Narrative:

At apr/mon/03 at XA59, during a takeoff from ZZZZ, aircraft X experienced a blowout of the right side direct view window seal. This happened about the same time the main air valves were turned on after main gear retraction. I heard a loud noise from near my right ear. I looked around and a red part outside the right side direct view flopping in the breeze. The crew discussed the problem and it was determined that we did not have an immediate emergency return problem. Because of the overweight landing condition of the aircraft at the time, we continued with the departure procedure. The crew discussed the pros and cons of landing overweight. Other than the noise in the cockpit, we determined that we did not have a problem that should cause us to land overweight. We agreed that the best course of action would be to burn down the fuel load so as to land under the maximum landing weight. The return to ZZZZ, first officer, would be the best place to return for both good WX and closeness if any more problems should evolve with the right side direct view window. We got a clearance from ZZZZ, first officer, approach to hold xxxxx intersection and we entered holding and burnt down the fuel weight. After we got level at holding altitude, the passenger were told the nature of the problem and the decision to return for a landing when we were at landing weight. While in the hold, we could hold the cabin altitude about 1500-1800 ft while the aircraft was at 4000 ft level. Had this problem occurred at altitude, the cabin most likely would have been near FL180 to FL220. After the landing was made at ZZZZ, first officer, I could open the direct view window and found the window seal was torn and blown outside the window frame. In addition, I found what seems to be a lot of silicon type sealer near the same area of the tear in the seal. When we picked up the aircraft in ZZZ, us, at the beginning of our week, there was a maintenance write-up that had been signed off at a company X maintenance facility, about a window leak in the right side direct view window. Another crew had written up the window for a leak near the first week of april and was signed off as checked and returned to service. After finding the large amount of silicon sealer near the torn seal, I feel that the aircraft was not fixed to any airworthiness standards. This same type of poor or substandard maintenance has been performed throughout the last yr on all aircraft maintained by company X. I am not sure that the proper report will be made by company X to the FAA in reference to far part 135(a)(4) and part 135.417 for the above problem. The corrective action on this problem was handled in the following way: a maintenance team for X FBO was dispatched to ZZZZ, first officer. The team installed a new window with seal attached. I and the other crew member were assigned a different aircraft and had left ZZZZ, first officer, before aircraft X was flown after the window fix. There is one more area that I feel needs to be addressed: I do not know if any violations of the FARS are being committed by company X, however, many of the pilots have questions about the following operational area. The area has to do with the use of electronics database computers holding all the aeronautical approach charts on the aircraft. In reference to advisory circular 120-76 the computer is a class 1 electronic flight bag. As per the advisory circular (which I know is not regulatory) any class 1 electronic flight bag can be used on the ground and in-flight as a source of supplemental information. It states that the electronic flight bag, including the charger, must be stowed during takeoff and landing. The problem is the way the company has instructed all crew members to use this equipment. It is used as the primary and only approach charts in the cockpit during pre, taxi, takeoff, cruise, and lndgs. There are no paper charts on board the aircraft other than the en route charts. The power supply in addition to the internal battery pack (which lasts sometimes only 15 mins without aircraft power) is through an automobile adapter wired to the aircraft with a power outlet similar to any automobile power outlet. One of the biggest problems with the unit I have experienced is that it locks up and the only way to regain control is to reset it with the re-set button. This processseems like it takes from 1-3 mins depending on the battery condition and speed of the CPU. The other problem is when the sunlight is just right, the LCD screen cannot be seen. All the aircraft in company X fleet fall under, and are operated under part 91 subpart F. The maintenance of this fleet is under, part 135. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated this was the poorest maintenance operation of any carrier the reporter has ever been employed as a pilot. The reporter said the main objective of this maintenance group is to keep the airplanes moving by signoff, MEL or a watch list. The reporter said the watch list is a list carried by maintenance of items that ran out of MEL time limits. The reporter stated the window seal was reported and had a maintenance history of leaking but was cleared by pumping silicon sealant into the torn seal. The reporter said unapproved repairs and additions are common. The reporter stated the electronic flight bag computer, per the advisory circular 120-76A, requires ship's power through a certified power source but this organization modified an automobile cigarette lighter socket wired to the ship's power with no circuit breaker or identify as to the source of power. The reporter said the FAA has been made aware of this situation through the hotline by the reporter. The reporter stated this maintenance organization does not have an engineering staff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A HAWKER 800 ON TKOF CLB DIVERTED DUE TO THE R DIRECT VIEW WINDOW SEAL FAILING CAUSING A LOUD NOISE. FOUND WINDOW SEAL IMPROPERLY REPAIRED.

