Narrative:

We were cleared into position and hold on runway 15. A mooney was cleared for takeoff on runway 8. The mooney was advised of worsening WX to the east of the field. He rolled and after he cleared the intersection of runway 8/15 we were also cleared. I was flying. The mooney reported bad WX and the tower asked his intentions and he replied, 'I guess I'll come back.' the mooney was issued a right turn to downwind for runway 8. This call I did not hear but was told these were his instruction when later I spoke with the tower manager at bur. We took off and after 500 ft began the turn to heading 210 degrees. We entered IMC somewhere between 500-1500 ft AGL, and I transitioned to instruments. When I did, I noticed on TCASII, an aircraft very close (much less than 1 mi?) in approximately the 10 O'clock position and 500 ft above my aircraft. Its close proximity and altitude made me believe we might impact the aircraft. As I was already in the turn to the right and climbing very rapidly, I elected to take no different evasive maneuver. We cleared the traffic and were switched to socal. We had further traffic south of us by about 3 mi and slightly above, but as we were climbing quickly and soon above its altitude I was not concerned. Socal mentioned the second aircraft and we responded. I asked socal myself if they were talking to the aircraft we had come so close to after takeoff and he replied they were talking to them, but I believe they might have been discussing the second aircraft. We flew to oak and I called bur tower. The controllers that worked us had gone home for the night. The next day, I called the tower again and spoke to the manager. She had reviewed the tapes and discovered the tower controller had indeed issued a right turn to downwind for runway 8 for that traffic. I have had a few conversations with the tower manager about this incident, the last one being today. She has listened to the tapes and interviewed the controllers. Her conclusion is that the tower controller did not issue the mooney traffic to us, as he did not think he was a factor. The tower controller believed the aircraft would 'be behind us the whole time.' the mooney was told about us and warned for wake turbulence. The version of what the manager described to me (what she had been told by the controller) is different than what I recall and as no one has seen radar tapes and memories get fuzzy, I did not argue with her. I let the manager know that in the event of an engine failure we would be flying straight to 1000 ft AGL then turning left to about a 110 degree heading and this course would have made the mooney an even greater factor. She was not aware of our procedure but thought that the controllers were aware and in any event they would have done what was needed to keep the aircraft separated. All in all, the manager seemed to feel that her controller had done nothing wrong in giving the mooney the right turn and that it was not necessary to tell us about his location. I beg to differ. The tower controllers do not seem to appreciate our need to know of traffic in the departure corridor nor even know/care what our single engine procedures are. It seems we have a difference of opinion on the margin of safety required at this facility. This is not the first issue I have had with burbank and have learned of another similar issue with traffic separation and will encourage those pilots to consider an as soon as possible report also. This incident brings up an important issue. Are tower facilities aware of our single engine procedures? If so, have they been asked to provide us with TA's that would impact such a departure corridor?