Narrative:

The day before the incident, the aircraft had been flown from ZZZ, its home field, to ZZZ1 for a pre-purchase inspection. I (the reporter) am the owner/pilot of the aircraft. The buyer, a commercial pilot, accompanied me. I flew the aircraft. All aspects of the aircraft functioned properly. On apr/wed/03, the aircraft was inspected at ZZZ1. (After the incident, the buyer informed me that maintenance had left a power cart connected to the aircraft at the end of the pre-purchase inspection and while the buyer informed maintenance of this, he was concerned that the aircraft remained connected to the power cart overnight.) on the morning of the incident, I arrived ZZZ1 to retrieve and return the aircraft to ZZZ. The mechanic working on the aircraft informed me that the aircraft was 'ready to go.' I performed a thorough preflight inspection and everything appeared proper. The master was switched on and the fuel pumps and the electronic gauges functioned properly. On start-up, the left engine turned but would not start, which appeared to be caused by the batteries having been run down. I called maintenance, explained the situation, asked for the mechanic who had done the pre-purchase inspection. I was told he was in a staff meeting, but that someone would be sent out. A line person arrived at the aircraft and asked what was wrong and offered a power cart start. I agreed. The aircraft then started normally. Alternator lights went out when brought on line and the load indicators responded. Avionics functioned properly as did all electrical equipment. I let the aircraft idle on the ramp for 20-30 mins to charge the batteries and then taxied and received takeoff clearance. On climb out, all was functioning normally until the gear handle was moved to the up position and a total electrical failure occurred. The gear handle was moved immediately back to the down position. During the next several mins, I assessed the problem while proceeding VFR to owd. All avionics were shut down via the avionics master. I attempted to re-excite the alternator field and regain electrical power at least 3 times during the flight. No electrical system restart could be achieved. I consulted the emergency procedures of the poh. About 8 mi from ZZZ, (ZZZ1 is only 15 mi from ZZZ), the aircraft was maintained visually outside class B. I contacted ZZZ tower and explained the situation and arranged for a fly-by for gear status check. When asked my intentions, I stated that I would manually extend the gear and land at ZZZ. On fly-by, the tower informed me that the gear was partially extended. I flew the aircraft and manually cranked down the landing gear, made a final pass by the tower, was informed that the gear appeared to be extended and was cleared to land runway 10. On final approach over the threshold, I shut down all fuel flow (mixtures, throttle and fuel switches) and turned off all electrical switches. The landing was uneventful, the gear held, the aircraft cleared the runway at the taxiway. On inspection of the aircraft by the maintenance staff at ZZZ, it was determined that both batteries had no water in them and could not hold a charge. It is surmised that the water may have been boiled off by excess power being supplied to the batteries over a period of time. Maintenance has been informed of this. The crucial performance considerations were remaining calm and focused, concentrating on flying the aircraft, maintaining situational awareness, being able to communicate with the tower (I initially inadvertently wound the gear up, the tower identified and advised me of this) and following aircraft manual gear extension emergency procedures. It should be noted that the tower's assistance was critical in dealing with the problem even though no emergency was ever declared. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the ground power cart was on the airplane overnight and boiled the electrolyte out of the batteries. The reporter said the batteries were no maintenance type batteries and the electrolyte level cannot be easily checked for fluid level. The reporter stated the batteries are the source of excitation power for the engine driven alternators and the standby power supply. The reporter said any power left in the dry batteries was exhausted when the landing gear was retracted. The reporter said the maintenance facility that accomplished the aircraft inspection and left the gpu on the airplane denied any responsibility for their actions. The reporter believes that in the interest of safety, the FAA should promote the installation of self-excited alternators for light aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BEECH 55 DURING CLBOUT ON GEAR RETRACTION THE ACFT LOST ALL ELECTRICAL PWR. CAUSED BY FAILURE OF BOTH MAIN BATTERIES.