Narrative: AT APR/MON/03 AT XA59, DURING A TKOF FROM ZZZZ, ACFT X EXPERIENCED A BLOWOUT OF THE R SIDE DIRECT VIEW WINDOW SEAL. THIS HAPPENED ABOUT THE SAME TIME THE MAIN AIR VALVES WERE TURNED ON AFTER MAIN GEAR RETRACTION. I HEARD A LOUD NOISE FROM NEAR MY R EAR. I LOOKED AROUND AND A RED PART OUTSIDE THE R SIDE DIRECT VIEW FLOPPING IN THE BREEZE. THE CREW DISCUSSED THE PROB AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT WE DID NOT HAVE AN IMMEDIATE EMER RETURN PROB. BECAUSE OF THE OVERWT LNDG CONDITION OF THE ACFT AT THE TIME, WE CONTINUED WITH THE DEP PROC. THE CREW DISCUSSED THE PROS AND CONS OF LNDG OVERWT. OTHER THAN THE NOISE IN THE COCKPIT, WE DETERMINED THAT WE DID NOT HAVE A PROB THAT SHOULD CAUSE US TO LAND OVERWT. WE AGREED THAT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE TO BURN DOWN THE FUEL LOAD SO AS TO LAND UNDER THE MAX LNDG WT. THE RETURN TO ZZZZ, FO, WOULD BE THE BEST PLACE TO RETURN FOR BOTH GOOD WX AND CLOSENESS IF ANY MORE PROBS SHOULD EVOLVE WITH THE R SIDE DIRECT VIEW WINDOW. WE GOT A CLRNC FROM ZZZZ, FO, APCH TO HOLD XXXXX INTXN AND WE ENTERED HOLDING AND BURNT DOWN THE FUEL WT. AFTER WE GOT LEVEL AT HOLDING ALT, THE PAX WERE TOLD THE NATURE OF THE PROB AND THE DECISION TO RETURN FOR A LNDG WHEN WE WERE AT LNDG WT. WHILE IN THE HOLD, WE COULD HOLD THE CABIN ALT ABOUT 1500-1800 FT WHILE THE ACFT WAS AT 4000 FT LEVEL. HAD THIS PROB OCCURRED AT ALT, THE CABIN MOST LIKELY WOULD HAVE BEEN NEAR FL180 TO FL220. AFTER THE LNDG WAS MADE AT ZZZZ, FO, I COULD OPEN THE DIRECT VIEW WINDOW AND FOUND THE WINDOW SEAL WAS TORN AND BLOWN OUTSIDE THE WINDOW FRAME. IN ADDITION, I FOUND WHAT SEEMS TO BE A LOT OF SILICON TYPE SEALER NEAR THE SAME AREA OF THE TEAR IN THE SEAL. WHEN WE PICKED UP THE ACFT IN ZZZ, US, AT THE BEGINNING OF OUR WK, THERE WAS A MAINT WRITE-UP THAT HAD BEEN SIGNED OFF AT A COMPANY X MAINT FACILITY, ABOUT A WINDOW LEAK IN THE R SIDE DIRECT VIEW WINDOW. ANOTHER CREW HAD WRITTEN UP THE WINDOW FOR A LEAK NEAR THE FIRST WK OF APRIL AND WAS SIGNED OFF AS CHKED AND RETURNED TO SVC. AFTER FINDING THE LARGE AMOUNT OF SILICON SEALER NEAR THE TORN SEAL, I FEEL THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT FIXED TO ANY AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS. THIS SAME TYPE OF POOR OR SUBSTANDARD MAINT HAS BEEN PERFORMED THROUGHOUT THE LAST YR ON ALL ACFT MAINTAINED BY COMPANY X. I AM NOT SURE THAT THE PROPER RPT WILL BE MADE BY COMPANY X TO THE FAA IN REF TO FAR PART 135(A)(4) AND PART 135.417 FOR THE ABOVE PROB. