Narrative:

As part of an aircraft chkout, I was executing an ILS runway 23 approach into fdk under VFR conditions. The approach consisted of direct EMI VOR, 293 degree radial transition to intersect the localizer. I was under the hood the entire time. The instructor (CFI) was acting as safety pilot. On the 293 degree radial outbound from EMI, the instructor failed the GPS receiver. With the primary navigation tuned to intercept the localizer and the secondary navigation tuned on the 293 degree radial, there was no way of determining the distance between EMI and the localizer (I was not timing the leg). Therefore, there was no back-up to determine the arrival at number intersection. If we failed, for whatever reason, to pick up the localizer, we would have a good chance of flying into the expanded P40 airspace (10 NM radius). I mentioned this to the instructor and he said that he had the airport in sight. After what I thought was a longer than normal time, I queried the instructor again. He said he had the airport and that we were inside number intersection. Things did not seem right, as we definitely should have arrived at the localizer. I wanted confirmation of our position relative to P40, so I requested the instructor to tune the GPS direct jeres intersection (which is an intersection almost in the center of P40). As he was tuning the GPS, I did not wait and started a 180 degree turn. Just as the plane began to roll, the localizer needle 'fell' through and ended up with a complete deflection on the other side. The needle was stuck in position, giving us the impression that we never intercepted the localizer, whereas we had actually flown right through it. This put us into or at least, very near the expanded P40. A post flight review confirmed correct instrument setup relative to frequencies. No instrument flags were displayed on the HSI. A listening watch on 121.5 was also confirmed on the second radio. No transmissions were heard over the emergency frequency. Upon landing at fdk, unicom requested the instructor to stop by and pick up a phone number to call. Having flown that approach many times before, a pilot can easily see fdk airport and make a determination as to relative position. The instructor obviously did not have correct positional awareness. This could have been due to night conditions. The instructor also did not know about the jeres intersection location as a way to quickly pick up positions to P40. Additionally, the instructor did not know how to set up an approach with the GPS. I originally had planned to do the GPS 5 approach. The instructor suggested doing the ILS runway 23 approach instead. I always fly with a back-up verification when intercepting localizer beams, or airways, or anything. Not having that back-up made me uncomfortable and I should have insisted on it. The stuck localizer needle was squawked up as this could be a real safety hazard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRINIDAD INSTR AND STUDENT'S AVOIDANCE ACTIONS OF P40 WHILE CONDUCTING A HOODED FDK ILS RWY 23 APCH WAS NOT TIMELY, AS A RESULT IT REQUIRED A RESPONSE TO A GOV AGENCY.

Narrative: AS PART OF AN ACFT CHKOUT, I WAS EXECUTING AN ILS RWY 23 APCH INTO FDK UNDER VFR CONDITIONS. THE APCH CONSISTED OF DIRECT EMI VOR, 293 DEG RADIAL TRANSITION TO INTERSECT THE LOCALIZER. I WAS UNDER THE HOOD THE ENTIRE TIME. THE INSTRUCTOR (CFI) WAS ACTING AS SAFETY PLT. ON THE 293 DEG RADIAL OUTBOUND FROM EMI, THE INSTRUCTOR FAILED THE GPS RECEIVER. WITH THE PRIMARY NAV TUNED TO INTERCEPT THE LOCALIZER AND THE SECONDARY NAV TUNED ON THE 293 DEG RADIAL, THERE WAS NO WAY OF DETERMINING THE DISTANCE BETWEEN EMI AND THE LOCALIZER (I WAS NOT TIMING THE LEG). THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO BACK-UP TO DETERMINE THE ARRIVAL AT NUMBER INTXN. IF WE FAILED, FOR WHATEVER REASON, TO PICK UP THE LOCALIZER, WE WOULD HAVE A GOOD CHANCE OF FLYING INTO THE EXPANDED P40 AIRSPACE (10 NM RADIUS). I MENTIONED THIS TO THE INSTRUCTOR AND HE SAID THAT HE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. AFTER WHAT I THOUGHT WAS A LONGER THAN NORMAL TIME, I QUERIED THE INSTRUCTOR AGAIN. HE SAID HE HAD THE ARPT AND THAT WE WERE INSIDE NUMBER INTXN. THINGS DID NOT SEEM RIGHT, AS WE DEFINITELY SHOULD HAVE ARRIVED AT THE LOCALIZER. I WANTED CONFIRMATION OF OUR POSITION RELATIVE TO P40, SO I REQUESTED THE INSTRUCTOR TO TUNE THE GPS DIRECT JERES INTXN (WHICH IS AN INTXN ALMOST IN THE CENTER OF P40). AS HE WAS TUNING THE GPS, I DID NOT WAIT AND STARTED A 180 DEG TURN. JUST AS THE PLANE BEGAN TO ROLL, THE LOCALIZER NEEDLE 'FELL' THROUGH AND ENDED UP WITH A COMPLETE DEFLECTION ON THE OTHER SIDE. THE NEEDLE WAS STUCK IN POS, GIVING US THE IMPRESSION THAT WE NEVER INTERCEPTED THE LOCALIZER, WHEREAS WE HAD ACTUALLY FLOWN RIGHT THROUGH IT. THIS PUT US INTO OR AT LEAST, VERY NEAR THE EXPANDED P40. A POST FLT REVIEW CONFIRMED CORRECT INSTRUMENT SETUP RELATIVE TO FREQUENCIES. NO INSTRUMENT FLAGS WERE DISPLAYED ON THE HSI. A LISTENING WATCH ON 121.5 WAS ALSO CONFIRMED ON THE SECOND RADIO. NO TRANSMISSIONS WERE HEARD OVER THE EMERGENCY FREQUENCY. UPON LNDG AT FDK, UNICOM REQUESTED THE INSTRUCTOR TO STOP BY AND PICK UP A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL. HAVING FLOWN THAT APCH MANY TIMES BEFORE, A PLT CAN EASILY SEE FDK ARPT AND MAKE A DETERMINATION AS TO RELATIVE POS. THE INSTRUCTOR OBVIOUSLY DID NOT HAVE CORRECT POSITIONAL AWARENESS. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN DUE TO NIGHT CONDITIONS. THE INSTRUCTOR ALSO DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE JERES INTXN LOCATION AS A WAY TO QUICKLY PICK UP POSITIONS TO P40. ADDITIONALLY, THE INSTRUCTOR DID NOT KNOW HOW TO SET UP AN APCH WITH THE GPS. I ORIGINALLY HAD PLANNED TO DO THE GPS 5 APCH. THE INSTRUCTOR SUGGESTED DOING THE ILS RWY 23 APCH INSTEAD. I ALWAYS FLY WITH A BACK-UP VERIFICATION WHEN INTERCEPTING LOCALIZER BEAMS, OR AIRWAYS, OR ANYTHING. NOT HAVING THAT BACK-UP MADE ME UNCOMFORTABLE AND I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED ON IT. THE STUCK LOCALIZER NEEDLE WAS SQUAWKED UP AS THIS COULD BE A REAL SAFETY HAZARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.