Narrative:

At 5000 ft MSL, st louis approach advised us we were being vectored across the localizer to runway 12R for traffic separation from a company B767. I had a visual with the B767 and relayed this to approach control. He gave us a 120 degree heading to intercept the localizer and asked if we could maintain visual with the B767. At our present position, it was easy to keep the B767 in sight and I acknowledged we could. My first officer and I were still expecting to be cleared for an approach because stl was reporting 1300 ft overcast and 8 mi visibility. Upon reaching pauley intersection, we were still at 5000 ft and beginning to go above the GS. The frequency was congested, but finally inquired if we were cleared for the approach. Approach responded we were cleared for the visual and contact tower 118.5. By this time we were way above GS, 170 KTS, and my priority was to descend this airplane. Even when approach cleared us for the visual at 5000 ft, we could see the B767, but soon lost the B767 as he descended into the overcast. I became concerned that we lost visual and could tell on TCASII that we were overtaking the B767. I tried to contact approach, but the frequency was again congested. By this time we had descended into the overcast and were approaching oblilo, the OM. I then contacted tower and after a short delay, tower instructed us to go around due to inadequate separation from the B767. At approximately 1500 ft AGL, we initiated the go around and were given vectors back to land uneventfully on runway 12R. Tower seemed concerned that we did not have separation with the B767 and my concern is that, upon being vectored back to stl, the approach controller remarked that tower was unaware that we were on a visual approach. I did not discuss with the controller the fact we were unable to contact him to advise him we had lost visual with the B767. After landing and commuting home, I replayed this scenario in my mind and realized what may have caused this situation. We were inbound on the trake 8 arrival with a 50 KT or more tailwind. ZKC gave us a clearance to cross the kayla arc at 11000 ft and 250 KTS. We were on the sgf transition and I requested direct fst. Center cleared us direct, but I soon realized my first officer was not descending as rapidly as I had expected. I advised ZKC we were probably going to make kayla at 11000 ft, but may not make the speed. He advised me to do the best we could and switched us to approach control. I think approach was then trying to handle the decreased separation by issuing us a visual approach. This is where the breakdown in communication happened. I did have the B767 in sight, but never called stl in sight. When I realized approach had cleared me for a visual, my workload increased because we were high on GS and lost contact with the B767. I feel approach issued a visual to keep the flow of traffic going, but was surprised he would issue a visual with the WX conditions given. Supplemental information from acn 564680: the cloud deck caused us to lose the B767 which we could not have possible visual to follow through the clouds. We eventually went around. It was wrong for the controller to use this clearance and wrong for us to accept it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: T75 APCH ISSUED VISUAL APCH CLRNC TO B767 CREW AT 5000 FT AND TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM COMPANY B767 LNDG ON THE PARALLEL RWY. WX AT STL ARPT AT THE TIME WAS 1300 FT OVCST, VISIBILITY 8 MI.

Narrative: AT 5000 FT MSL, ST LOUIS APCH ADVISED US WE WERE BEING VECTORED ACROSS THE LOC TO RWY 12R FOR TFC SEPARATION FROM A COMPANY B767. I HAD A VISUAL WITH THE B767 AND RELAYED THIS TO APCH CTL. HE GAVE US A 120 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT THE LOC AND ASKED IF WE COULD MAINTAIN VISUAL WITH THE B767. AT OUR PRESENT POS, IT WAS EASY TO KEEP THE B767 IN SIGHT AND I ACKNOWLEDGED WE COULD. MY FO AND I WERE STILL EXPECTING TO BE CLRED FOR AN APCH BECAUSE STL WAS RPTING 1300 FT OVCST AND 8 MI VISIBILITY. UPON REACHING PAULEY INTXN, WE WERE STILL AT 5000 FT AND BEGINNING TO GO ABOVE THE GS. THE FREQ WAS CONGESTED, BUT FINALLY INQUIRED IF WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. APCH RESPONDED WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL AND CONTACT TWR 118.5. BY THIS TIME WE WERE WAY ABOVE GS, 170 KTS, AND MY PRIORITY WAS TO DSND THIS AIRPLANE. EVEN WHEN APCH CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL AT 5000 FT, WE COULD SEE THE B767, BUT SOON LOST THE B767 AS HE DSNDED INTO THE OVCST. I BECAME CONCERNED THAT WE LOST VISUAL AND COULD TELL ON TCASII THAT WE WERE OVERTAKING THE B767. I TRIED TO CONTACT APCH, BUT THE FREQ WAS AGAIN CONGESTED. BY THIS TIME WE HAD DSNDED INTO THE OVCST AND WERE APCHING OBLILO, THE OM. I THEN CONTACTED TWR AND AFTER A SHORT DELAY, TWR INSTRUCTED US TO GO AROUND DUE TO INADEQUATE SEPARATION FROM THE B767. AT APPROX 1500 FT AGL, WE INITIATED THE GAR AND WERE GIVEN VECTORS BACK TO LAND UNEVENTFULLY ON RWY 12R. TWR SEEMED CONCERNED THAT WE DID NOT HAVE SEPARATION WITH THE B767 AND MY CONCERN IS THAT, UPON BEING VECTORED BACK TO STL, THE APCH CTLR REMARKED THAT TWR WAS UNAWARE THAT WE WERE ON A VISUAL APCH. I DID NOT DISCUSS WITH THE CTLR THE FACT WE WERE UNABLE TO CONTACT HIM TO ADVISE HIM WE HAD LOST VISUAL WITH THE B767. AFTER LNDG AND COMMUTING HOME, I REPLAYED THIS SCENARIO IN MY MIND AND REALIZED WHAT MAY HAVE CAUSED THIS SIT. WE WERE INBOUND ON THE TRAKE 8 ARR WITH A 50 KT OR MORE TAILWIND. ZKC GAVE US A CLRNC TO CROSS THE KAYLA ARC AT 11000 FT AND 250 KTS. WE WERE ON THE SGF TRANSITION AND I REQUESTED DIRECT FST. CTR CLRED US DIRECT, BUT I SOON REALIZED MY FO WAS NOT DSNDING AS RAPIDLY AS I HAD EXPECTED. I ADVISED ZKC WE WERE PROBABLY GOING TO MAKE KAYLA AT 11000 FT, BUT MAY NOT MAKE THE SPD. HE ADVISED ME TO DO THE BEST WE COULD AND SWITCHED US TO APCH CTL. I THINK APCH WAS THEN TRYING TO HANDLE THE DECREASED SEPARATION BY ISSUING US A VISUAL APCH. THIS IS WHERE THE BREAKDOWN IN COM HAPPENED. I DID HAVE THE B767 IN SIGHT, BUT NEVER CALLED STL IN SIGHT. WHEN I REALIZED APCH HAD CLRED ME FOR A VISUAL, MY WORKLOAD INCREASED BECAUSE WE WERE HIGH ON GS AND LOST CONTACT WITH THE B767. I FEEL APCH ISSUED A VISUAL TO KEEP THE FLOW OF TFC GOING, BUT WAS SURPRISED HE WOULD ISSUE A VISUAL WITH THE WX CONDITIONS GIVEN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 564680: THE CLOUD DECK CAUSED US TO LOSE THE B767 WHICH WE COULD NOT HAVE POSSIBLE VISUAL TO FOLLOW THROUGH THE CLOUDS. WE EVENTUALLY WENT AROUND. IT WAS WRONG FOR THE CTLR TO USE THIS CLRNC AND WRONG FOR US TO ACCEPT IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.