Narrative:

The safety pilot and I were flying instrument approachs at esn under VFR. The skies were crowded. Combine that with the newly-designated ADIZ around washington, dc, and the baltimore approach controllers were very overloaded. Because of the crowds and the ADIZ, we had filed an IFR flight plan to return home to gai, and after our last approach at esn, we were going to call baltimore clearance rco to pick up our IFR clearance home. The IFR clearance would expedite our entry into the ADIZ. Procedure turn inbound on our last VFR practice approach, the safety pilot called baltimore rco for our clearance. We were expecting the controller to include a 'call when you are ready to depart' or a 'hold for release, but he immediately cleared us via direct fme, direct gai. The safety pilot changed our squawk from 1200 to the assigned code, but I misunderstood the clearance and still assumed that we were not released, so I continued the approach. A couple of mins later, the controller called us and asked us where we were going. He repeated that we were cleared direct fme. I immediately broke off the approach and turned direct fme. He inquired why we did not follow the original clearance, but did not pursue it further. Fortunately, our failure to follow the clearance did not result in any traffic conflicts. This could have been prevented by: 1) the safety pilot should have explicitly told baltimore clearance that we were not yet ready for IFR release and that we would call when we were. 2) when I saw the safety pilot change the squawk, I should have asked him specifically whether we were cleared for IFR, whether he had acknowledged the clearance, and what the clearance required us to do. Of note, the plane has a new garmin GPS audio panel that allows one pilot to talk and listen on the #1 radio and the other to talk and listen on the #2. I was monitoring unicom while the safety pilot was getting our clearance from baltimore. If the plane had an older-style audio panel, we both would have heard the communications with both unicom and clearance, and there would have been no confusion. Instituting an AD1Z, which overloaded the controller, also contributed!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C172 PLT AND SAFETY PLT HAD A TRACK DEV IN PCT CLASS E.

Narrative: THE SAFETY PLT AND I WERE FLYING INST APCHS AT ESN UNDER VFR. THE SKIES WERE CROWDED. COMBINE THAT WITH THE NEWLY-DESIGNATED ADIZ AROUND WASHINGTON, DC, AND THE BALTIMORE APCH CTLRS WERE VERY OVERLOADED. BECAUSE OF THE CROWDS AND THE ADIZ, WE HAD FILED AN IFR FLT PLAN TO RETURN HOME TO GAI, AND AFTER OUR LAST APCH AT ESN, WE WERE GOING TO CALL BALTIMORE CLRNC RCO TO PICK UP OUR IFR CLRNC HOME. THE IFR CLRNC WOULD EXPEDITE OUR ENTRY INTO THE ADIZ. PROC TURN INBOUND ON OUR LAST VFR PRACTICE APCH, THE SAFETY PLT CALLED BALTIMORE RCO FOR OUR CLRNC. WE WERE EXPECTING THE CTLR TO INCLUDE A 'CALL WHEN YOU ARE READY TO DEPART' OR A 'HOLD FOR RELEASE, BUT HE IMMEDIATELY CLRED US VIA DIRECT FME, DIRECT GAI. THE SAFETY PLT CHANGED OUR SQUAWK FROM 1200 TO THE ASSIGNED CODE, BUT I MISUNDERSTOOD THE CLRNC AND STILL ASSUMED THAT WE WERE NOT RELEASED, SO I CONTINUED THE APCH. A COUPLE OF MINS LATER, THE CTLR CALLED US AND ASKED US WHERE WE WERE GOING. HE REPEATED THAT WE WERE CLRED DIRECT FME. I IMMEDIATELY BROKE OFF THE APCH AND TURNED DIRECT FME. HE INQUIRED WHY WE DID NOT FOLLOW THE ORIGINAL CLRNC, BUT DID NOT PURSUE IT FURTHER. FORTUNATELY, OUR FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE CLRNC DID NOT RESULT IN ANY TFC CONFLICTS. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY: 1) THE SAFETY PLT SHOULD HAVE EXPLICITLY TOLD BALTIMORE CLRNC THAT WE WERE NOT YET READY FOR IFR RELEASE AND THAT WE WOULD CALL WHEN WE WERE. 2) WHEN I SAW THE SAFETY PLT CHANGE THE SQUAWK, I SHOULD HAVE ASKED HIM SPECIFICALLY WHETHER WE WERE CLRED FOR IFR, WHETHER HE HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE CLRNC, AND WHAT THE CLRNC REQUIRED US TO DO. OF NOTE, THE PLANE HAS A NEW GARMIN GPS AUDIO PANEL THAT ALLOWS ONE PLT TO TALK AND LISTEN ON THE #1 RADIO AND THE OTHER TO TALK AND LISTEN ON THE #2. I WAS MONITORING UNICOM WHILE THE SAFETY PLT WAS GETTING OUR CLRNC FROM BALTIMORE. IF THE PLANE HAD AN OLDER-STYLE AUDIO PANEL, WE BOTH WOULD HAVE HEARD THE COMS WITH BOTH UNICOM AND CLRNC, AND THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO CONFUSION. INSTITUTING AN AD1Z, WHICH OVERLOADED THE CTLR, ALSO CONTRIBUTED!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.