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION ON THIS PROB WAS HANDLED IN THE FOLLOWING WAY: A MAINT TEAM FOR X FBO WAS DISPATCHED TO ZZZZ, FO. THE TEAM INSTALLED A NEW WINDOW WITH SEAL ATTACHED. I AND THE OTHER CREW MEMBER WERE ASSIGNED A DIFFERENT ACFT AND HAD LEFT ZZZZ, FO, BEFORE ACFT X WAS FLOWN AFTER THE WINDOW FIX. THERE IS ONE MORE AREA THAT I FEEL NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED: I DO NOT KNOW IF ANY VIOLATIONS OF THE FARS ARE BEING COMMITTED BY COMPANY X, HOWEVER, MANY OF THE PLTS HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONAL AREA. THE AREA HAS TO DO WITH THE USE OF ELECTRONICS DATABASE COMPUTERS HOLDING ALL THE AERO APCH CHARTS ON THE ACFT. IN REF TO ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-76 THE COMPUTER IS A CLASS 1 ELECTRONIC FLT BAG. AS PER THE ADVISORY CIRCULAR (WHICH I KNOW IS NOT REGULATORY) ANY CLASS 1 ELECTRONIC FLT BAG CAN BE USED ON THE GND AND INFLT AS A SOURCE OF SUPPLEMENTAL INFO. IT STATES THAT THE ELECTRONIC FLT BAG, INCLUDING THE CHARGER, MUST BE STOWED DURING TKOF AND LNDG. THE PROB IS THE WAY THE COMPANY HAS INSTRUCTED ALL CREW MEMBERS TO USE THIS EQUIP. IT IS USED AS THE PRIMARY AND ONLY APCH CHARTS IN THE COCKPIT DURING PRE, TAXI, TKOF, CRUISE, AND LNDGS. THERE ARE NO PAPER CHARTS ON BOARD THE ACFT OTHER THAN THE ENRTE CHARTS. THE PWR SUPPLY IN ADDITION TO THE INTERNAL BATTERY PACK (WHICH LASTS SOMETIMES ONLY 15 MINS WITHOUT ACFT PWR) IS THROUGH AN AUTOMOBILE ADAPTER WIRED TO THE ACFT WITH A PWR OUTLET SIMILAR TO ANY AUTOMOBILE PWR OUTLET. ONE OF THE BIGGEST PROBS WITH THE UNIT I HAVE EXPERIENCED IS THAT IT LOCKS UP AND THE ONLY WAY TO REGAIN CTL IS TO RESET IT WITH THE RE-SET BUTTON. THIS PROCESSSEEMS LIKE IT TAKES FROM 1-3 MINS DEPENDING ON THE BATTERY CONDITION AND SPD OF THE CPU. THE OTHER PROB IS WHEN THE SUNLIGHT IS JUST RIGHT, THE LCD SCREEN CANNOT BE SEEN. ALL THE ACFT IN COMPANY X FLEET FALL UNDER, AND ARE OPERATED UNDER PART 91 SUBPART F. THE MAINT OF THIS FLEET IS UNDER, PART 135. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THIS WAS THE POOREST MAINT OP OF ANY CARRIER THE RPTR HAS EVER BEEN EMPLOYED AS A PLT. THE RPTR SAID THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THIS MAINT GROUP IS TO KEEP THE AIRPLANES MOVING BY SIGNOFF, MEL OR A WATCH LIST. THE RPTR SAID THE WATCH LIST IS A LIST CARRIED BY MAINT OF ITEMS THAT RAN OUT OF MEL TIME LIMITS. THE RPTR STATED THE WINDOW SEAL WAS RPTED AND HAD A MAINT HISTORY OF LEAKING BUT WAS CLRED BY PUMPING SILICON SEALANT INTO THE TORN SEAL. THE RPTR SAID UNAPPROVED REPAIRS AND ADDITIONS ARE COMMON. THE RPTR STATED THE ELECTRONIC FLT BAG COMPUTER, PER THE ADVISORY CIRCULAR 120-76A, REQUIRES SHIP'S PWR THROUGH A CERTIFIED PWR SOURCE BUT THIS ORGANIZATION MODIFIED AN AUTOMOBILE CIGARETTE LIGHTER SOCKET WIRED TO THE SHIP'S PWR WITH NO CIRCUIT BREAKER OR IDENT AS TO THE SOURCE OF PWR. THE RPTR SAID THE FAA HAS BEEN MADE AWARE OF THIS SIT THROUGH THE HOTLINE BY THE RPTR. THE RPTR STATED THIS MAINT ORGANIZATION DOES NOT HAVE AN ENGINEERING STAFF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.