Narrative:

Radio communications were established by the student through the opening of an IFR flight plan and a request for the current altimeter setting at awo. At the time, a NOTAM was available regarding the outage of AWOS, and we were unable to receive the report from awo. Controller rudely told us to pick up the AWOS before we informed him of our inability to pick up the report. From then on, communications went downhill, where both the instructor and myself thought the controller was having a bad day. We requested the full procedure NDB runway 34R approach followed by a published missed and hold. The instructions we received were unclr. My interpretation was that we were given the published missed approach procedure with an altitude restr of 4000 ft stapled onto it. My instructor's interpretation, I later found out, was to maintain 4000 ft through the entire approach. Regardless of what the instruction was, the altitude 4000 ft resulted in creating confusion later during the missed approach procedure. Neither one of us questioned the controller's clearance, and instead took it for our own interpretation. We should have asked for clarification, but neither one of us did. As we got cleared for the approach, the controller told us to descend and maintain 3000 ft until established on the approach. After the approach, during the missed approach procedure, I called ZSE informing the controller we were missed, 1600 ft climbing 4000 ft. ATC acknowledged radar contact and made no correction to my climbing 4000 ft statement. It was at this point that confusion struck, and my instructor and I realized we were not on the same page regarding the altitude assignment. He believed it was the altitudes as published, while I believed it was 4000 ft. At 2000 ft, the published missed approach altitude, I called ATC a second time confirming our climb to 4000 ft. He came on the radio very sharply saying 'negative,' following up with what literally was an unnecessary lecture on the published approach procedure, which only created more confusion. Somewhere in this lecture, he must have given us a new heading assignment with the cancellation of our published missed approach procedure although neither my instructor nor myself heard it. We continued to fly direct aw NDB for the hold, and at aw began an entry to the hold. During the turn, as we reported entering the hold, the controller again rudely told us that we were not cleared for the hold and instead, had been given a heading instruction. This turn into the hold was a deviation from our assigned clearance, which from the sound of the controller's second lecture could have resulted, had we not corrected this deviation immediately, in a hazardous situation with respect to spacing. He immediately told us to expedite a climb to 3000 ft and heading change to 130 degrees for traffic. I learned 2 lessons from this experience. First, if you're not sure about a clearance, ask for confirmation sooner as opposed to later. This way, you can stay focused, as opposed to thinking in the back of your mind 'what were the instructions again?' the second lesson learned was that communications should be limited to necessary dialogue using standard phraseology. During the unnecessary lecture from the controller on the missed approach procedure, either we just flat out missed our new heading assignment or he forgot to assign one.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: STUDENT AND INSTRUCTOR PLT ON AN IFR TRAINING FLT IN A C172 GET A SERIES OF LECTURES FROM ARTCC RADAR CTLR WHEN THEY FAIL TO FOLLOW THE ALLEGED INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED FOR AN APCH AND A MAP PROC, AND THEN PERFORMED A HDG TRACK DEV NEAR THE AW NDB AT AWO, WA.

