Narrative:

Inbound to freeport, bahamas on BR65V, ZMA gave us a clearance limit of rapps intersection. Then, during our descent, we were told to cross rapps at 7000 ft. About 8 mi from rapps, going through 10000 ft, ZMA told us to stop descent and maintain 9000 ft. Then ZMA changed that clearance and told us to maintain 10000 ft. We started to reverse our descent and climb back to 10000 ft. Then ZMA changed the clearance again to descend to 9000 ft. Up to this point, we did not know why the altitude clearance had been changed. Then, listening to the frequency, we heard of nearby traffic level at 8500 ft. ZMA never directly told us of this traffic. All this was occurring as ZMA was in the process of handing us off to grand bahama approach. There was frequency congestion and it took some time to make contact with grand bahama approach, which does not have radar coverage in this area. Meanwhile, I had forgotten about rapps being a clearance limit and flew past it. I forgot if ZMA ever told us radar service was terminated. Grand bahama approach asked us our position after establishing contact. We gave our position past rapps intersection which jogged my memory of the clearance limit. Grand bahama approach did not seem disturbed we had flown past it, nor did they ever indicate this event caused a conflict. However, they did remind us we had not reported rapps to them on contact. We continued inbound on BR65V and received a descent to 7000 ft. There is no ATIS information at freeport and we asked approach which runway was active at the field. The answer was runway 24, which was not the runway we had expected and set up in our FMS. (Runway 6 is the preferential runway at freeport.) as we started reprogramming our FMS for runway 24, approach asked for our DME position off freeport VOR. I replied 12 DME and was immediately told to enter a 12 DME arc. I was not told which direction to arc and initially started to arc to the west which was the wrong direction for runway 24. Approach then cleared us for a VOR approach to runway 24. I realized quickly the arc needed to be to the east and reversed course before I had established the arc to the west. At the same time, we were trying to tell approach we needed clearance for the RNAV runway 24 approach. Our aircraft is not certified for VOR approachs. The RNAV runway 24 approach does not include an arc and the 12 DME arc would not position us on the approach segment at an IAF. We tried to explain this to the approach controller but he seemed confused about our RNAV runway 24 request. Instead, he never gave us the RNAV runway 24 approach clearance, but instead told us to contact tower. We contacted tower and we requested clearance to gigne waypoint, which is an IAF for the RNAV runway 24 approach. Tower instead cleared us to the baama waypoint (another IAF for the RNAV runway 24). By this time, we were VFR. We proceeded to baama and executed the approach to an uneventful landing. Summary and recommendation: changing altitude clrncs, searching for VFR traffic, a late center handoff to approach and frequency congestion contributed to my failure to remember the rapps clearance limit. I will avoid this in the future by programming a hold into the FMS whenever I receive a clearance limit. I can easily delete the hold when further clearance is received. Also, grand bahama approach needs to be familiar with RNAV approachs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CLRNC LIMIT IS EXCEEDED ARRIVING AT FREEPORT, BAHAMAS FOLLOWED BY MUCH CONFUSION DURING THE SUBSEQUENT APCH TO THE ARPT.

