'T SEEM TO IMMEDIATELY GRASP THE REASON I WAS DIRECTING THIS AND WAS SLOW TO RESPOND, ALLOWING THE SPD TO BUILD UP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BOOK GAR PROCS TO 210-220 KTS. I WAS ABOUT TO TAKE THE AIRPLANE FROM HIM WHEN THE TWR CTLR STARTING YELLING AT US THAT WE HAD EXCEEDED OUR 1.5 MI LIMIT AND 'TURN L IMMEDIATELY.' I INFORMED HER THAT WE WERE ALREADY IN A 30 DEG TURN TO THE L. SHE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING ELSE EXCEPT 'CLRED TO LAND.' I DID NOT TAKE THE AIRPLANE BECAUSE THE FO WAS AT 30 DEGS AND SLOWING HIS SPD, AND SINCE THE DAMAGE WAS ALREADY DONE, THERE REALLY WASN'T ANY POINT IN HUMILIATING HIM FURTHER. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SIT EXCEEDING THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY THE CTLR: 1) SHE GAVE US A FAIRLY COMPLEX CLRNC IN THE MIDDLE OF A GAR PROC AND WE WERE MORE INTENT ON FLYING THE AIRPLANE DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. 2) A 1.5 MI RADIUS TURN IS VERY TIGHT FOR A B737 WHEN YOU ARE NOT PREPARED FOR IT, OR INEXPERIENCED. THE FO HAS ABOUT 1 YR WITH THE COMPANY, AND ALTHOUGH HIS SKILLS AND PROCS ARE VERY GOOD, HE HAD NO EXPERIENCE IN THIS TYPE OF MANEUVER IN LINE FLYING. 3) THE FOM PROCS, AND ALL TRAINING EVOLUTIONS, ARE DONE AS A STRAIGHT OUT GAR TO 210 KTS CLEAN TO THE MISSED APCH ALT. IN 16 YRS WITH THE COMPANY AND THE PREVIOUS 9 YRS WITH ANOTHER CARRIER, I NEVER ONCE DID A VFR GAR IN THE SIMULATOR WITH A TIGHT TURN AND SHORT CLB NECESSITATING SLOW SPDS AND FLAPS 5 DEGS TO MEET A 1.5 MI RADIUS LIMITATION. PERHAPS THE TRAINING DEPT CAN ADD THIS TO THE SYLLABUS INSTEAD OF ONE OF THE INST MISSED APCHS. I'VE PROBABLY DONE 80% OF MY GAR IN VMC CONDITIONS OVER MY 25+ YRS OF AIRLINE FLYING, YET ONLY IMC PROCS ARE PRACTICED IN TRAINING. 4) SINCE I WAS FOCUSED ON MAKING SURE THE FO MADE A SAFE GAR, I HEARD THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS, BUT WASN'T ABLE TO THINK ABOUT THEM UNTIL IT WAS TOO LATE. WE MADE THE L TURN, BUT DIDN'T COMPREHEND HOW TIGHT WE NEEDED TO BE UNTIL LATER WHEN I INTERRUPTED THE GAR PROC TO KEEP THE FLAPS AT '5 DEGS.' THIS UNDOUBTEDLY CONFUSED THE FO BECAUSE HE HAD NOT HEARD OR COMPREHENDED THAT WE NEEDED TO MAKE A SLOW AND TIGHT TURN TO STAY WITHIN THE 1.5 MI LIMIT. HE WAS ALSO IN CONFLICT BECAUSE I WAS DIRECTING SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE 'CANNED' GAR IN THE FOM. 5) I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN MORE POSITIVE CTL AND THE ACFT WHEN IT WAS OBVIOUS THE FO DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY OF THE TIGHT, SLOW TURN. IT WAS A COMPLEX SIT AND HE WAS CLRLY WAY BEHIND THE PWR CURVE AND NOT CATCHING ON FAST ENOUGH. 6) THE TWR CTLR COULD HAVE HELPED US OUT BY GIVING US INSTRUCTIONS A LITTLE LATER IN THE GAR AND CALLING SFO FOR SOME RELIEF ON THAT VERY TIGHT 1.5 MI RADIUS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.