Narrative:

Flight XXX ord to ZZZ. After landing on runway 22, turned north on runway 36, left on taxiway F. Consulting the airport diagram, the entire time we were going to turn on taxiway a to get to ramp, we passed taxiway a and held short on taxiway C. Looking at the diagram we decided the safest course of action was to proceed to the depicted taxiway C ramp area and reverse course. The depicted area was much smaller than expected, but there still seemed to be enough room to turn around. We started a right 180 degree, and I said stop, because of snow obscuring the edge of the taxiway. I was not comfortable continuing. Then because of what could only be extreme fatigue and emotional stress, the captain briefly used reverse to aid in the turn. I was not consulted, and do not know if the captain even knew what was going on around him. I started to ask that we stop for help as I had suggested before. After attempting a left turn, we began to suspect the left main may be caught in snow or ice. It was not apparent that the left main went off the taxiway. We stopped and requested help, and I called maintenance control and maintenance on cell. The primary contributing factors to this incident were the captain's extreme fatigue and my failure to recognize the fatigue immediately, because of my own fatigue. Also, the poor airport diagram, poor airport lighting on that portion of the ramp, the airport being uncontrolled at that time of night, several GA aircraft in pattern that did not designate what runway they intended to use. But, most importantly, was the captain's extreme fatigue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FATIGUED FLT CREW OF E145 EXITED THE SNOW OBSCURED PAVED RAMP AREA IN EVV DURING NIGHTTIME ARR AT EVV, AN UNCTLED ARPT AT THE TIME OF ARR.

Narrative: FLT XXX ORD TO ZZZ. AFTER LNDG ON RWY 22, TURNED N ON RWY 36, L ON TXWY F. CONSULTING THE ARPT DIAGRAM, THE ENTIRE TIME WE WERE GOING TO TURN ON TXWY A TO GET TO RAMP, WE PASSED TXWY A AND HELD SHORT ON TXWY C. LOOKING AT THE DIAGRAM WE DECIDED THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO PROCEED TO THE DEPICTED TXWY C RAMP AREA AND REVERSE COURSE. THE DEPICTED AREA WAS MUCH SMALLER THAN EXPECTED, BUT THERE STILL SEEMED TO BE ENOUGH ROOM TO TURN AROUND. WE STARTED A R 180 DEG, AND I SAID STOP, BECAUSE OF SNOW OBSCURING THE EDGE OF THE TXWY. I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE CONTINUING. THEN BECAUSE OF WHAT COULD ONLY BE EXTREME FATIGUE AND EMOTIONAL STRESS, THE CAPT BRIEFLY USED REVERSE TO AID IN THE TURN. I WAS NOT CONSULTED, AND DO NOT KNOW IF THE CAPT EVEN KNEW WHAT WAS GOING ON AROUND HIM. I STARTED TO ASK THAT WE STOP FOR HELP AS I HAD SUGGESTED BEFORE. AFTER ATTEMPTING A L TURN, WE BEGAN TO SUSPECT THE L MAIN MAY BE CAUGHT IN SNOW OR ICE. IT WAS NOT APPARENT THAT THE L MAIN WENT OFF THE TXWY. WE STOPPED AND REQUESTED HELP, AND I CALLED MAINT CTL AND MAINT ON CELL. THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT WERE THE CAPT'S EXTREME FATIGUE AND MY FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE FATIGUE IMMEDIATELY, BECAUSE OF MY OWN FATIGUE. ALSO, THE POOR ARPT DIAGRAM, POOR ARPT LIGHTING ON THAT PORTION OF THE RAMP, THE ARPT BEING UNCTLED AT THAT TIME OF NIGHT, SEVERAL GA ACFT IN PATTERN THAT DID NOT DESIGNATE WHAT RWY THEY INTENDED TO USE. BUT, MOST IMPORTANTLY, WAS THE CAPT'S EXTREME FATIGUE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.