Narrative: RADIO COMS WERE ESTABLISHED BY THE STUDENT THROUGH THE OPENING OF AN IFR FLT PLAN AND A REQUEST FOR THE CURRENT ALTIMETER SETTING AT AWO. AT THE TIME, A NOTAM WAS AVAILABLE REGARDING THE OUTAGE OF AWOS, AND WE WERE UNABLE TO RECEIVE THE RPT FROM AWO. CTLR RUDELY TOLD US TO PICK UP THE AWOS BEFORE WE INFORMED HIM OF OUR INABILITY TO PICK UP THE RPT. FROM THEN ON, COMS WENT DOWNHILL, WHERE BOTH THE INSTRUCTOR AND MYSELF THOUGHT THE CTLR WAS HAVING A BAD DAY. WE REQUESTED THE FULL PROC NDB RWY 34R APCH FOLLOWED BY A PUBLISHED MISSED AND HOLD. THE INSTRUCTIONS WE RECEIVED WERE UNCLR. MY INTERP WAS THAT WE WERE GIVEN THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH PROC WITH AN ALT RESTR OF 4000 FT STAPLED ONTO IT. MY INSTRUCTOR'S INTERP, I LATER FOUND OUT, WAS TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT THROUGH THE ENTIRE APCH. REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE INSTRUCTION WAS, THE ALT 4000 FT RESULTED IN CREATING CONFUSION LATER DURING THE MISSED APCH PROC. NEITHER ONE OF US QUESTIONED THE CTLR'S CLRNC, AND INSTEAD TOOK IT FOR OUR OWN INTERP. WE SHOULD HAVE ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION, BUT NEITHER ONE OF US DID. AS WE GOT CLRED FOR THE APCH, THE CTLR TOLD US TO DSND AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON THE APCH. AFTER THE APCH, DURING THE MISSED APCH PROC, I CALLED ZSE INFORMING THE CTLR WE WERE MISSED, 1600 FT CLBING 4000 FT. ATC ACKNOWLEDGED RADAR CONTACT AND MADE NO CORRECTION TO MY CLBING 4000 FT STATEMENT. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT CONFUSION STRUCK, AND MY INSTRUCTOR AND I REALIZED WE WERE NOT ON THE SAME PAGE REGARDING THE ALT ASSIGNMENT. HE BELIEVED IT WAS THE ALTS AS PUBLISHED, WHILE I BELIEVED IT WAS 4000 FT. AT 2000 FT, THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH ALT, I CALLED ATC A SECOND TIME CONFIRMING OUR CLB TO 4000 FT. HE CAME ON THE RADIO VERY SHARPLY SAYING 'NEGATIVE,' FOLLOWING UP WITH WHAT LITERALLY WAS AN UNNECESSARY LECTURE ON THE PUBLISHED APCH PROC, WHICH ONLY CREATED MORE CONFUSION. SOMEWHERE IN THIS LECTURE, HE MUST HAVE GIVEN US A NEW HDG ASSIGNMENT WITH THE CANCELLATION OF OUR PUBLISHED MISSED APCH PROC ALTHOUGH NEITHER MY INSTRUCTOR NOR MYSELF HEARD IT. WE CONTINUED TO FLY DIRECT AW NDB FOR THE HOLD, AND AT AW BEGAN AN ENTRY TO THE HOLD. DURING THE TURN, AS WE RPTED ENTERING THE HOLD, THE CTLR AGAIN RUDELY TOLD US THAT WE WERE NOT CLRED FOR THE HOLD AND INSTEAD, HAD BEEN GIVEN A HDG INSTRUCTION. THIS TURN INTO THE HOLD WAS A DEV FROM OUR ASSIGNED CLRNC, WHICH FROM THE SOUND OF THE CTLR'S SECOND LECTURE COULD HAVE RESULTED, HAD WE NOT CORRECTED THIS DEV IMMEDIATELY, IN A HAZARDOUS SIT WITH RESPECT TO SPACING. HE IMMEDIATELY TOLD US TO EXPEDITE A CLB TO 3000 FT AND HDG CHANGE TO 130 DEGS FOR TFC. I LEARNED 2 LESSONS FROM THIS EXPERIENCE. FIRST, IF YOU'RE NOT SURE ABOUT A CLRNC, ASK FOR CONFIRMATION SOONER AS OPPOSED TO LATER. THIS WAY, YOU CAN STAY FOCUSED, AS OPPOSED TO THINKING IN THE BACK OF YOUR MIND 'WHAT WERE THE INSTRUCTIONS AGAIN?' THE SECOND LESSON LEARNED WAS THAT COMS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO NECESSARY DIALOGUE USING STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY. DURING THE UNNECESSARY LECTURE FROM THE CTLR ON THE MISSED APCH PROC, EITHER WE JUST FLAT OUT MISSED OUR NEW HDG ASSIGNMENT OR HE FORGOT TO ASSIGN ONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.