Narrative: THE DAY BEFORE THE INCIDENT, THE ACFT HAD BEEN FLOWN FROM ZZZ, ITS HOME FIELD, TO ZZZ1 FOR A PRE-PURCHASE INSPECTION. I (THE RPTR) AM THE OWNER/PLT OF THE ACFT. THE BUYER, A COMMERCIAL PLT, ACCOMPANIED ME. I FLEW THE ACFT. ALL ASPECTS OF THE ACFT FUNCTIONED PROPERLY. ON APR/WED/03, THE ACFT WAS INSPECTED AT ZZZ1. (AFTER THE INCIDENT, THE BUYER INFORMED ME THAT MAINT HAD LEFT A PWR CART CONNECTED TO THE ACFT AT THE END OF THE PRE-PURCHASE INSPECTION AND WHILE THE BUYER INFORMED MAINT OF THIS, HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE ACFT REMAINED CONNECTED TO THE PWR CART OVERNIGHT.) ON THE MORNING OF THE INCIDENT, I ARRIVED ZZZ1 TO RETRIEVE AND RETURN THE ACFT TO ZZZ. THE MECH WORKING ON THE ACFT INFORMED ME THAT THE ACFT WAS 'READY TO GO.' I PERFORMED A THOROUGH PREFLT INSPECTION AND EVERYTHING APPEARED PROPER. THE MASTER WAS SWITCHED ON AND THE FUEL PUMPS AND THE ELECTRONIC GAUGES FUNCTIONED PROPERLY. ON START-UP, THE L ENG TURNED BUT WOULD NOT START, WHICH APPEARED TO BE CAUSED BY THE BATTERIES HAVING BEEN RUN DOWN. I CALLED MAINT, EXPLAINED THE SIT, ASKED FOR THE MECH WHO HAD DONE THE PRE-PURCHASE INSPECTION. I WAS TOLD HE WAS IN A STAFF MEETING, BUT THAT SOMEONE WOULD BE SENT OUT. A LINE PERSON ARRIVED AT THE ACFT AND ASKED WHAT WAS WRONG AND OFFERED A PWR CART START. I AGREED. THE ACFT THEN STARTED NORMALLY. ALTERNATOR LIGHTS WENT OUT WHEN BROUGHT ON LINE AND THE LOAD INDICATORS RESPONDED. AVIONICS FUNCTIONED PROPERLY AS DID ALL ELECTRICAL EQUIP. I LET THE ACFT IDLE ON THE RAMP FOR 20-30 MINS TO CHARGE THE BATTERIES AND THEN TAXIED AND RECEIVED TKOF CLRNC. ON CLBOUT, ALL WAS FUNCTIONING NORMALLY UNTIL THE GEAR HANDLE WAS MOVED TO THE UP POS AND A TOTAL ELECTRICAL FAILURE OCCURRED. THE GEAR HANDLE WAS MOVED IMMEDIATELY BACK TO THE DOWN POS. DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL MINS, I ASSESSED THE PROB WHILE PROCEEDING VFR TO OWD. ALL AVIONICS WERE SHUT DOWN VIA THE AVIONICS MASTER. I ATTEMPTED TO RE-EXCITE THE ALTERNATOR FIELD AND REGAIN ELECTRICAL PWR AT LEAST 3 TIMES DURING THE FLT. NO ELECTRICAL SYS RESTART COULD BE ACHIEVED. I CONSULTED THE EMER PROCS OF THE POH. ABOUT 8 MI FROM ZZZ, (ZZZ1 IS ONLY 15 MI FROM ZZZ), THE ACFT WAS MAINTAINED VISUALLY OUTSIDE CLASS B. I CONTACTED ZZZ TWR AND EXPLAINED THE SIT AND ARRANGED FOR A FLY-BY FOR GEAR STATUS CHK. WHEN ASKED MY INTENTIONS, I STATED THAT I WOULD MANUALLY EXTEND THE GEAR AND LAND AT ZZZ. ON FLY-BY, THE TWR INFORMED ME THAT THE GEAR WAS PARTIALLY EXTENDED. I FLEW THE ACFT AND MANUALLY CRANKED DOWN THE LNDG GEAR, MADE A FINAL PASS BY THE TWR, WAS INFORMED THAT THE GEAR APPEARED TO BE EXTENDED AND WAS CLRED TO LAND RWY 10. ON FINAL APCH OVER THE THRESHOLD, I SHUT DOWN ALL FUEL FLOW (MIXTURES, THROTTLE AND FUEL SWITCHES) AND TURNED OFF ALL ELECTRICAL SWITCHES. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL, THE GEAR HELD, THE ACFT CLRED THE RWY AT THE TXWY. ON INSPECTION OF THE ACFT BY THE MAINT STAFF AT ZZZ, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT BOTH BATTERIES HAD NO WATER IN THEM AND COULD NOT HOLD A CHARGE. IT IS SURMISED THAT THE WATER MAY HAVE BEEN BOILED OFF BY EXCESS PWR BEING SUPPLIED TO THE BATTERIES OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. MAINT HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THIS. THE CRUCIAL PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS WERE REMAINING CALM AND FOCUSED, CONCENTRATING ON FLYING THE ACFT, MAINTAINING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, BEING ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE TWR (I INITIALLY INADVERTENTLY WOUND THE GEAR UP, THE TWR IDENTIFIED AND ADVISED ME OF THIS) AND FOLLOWING ACFT MANUAL GEAR EXTENSION EMER PROCS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE TWR'S ASSISTANCE WAS CRITICAL IN DEALING WITH THE PROB EVEN THOUGH NO EMER WAS EVER DECLARED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE GND PWR CART WAS ON THE AIRPLANE OVERNIGHT AND BOILED THE ELECTROLYTE OUT OF THE BATTERIES. THE RPTR SAID THE BATTERIES WERE NO MAINT TYPE BATTERIES AND THE ELECTROLYTE LEVEL CANNOT BE EASILY CHKED FOR FLUID LEVEL. THE RPTR STATED THE BATTERIES ARE THE SOURCE OF EXCITATION PWR FOR THE ENG DRIVEN ALTERNATORS AND THE STANDBY PWR SUPPLY. THE RPTR SAID ANY PWR LEFT IN THE DRY BATTERIES WAS EXHAUSTED WHEN THE LNDG GEAR WAS RETRACTED. THE RPTR SAID THE MAINT FACILITY THAT ACCOMPLISHED THE ACFT INSPECTION AND LEFT THE GPU ON THE AIRPLANE DENIED ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR ACTIONS. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY, THE FAA SHOULD PROMOTE THE INSTALLATION OF SELF-EXCITED ALTERNATORS FOR LIGHT ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.