Narrative: INBOUND TO FREEPORT, BAHAMAS ON BR65V, ZMA GAVE US A CLRNC LIMIT OF RAPPS INTXN. THEN, DURING OUR DSCNT, WE WERE TOLD TO CROSS RAPPS AT 7000 FT. ABOUT 8 MI FROM RAPPS, GOING THROUGH 10000 FT, ZMA TOLD US TO STOP DSCNT AND MAINTAIN 9000 FT. THEN ZMA CHANGED THAT CLRNC AND TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 10000 FT. WE STARTED TO REVERSE OUR DSCNT AND CLB BACK TO 10000 FT. THEN ZMA CHANGED THE CLRNC AGAIN TO DSND TO 9000 FT. UP TO THIS POINT, WE DID NOT KNOW WHY THE ALT CLRNC HAD BEEN CHANGED. THEN, LISTENING TO THE FREQ, WE HEARD OF NEARBY TFC LEVEL AT 8500 FT. ZMA NEVER DIRECTLY TOLD US OF THIS TFC. ALL THIS WAS OCCURRING AS ZMA WAS IN THE PROCESS OF HANDING US OFF TO GRAND BAHAMA APCH. THERE WAS FREQ CONGESTION AND IT TOOK SOME TIME TO MAKE CONTACT WITH GRAND BAHAMA APCH, WHICH DOES NOT HAVE RADAR COVERAGE IN THIS AREA. MEANWHILE, I HAD FORGOTTEN ABOUT RAPPS BEING A CLRNC LIMIT AND FLEW PAST IT. I FORGOT IF ZMA EVER TOLD US RADAR SVC WAS TERMINATED. GRAND BAHAMA APCH ASKED US OUR POS AFTER ESTABLISHING CONTACT. WE GAVE OUR POS PAST RAPPS INTXN WHICH JOGGED MY MEMORY OF THE CLRNC LIMIT. GRAND BAHAMA APCH DID NOT SEEM DISTURBED WE HAD FLOWN PAST IT, NOR DID THEY EVER INDICATE THIS EVENT CAUSED A CONFLICT. HOWEVER, THEY DID REMIND US WE HAD NOT RPTED RAPPS TO THEM ON CONTACT. WE CONTINUED INBOUND ON BR65V AND RECEIVED A DSCNT TO 7000 FT. THERE IS NO ATIS INFO AT FREEPORT AND WE ASKED APCH WHICH RWY WAS ACTIVE AT THE FIELD. THE ANSWER WAS RWY 24, WHICH WAS NOT THE RWY WE HAD EXPECTED AND SET UP IN OUR FMS. (RWY 6 IS THE PREFERENTIAL RWY AT FREEPORT.) AS WE STARTED REPROGRAMMING OUR FMS FOR RWY 24, APCH ASKED FOR OUR DME POS OFF FREEPORT VOR. I REPLIED 12 DME AND WAS IMMEDIATELY TOLD TO ENTER A 12 DME ARC. I WAS NOT TOLD WHICH DIRECTION TO ARC AND INITIALLY STARTED TO ARC TO THE W WHICH WAS THE WRONG DIRECTION FOR RWY 24. APCH THEN CLRED US FOR A VOR APCH TO RWY 24. I REALIZED QUICKLY THE ARC NEEDED TO BE TO THE E AND REVERSED COURSE BEFORE I HAD ESTABLISHED THE ARC TO THE W. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WERE TRYING TO TELL APCH WE NEEDED CLRNC FOR THE RNAV RWY 24 APCH. OUR ACFT IS NOT CERTIFIED FOR VOR APCHS. THE RNAV RWY 24 APCH DOES NOT INCLUDE AN ARC AND THE 12 DME ARC WOULD NOT POS US ON THE APCH SEGMENT AT AN IAF. WE TRIED TO EXPLAIN THIS TO THE APCH CTLR BUT HE SEEMED CONFUSED ABOUT OUR RNAV RWY 24 REQUEST. INSTEAD, HE NEVER GAVE US THE RNAV RWY 24 APCH CLRNC, BUT INSTEAD TOLD US TO CONTACT TWR. WE CONTACTED TWR AND WE REQUESTED CLRNC TO GIGNE WAYPOINT, WHICH IS AN IAF FOR THE RNAV RWY 24 APCH. TWR INSTEAD CLRED US TO THE BAAMA WAYPOINT (ANOTHER IAF FOR THE RNAV RWY 24). BY THIS TIME, WE WERE VFR. WE PROCEEDED TO BAAMA AND EXECUTED THE APCH TO AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION: CHANGING ALT CLRNCS, SEARCHING FOR VFR TFC, A LATE CTR HDOF TO APCH AND FREQ CONGESTION CONTRIBUTED TO MY FAILURE TO REMEMBER THE RAPPS CLRNC LIMIT. I WILL AVOID THIS IN THE FUTURE BY PROGRAMMING A HOLD INTO THE FMS WHENEVER I RECEIVE A CLRNC LIMIT. I CAN EASILY DELETE THE HOLD WHEN FURTHER CLRNC IS RECEIVED. ALSO, GRAND BAHAMA APCH NEEDS TO BE FAMILIAR WITH RNAV APCHS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.