Narrative:

My first officer was relatively new on the A319 and flew B727's prior to this. A B727 does 'go down and slow down.' an A319 does not, and he's still adjusting to the fact. We got vectors to a visual to runway 35L. On downwind, we were high and fast and correcting quickly (first officer flying). The approach controller turned us to a base leg and we were still high and fast, but not too much to make a safe approach. My first officer was slow to recognize we were high, so I asked him to drop the gear early, which he did. Things were starting to work themselves out when we got cleared for the visual. My first officer was flying with the autoplt on, using the FCU, and continued to do so after being cleared for the visual, but forgot to set an altitude lower than 3000 ft (our previous cleared altitude) in the FCU, so the plane spooled up and started to level before the first officer caught it, putting us a little higher and faster than we were already. Next, the first officer called for flaps at a speed over the limit, which I caught, but that threw him off as well. The controller asked us to switch to tower, which I did, but I never checked on with tower. I was so busy coaching my first officer, doing the landing checklist, sitting the flight attendants down for landing and talking to the controller, and then so relieved that my first officer finally got everything stabilized by 500 ft (our minimums), that I forgot to call tower for landing clearance. The runway was clear and no conflict occurred. I talked to tower on rollout, taxied off, contacted ground, and proceeded to our gate. Factors that contributed to this included 1) a new first officer who was unfamiliar with how poorly the A319 'goes-down and slows down', particularly coming from a B727, which can drop like a rock if necessary, 2) my reluctance to coach my first officer too early on because of my first officer's good aviation backgnd and because I felt like I had already 'hounded' him enough on our trip, and 3) the approach controller's turn to base while we were still high. The next time I will be more assertive with an first officer that makes me even slightly uncomfortable, and I will ask the controller to extend our downwind more to give us more time to descend before turning base.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CLRNC FOR LNDG NOT RECEIVED WHEN AN A319 PIC ALLOWS HIS FLT TO LAND ON RWY 35L WITHOUT CONTACTING TWR AT OKC, OK.

Narrative: MY FO WAS RELATIVELY NEW ON THE A319 AND FLEW B727'S PRIOR TO THIS. A B727 DOES 'GO DOWN AND SLOW DOWN.' AN A319 DOES NOT, AND HE'S STILL ADJUSTING TO THE FACT. WE GOT VECTORS TO A VISUAL TO RWY 35L. ON DOWNWIND, WE WERE HIGH AND FAST AND CORRECTING QUICKLY (FO FLYING). THE APCH CTLR TURNED US TO A BASE LEG AND WE WERE STILL HIGH AND FAST, BUT NOT TOO MUCH TO MAKE A SAFE APCH. MY FO WAS SLOW TO RECOGNIZE WE WERE HIGH, SO I ASKED HIM TO DROP THE GEAR EARLY, WHICH HE DID. THINGS WERE STARTING TO WORK THEMSELVES OUT WHEN WE GOT CLRED FOR THE VISUAL. MY FO WAS FLYING WITH THE AUTOPLT ON, USING THE FCU, AND CONTINUED TO DO SO AFTER BEING CLRED FOR THE VISUAL, BUT FORGOT TO SET AN ALT LOWER THAN 3000 FT (OUR PREVIOUS CLRED ALT) IN THE FCU, SO THE PLANE SPOOLED UP AND STARTED TO LEVEL BEFORE THE FO CAUGHT IT, PUTTING US A LITTLE HIGHER AND FASTER THAN WE WERE ALREADY. NEXT, THE FO CALLED FOR FLAPS AT A SPD OVER THE LIMIT, WHICH I CAUGHT, BUT THAT THREW HIM OFF AS WELL. THE CTLR ASKED US TO SWITCH TO TWR, WHICH I DID, BUT I NEVER CHKED ON WITH TWR. I WAS SO BUSY COACHING MY FO, DOING THE LNDG CHKLIST, SITTING THE FLT ATTENDANTS DOWN FOR LNDG AND TALKING TO THE CTLR, AND THEN SO RELIEVED THAT MY FO FINALLY GOT EVERYTHING STABILIZED BY 500 FT (OUR MINIMUMS), THAT I FORGOT TO CALL TWR FOR LNDG CLRNC. THE RWY WAS CLR AND NO CONFLICT OCCURRED. I TALKED TO TWR ON ROLLOUT, TAXIED OFF, CONTACTED GND, AND PROCEEDED TO OUR GATE. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCLUDED 1) A NEW FO WHO WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH HOW POORLY THE A319 'GOES-DOWN AND SLOWS DOWN', PARTICULARLY COMING FROM A B727, WHICH CAN DROP LIKE A ROCK IF NECESSARY, 2) MY RELUCTANCE TO COACH MY FO TOO EARLY ON BECAUSE OF MY FO'S GOOD AVIATION BACKGND AND BECAUSE I FELT LIKE I HAD ALREADY 'HOUNDED' HIM ENOUGH ON OUR TRIP, AND 3) THE APCH CTLR'S TURN TO BASE WHILE WE WERE STILL HIGH. THE NEXT TIME I WILL BE MORE ASSERTIVE WITH AN FO THAT MAKES ME EVEN SLIGHTLY UNCOMFORTABLE, AND I WILL ASK THE CTLR TO EXTEND OUR DOWNWIND MORE TO GIVE US MORE TIME TO DSND BEFORE TURNING BASE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.