Narrative:

As a crew, we failed to set flaps 5 degrees for takeoff after it was called for. As a crew, we failed to catch the error on the checklist, nor did we catch it on our personal review approaching the runway. The takeoff warning horn alerted us as I turned to line up airplane. Fatigue/body clock was a main factor in our inattentiveness. I was in bed the previous 2 nights before that time. The sequence was delayed 1 hour due to loading issues in msy, passenger issues in hou. Workload was heavy due to thunderstorms in texas. I also had a meal (leftovers) en route and was feeling 'logy' to the point I had gone to airport bathroom and washed my face in cold water trying to refresh myself. Earlier in the pairing, I had felt left out in situational awareness issues that arose during pretkof checklist, and I had made a conscious decision to run the pretkof checklist while monitoring ground radio xmissions. This was a change from my habit pattern of running that checklist in a sterile headset environment. I was off gate in las and was deep in the ramp control area. I made another mistake of habit pattern of calling 'flaps five checklist' (1 word) instead of, 'flaps 5 degrees,' wait until I see the first officer's hand move the flap lever, 'pretkof checklist.' I know immediately that I had done that, but why I didn't stop and start again I don't know. I became distraction by 2 radio calls as we worked our way through the checklist. The first radio call was a pushback at gate and the second was a push approval at another gate. I did not know where that gate was, and I glanced up to see if a plane was being pushed into us, or blocking us. At that point my hand went to the flap lever, but my eyes were outside cockpit looking for a conflict. I don't know where the first officer's mindset was. I am not sure what the first officer's flows were, but they were not quite the same as the other first officer's I had flown with in december. I may have been unconsciously rushing him, even though I waited for him to call after start checklist complete every time. There was a 'bump' in the accustomed flow at that point the entire 3-DAY pairing, but I still couldn't say what that bump was. Perhaps it was stowage/unstowage of opc. There was some slow maneuvering to work our way out of 'alleyway' ramp area. Due to congestion, I was unable to briefly bring a throttle up enough to takeoff warning horn activation point, which is another habit or self check. Tower prompted me for takeoff, again rushing or preempting a final look, as I became preoccupied with doublechking all parameters for the LNAV departure. They were correct, the flaps were not. We were both very shocked and sorry about this event. I have previously suggested that the flaps not be raised past 5 degrees, the flaps up, clean up checklist. I still feel that is the way to go on this recurring problem.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLC FAILS TO SET FLAPS TO TKOF POS AND REJECTS TKOF AT LAS.

Narrative: AS A CREW, WE FAILED TO SET FLAPS 5 DEGS FOR TKOF AFTER IT WAS CALLED FOR. AS A CREW, WE FAILED TO CATCH THE ERROR ON THE CHKLIST, NOR DID WE CATCH IT ON OUR PERSONAL REVIEW APCHING THE RWY. THE TKOF WARNING HORN ALERTED US AS I TURNED TO LINE UP AIRPLANE. FATIGUE/BODY CLOCK WAS A MAIN FACTOR IN OUR INATTENTIVENESS. I WAS IN BED THE PREVIOUS 2 NIGHTS BEFORE THAT TIME. THE SEQUENCE WAS DELAYED 1 HR DUE TO LOADING ISSUES IN MSY, PAX ISSUES IN HOU. WORKLOAD WAS HVY DUE TO TSTMS IN TEXAS. I ALSO HAD A MEAL (LEFTOVERS) ENRTE AND WAS FEELING 'LOGY' TO THE POINT I HAD GONE TO ARPT BATHROOM AND WASHED MY FACE IN COLD WATER TRYING TO REFRESH MYSELF. EARLIER IN THE PAIRING, I HAD FELT LEFT OUT IN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ISSUES THAT AROSE DURING PRETKOF CHKLIST, AND I HAD MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO RUN THE PRETKOF CHKLIST WHILE MONITORING GND RADIO XMISSIONS. THIS WAS A CHANGE FROM MY HABIT PATTERN OF RUNNING THAT CHKLIST IN A STERILE HEADSET ENVIRONMENT. I WAS OFF GATE IN LAS AND WAS DEEP IN THE RAMP CTL AREA. I MADE ANOTHER MISTAKE OF HABIT PATTERN OF CALLING 'FLAPS FIVE CHKLIST' (1 WORD) INSTEAD OF, 'FLAPS 5 DEGS,' WAIT UNTIL I SEE THE FO'S HAND MOVE THE FLAP LEVER, 'PRETKOF CHKLIST.' I KNOW IMMEDIATELY THAT I HAD DONE THAT, BUT WHY I DIDN'T STOP AND START AGAIN I DON'T KNOW. I BECAME DISTR BY 2 RADIO CALLS AS WE WORKED OUR WAY THROUGH THE CHKLIST. THE FIRST RADIO CALL WAS A PUSHBACK AT GATE AND THE SECOND WAS A PUSH APPROVAL AT ANOTHER GATE. I DID NOT KNOW WHERE THAT GATE WAS, AND I GLANCED UP TO SEE IF A PLANE WAS BEING PUSHED INTO US, OR BLOCKING US. AT THAT POINT MY HAND WENT TO THE FLAP LEVER, BUT MY EYES WERE OUTSIDE COCKPIT LOOKING FOR A CONFLICT. I DON'T KNOW WHERE THE FO'S MINDSET WAS. I AM NOT SURE WHAT THE FO'S FLOWS WERE, BUT THEY WERE NOT QUITE THE SAME AS THE OTHER FO'S I HAD FLOWN WITH IN DECEMBER. I MAY HAVE BEEN UNCONSCIOUSLY RUSHING HIM, EVEN THOUGH I WAITED FOR HIM TO CALL AFTER START CHKLIST COMPLETE EVERY TIME. THERE WAS A 'BUMP' IN THE ACCUSTOMED FLOW AT THAT POINT THE ENTIRE 3-DAY PAIRING, BUT I STILL COULDN'T SAY WHAT THAT BUMP WAS. PERHAPS IT WAS STOWAGE/UNSTOWAGE OF OPC. THERE WAS SOME SLOW MANEUVERING TO WORK OUR WAY OUT OF 'ALLEYWAY' RAMP AREA. DUE TO CONGESTION, I WAS UNABLE TO BRIEFLY BRING A THROTTLE UP ENOUGH TO TKOF WARNING HORN ACTIVATION POINT, WHICH IS ANOTHER HABIT OR SELF CHK. TWR PROMPTED ME FOR TKOF, AGAIN RUSHING OR PREEMPTING A FINAL LOOK, AS I BECAME PREOCCUPIED WITH DOUBLECHKING ALL PARAMETERS FOR THE LNAV DEP. THEY WERE CORRECT, THE FLAPS WERE NOT. WE WERE BOTH VERY SHOCKED AND SORRY ABOUT THIS EVENT. I HAVE PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED THAT THE FLAPS NOT BE RAISED PAST 5 DEGS, THE FLAPS UP, CLEAN UP CHKLIST. I STILL FEEL THAT IS THE WAY TO GO ON THIS RECURRING PROB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.