Narrative:

We were vectored from the southwest over the airport for a right downwind to runway 27R. The controller instructed us to prepare for a close-in turn to base. Presumably, we were to be #1 for the runway. The first officer was flying the approach and this was the first leg that he had flown with me. The first officer appropriately slowed the aircraft sufficiently to extend flaps to 5 degrees and extended the speed brakes. We were still quite high and needed to lose altitude as rapidly as possible and were asked by the controller if we could increase our rate of descent. I replied that we could increase it a little. I instructed the first officer to slow down enough to get the flaps out to 10 degrees, which he did. We were then given a turn to base although still considerably higher than we would normally be, given our distance from the runway. We extended the gear early and continued to slow down to enable us to extend the flaps to 25 degrees in order to increase our rate of descent. On base, we observed traffic on final for the parallel runway and called our runway in sight, at which time we were cleared for the visual approach and advised by the controller of the nearby traffic for the parallel runway. We called the traffic in sight and acknowledged the clearance for a visual approach. Our target vref was 133 KTS at 40 des of flaps and our speed was now down to 160 KTS as we turned final about 1 mi outside the marker. During the turn, the controller instructed us to maintain 180 KTS until the marker. Since we were already below that speed and would be over the marker in a matter of seconds, it was impractical to retract flaps and accelerate to 180 degrees and that is what I should have told the controller immediately. I failed to do so, however, probably because I was focusing my attention on the traffic directly abeam us on the parallel final, monitoring our position with regard to the GS and evaluating whether we could complete the final segment of the approach in a stabilized manner. I should have advised we were already slowed and unable to accelerate to 180 KTS anyway. We were receiving the visual marker signal and showed 0.4 NM outside the marker when the controller called and angrily asked our speed. By now, it was down to 150 KTS which works out to less than 10 seconds from the marker. I told him we needed to continue to slow in preparation for landing. He reminded us of our previous clearance and berated us for slowing down early. The rest of the approach and landing were uneventful. This set-up occurs frequently when the controller thinks he can both fill up a gap in his sequence and 'do us a favor' by giving us a short approach. Most times it works out that we can accept this unsolicited favor and salvage a descent approach and landing. In this instance, however, the fact that we started out high on downwind and needed to configure early meant we had to slow to appropriate flap extension speeds early. Everything was fine until we got the speed restr after we had already slowed and were so close to the marker. Again, I should have advised the controller we could not maintain 180 KTS to the marker and that's really the bottom line.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH CTLR SPD REQUEST BECAUSE OF THE HIGH RATE OF DSCNT AND CLOSE-IN TURN TO FINAL.

Narrative: WE WERE VECTORED FROM THE SW OVER THE ARPT FOR A R DOWNWIND TO RWY 27R. THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO PREPARE FOR A CLOSE-IN TURN TO BASE. PRESUMABLY, WE WERE TO BE #1 FOR THE RWY. THE FO WAS FLYING THE APCH AND THIS WAS THE FIRST LEG THAT HE HAD FLOWN WITH ME. THE FO APPROPRIATELY SLOWED THE ACFT SUFFICIENTLY TO EXTEND FLAPS TO 5 DEGS AND EXTENDED THE SPD BRAKES. WE WERE STILL QUITE HIGH AND NEEDED TO LOSE ALT AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AND WERE ASKED BY THE CTLR IF WE COULD INCREASE OUR RATE OF DSCNT. I REPLIED THAT WE COULD INCREASE IT A LITTLE. I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO SLOW DOWN ENOUGH TO GET THE FLAPS OUT TO 10 DEGS, WHICH HE DID. WE WERE THEN GIVEN A TURN TO BASE ALTHOUGH STILL CONSIDERABLY HIGHER THAN WE WOULD NORMALLY BE, GIVEN OUR DISTANCE FROM THE RWY. WE EXTENDED THE GEAR EARLY AND CONTINUED TO SLOW DOWN TO ENABLE US TO EXTEND THE FLAPS TO 25 DEGS IN ORDER TO INCREASE OUR RATE OF DSCNT. ON BASE, WE OBSERVED TFC ON FINAL FOR THE PARALLEL RWY AND CALLED OUR RWY IN SIGHT, AT WHICH TIME WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH AND ADVISED BY THE CTLR OF THE NEARBY TFC FOR THE PARALLEL RWY. WE CALLED THE TFC IN SIGHT AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC FOR A VISUAL APCH. OUR TARGET VREF WAS 133 KTS AT 40 DES OF FLAPS AND OUR SPD WAS NOW DOWN TO 160 KTS AS WE TURNED FINAL ABOUT 1 MI OUTSIDE THE MARKER. DURING THE TURN, THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 180 KTS UNTIL THE MARKER. SINCE WE WERE ALREADY BELOW THAT SPD AND WOULD BE OVER THE MARKER IN A MATTER OF SECONDS, IT WAS IMPRACTICAL TO RETRACT FLAPS AND ACCELERATE TO 180 DEGS AND THAT IS WHAT I SHOULD HAVE TOLD THE CTLR IMMEDIATELY. I FAILED TO DO SO, HOWEVER, PROBABLY BECAUSE I WAS FOCUSING MY ATTN ON THE TFC DIRECTLY ABEAM US ON THE PARALLEL FINAL, MONITORING OUR POS WITH REGARD TO THE GS AND EVALUATING WHETHER WE COULD COMPLETE THE FINAL SEGMENT OF THE APCH IN A STABILIZED MANNER. I SHOULD HAVE ADVISED WE WERE ALREADY SLOWED AND UNABLE TO ACCELERATE TO 180 KTS ANYWAY. WE WERE RECEIVING THE VISUAL MARKER SIGNAL AND SHOWED 0.4 NM OUTSIDE THE MARKER WHEN THE CTLR CALLED AND ANGRILY ASKED OUR SPD. BY NOW, IT WAS DOWN TO 150 KTS WHICH WORKS OUT TO LESS THAN 10 SECONDS FROM THE MARKER. I TOLD HIM WE NEEDED TO CONTINUE TO SLOW IN PREPARATION FOR LNDG. HE REMINDED US OF OUR PREVIOUS CLRNC AND BERATED US FOR SLOWING DOWN EARLY. THE REST OF THE APCH AND LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL. THIS SET-UP OCCURS FREQUENTLY WHEN THE CTLR THINKS HE CAN BOTH FILL UP A GAP IN HIS SEQUENCE AND 'DO US A FAVOR' BY GIVING US A SHORT APCH. MOST TIMES IT WORKS OUT THAT WE CAN ACCEPT THIS UNSOLICITED FAVOR AND SALVAGE A DSCNT APCH AND LNDG. IN THIS INSTANCE, HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT WE STARTED OUT HIGH ON DOWNWIND AND NEEDED TO CONFIGURE EARLY MEANT WE HAD TO SLOW TO APPROPRIATE FLAP EXTENSION SPDS EARLY. EVERYTHING WAS FINE UNTIL WE GOT THE SPD RESTR AFTER WE HAD ALREADY SLOWED AND WERE SO CLOSE TO THE MARKER. AGAIN, I SHOULD HAVE ADVISED THE CTLR WE COULD NOT MAINTAIN 180 KTS TO THE MARKER AND THAT'S REALLY THE BOTTOM LINE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.