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WITHOUT BENEFIT OF A TA, A POTENTIAL CONFLICT OCCURS BTWN A DEP MOONEY AND A DEP B737-700 1 MI S OF BUR, CA.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 15. A MOONEY WAS CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 8. THE MOONEY WAS ADVISED OF WORSENING WX TO THE E OF THE FIELD. HE ROLLED AND AFTER HE CLRED THE INTXN OF RWY 8/15 WE WERE ALSO CLRED. I WAS FLYING. THE MOONEY RPTED BAD WX AND THE TWR ASKED HIS INTENTIONS AND HE REPLIED, 'I GUESS I'LL COME BACK.' THE MOONEY WAS ISSUED A R TURN TO DOWNWIND FOR RWY 8. THIS CALL I DID NOT HEAR BUT WAS TOLD THESE WERE HIS INSTRUCTION WHEN LATER I SPOKE WITH THE TWR MGR AT BUR. WE TOOK OFF AND AFTER 500 FT BEGAN THE TURN TO HDG 210 DEGS. WE ENTERED IMC SOMEWHERE BTWN 500-1500 FT AGL, AND I TRANSITIONED TO INSTS. WHEN I DID, I NOTICED ON TCASII, AN ACFT VERY CLOSE (MUCH LESS THAN 1 MI?) IN APPROX THE 10 O'CLOCK POS AND 500 FT ABOVE MY ACFT. ITS CLOSE PROX AND ALT MADE ME BELIEVE WE MIGHT IMPACT THE ACFT. AS I WAS ALREADY IN THE TURN TO THE R AND CLBING VERY RAPIDLY, I ELECTED TO TAKE NO DIFFERENT EVASIVE MANEUVER. WE CLRED THE TFC AND WERE SWITCHED TO SOCAL. WE HAD FURTHER TFC S OF US BY ABOUT 3 MI AND SLIGHTLY ABOVE, BUT AS WE WERE CLBING QUICKLY AND SOON ABOVE ITS ALT I WAS NOT CONCERNED. SOCAL MENTIONED THE SECOND ACFT AND WE RESPONDED. I ASKED SOCAL MYSELF IF THEY WERE TALKING TO THE ACFT WE HAD COME SO CLOSE TO AFTER TKOF AND HE REPLIED THEY WERE TALKING TO THEM, BUT I BELIEVE THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THE SECOND ACFT. WE FLEW TO OAK AND I CALLED BUR TWR. THE CTLRS THAT WORKED US HAD GONE HOME FOR THE NIGHT. THE NEXT DAY, I CALLED THE TWR AGAIN AND SPOKE TO THE MGR. SHE HAD REVIEWED THE TAPES AND DISCOVERED THE TWR CTLR HAD INDEED ISSUED A R TURN TO DOWNWIND FOR RWY 8 FOR THAT TFC. I HAVE HAD A FEW CONVERSATIONS WITH THE TWR MGR ABOUT THIS INCIDENT, THE LAST ONE BEING TODAY. SHE HAS LISTENED TO THE TAPES AND INTERVIEWED THE CTLRS. HER CONCLUSION IS THAT THE TWR CTLR DID NOT ISSUE THE MOONEY TFC TO US, AS HE DID NOT THINK HE WAS A FACTOR. THE TWR CTLR BELIEVED THE ACFT WOULD 'BE BEHIND US THE WHOLE TIME.' THE MOONEY WAS TOLD ABOUT US AND WARNED FOR WAKE TURB. THE VERSION OF WHAT THE MGR DESCRIBED TO ME (WHAT SHE HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE CTLR) IS DIFFERENT THAN WHAT I RECALL AND AS NO ONE HAS SEEN RADAR TAPES AND MEMORIES GET FUZZY, I DID NOT ARGUE WITH HER. I LET THE MGR KNOW THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN ENG FAILURE WE WOULD BE FLYING STRAIGHT TO 1000 FT AGL THEN TURNING L TO ABOUT A 110 DEG HDG AND THIS COURSE WOULD HAVE MADE THE MOONEY AN EVEN GREATER FACTOR. SHE WAS NOT AWARE OF OUR PROC BUT THOUGHT THAT THE CTLRS WERE AWARE AND IN ANY EVENT THEY WOULD HAVE DONE WHAT WAS NEEDED TO KEEP THE ACFT SEPARATED. ALL IN ALL, THE MGR SEEMED TO FEEL THAT HER CTLR HAD DONE NOTHING WRONG IN GIVING THE MOONEY THE R TURN AND THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO TELL US ABOUT HIS LOCATION. I BEG TO DIFFER. THE TWR CTLRS DO NOT SEEM TO APPRECIATE OUR NEED TO KNOW OF TFC IN THE DEP CORRIDOR NOR EVEN KNOW/CARE WHAT OUR SINGLE ENG PROCS ARE. IT SEEMS WE HAVE A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON THE MARGIN OF SAFETY REQUIRED AT THIS FACILITY. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST ISSUE I HAVE HAD WITH BURBANK AND HAVE LEARNED OF ANOTHER SIMILAR ISSUE WITH TFC SEPARATION AND WILL ENCOURAGE THOSE PLTS TO CONSIDER AN ASAP RPT ALSO. THIS INCIDENT BRINGS UP AN IMPORTANT ISSUE. ARE TWR FACILITIES AWARE OF OUR SINGLE ENG PROCS? IF SO, HAVE THEY BEEN ASKED TO PROVIDE US WITH TA'S THAT WOULD IMPACT SUCH A DEP CORRIDOR?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.