Narrative:

I feel safety was compromised on this flight as a result of ATC shortcomings as well as a few mistakes of my own. As far as I know, there were no airspace violations, proximity to other aircraft, or other such issues, although terrain and obstacle clearance was an issue, as was the lack of an orderly setup for approach and landing. The aircraft was a bonanza A36. The flight was IFR from winston salem, nc, to manassas, va (int to hef). The WX was worse than forecast, with IFR conditions en route at 7000 ft, and even light icing was encountered shortly prior to descent into the terminal area. Prior to handoff to approach, I obtained the ATIS information which I reported to dulles approach upon handoff to them. The controller advised us to 'expect the visual' at manassas. He asked if I had the manassas WX, and again I told him I had ATIS information. As we were descended and vectored within the terminal area, I advised the controller that I didn't think the visual approach would work as we were in solid IMC and moderate rain. I requested the ILS runway 16L approach, the active runways being runway 16L&right according to ATIS information. The controller asked if we could accept the GPS. He didn't indicate which runway. I assumed he meant either GPS runway 16L or GPS runway 16R. I said no, we wanted the ILS. Since I was requesting the ILS, I had not asked him which GPS approach he meant. Inbound from the wsw of the airport, we received a vector to 180 degrees away from the airport. We were probably about 7 or 8 NM southwest of the airport at the time. A turn to the south seemed strange, but the controller seemed annoyed with us for asking for the ILS, and I assumed the out-of-the-way vector was necessary for him to accommodate our request, which seemed to cause him some hardship. After several more vectors, including vectors through restr area R6608, and also including a 360 degree turn, we were finally pointed back in the right direction. Unexpectedly, the controller announced he was too busy and did not have time to give us the ILS. We were told to expect the GPS approach. He did not indicate which GPS approach. I wondered why he didn't indicate whether it was the GPS runway 16R or GPS runway 16L. I realized there was only 1 GPS approach to the north, however. So I decided to rechk the ATIS, which had now changed. Conditions at manassas had drastically deteriorated, and sounded much more like what we were flying in. But more importantly, the airport had been turned around and was now landing to the north. From the time we originally checked the ATIS, the controller had not informed us that there was the new ATIS, or even that the airport was now landing the other direction. So now I had to suddenly get the GPS configured for the approach, which I knew would be the GPS 34. Setting up the GPS for approach is not always an easy task, especially so given the sequence of events and the flight conditions, and our proximity to the approach course. I set up the GPS for the GPS 34, with the entry to the approach selected as 'vectors to final,' since I seemed to be on a vector to intercept the final approach course. Soon thereafter, however, I was told to proceed direct barin, cleared for the approach. I fumbled through the approach, trying to reconfigure the GPS for the unexpected entry, as well as trying to aviate and navigation. We were still in solid IMC and rain. I flew an unstable approach, and am uncertain as to whether I flew the correct descent profile. In retrospect, I believe I may have descended to MDA too soon. If I didn't, it was only by chance, as my positional awareness was inadequate. I spent too much time trying to get the GPS to correctly recycle for a different entry. I should have either asked the controller for a vector to the final approach course, or abandoned the approach and sorted things out at a safe altitude. I should not have let the controller brush me off and make me feel intimidated. Nor should I have descended when I was not truly established, neither course-wise, operationally, or mentally. The controller didn't have his act together either. I told him I had the original ATIS information and he never notified me that the subsequent ATIS information was current. He also knew I had asked for the ILS runway 16. Did heknow then they were landing on runway 34? Also, he never said which GPS approach to expect. I should have asked, of course, but I didn't expect any surprises and didn't want to bother him since 'he was busy.' I know that we must have passed within about 1/2 mi of some towers, probably with insufficient vertical separation. I wish I could remember for sure where we had started down.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CFIT WHEN A BE36 PVT PLT DSNDS PREMATURELY WHILE MAKING A GPS APCH TO RWY 34 IN INCLEMENT WX SW OF HEF, VA.

Narrative: I FEEL SAFETY WAS COMPROMISED ON THIS FLT AS A RESULT OF ATC SHORTCOMINGS AS WELL AS A FEW MISTAKES OF MY OWN. AS FAR AS I KNOW, THERE WERE NO AIRSPACE VIOLATIONS, PROX TO OTHER ACFT, OR OTHER SUCH ISSUES, ALTHOUGH TERRAIN AND OBSTACLE CLRNC WAS AN ISSUE, AS WAS THE LACK OF AN ORDERLY SETUP FOR APCH AND LNDG. THE ACFT WAS A BONANZA A36. THE FLT WAS IFR FROM WINSTON SALEM, NC, TO MANASSAS, VA (INT TO HEF). THE WX WAS WORSE THAN FORECAST, WITH IFR CONDITIONS ENRTE AT 7000 FT, AND EVEN LIGHT ICING WAS ENCOUNTERED SHORTLY PRIOR TO DSCNT INTO THE TERMINAL AREA. PRIOR TO HDOF TO APCH, I OBTAINED THE ATIS INFO WHICH I RPTED TO DULLES APCH UPON HDOF TO THEM. THE CTLR ADVISED US TO 'EXPECT THE VISUAL' AT MANASSAS. HE ASKED IF I HAD THE MANASSAS WX, AND AGAIN I TOLD HIM I HAD ATIS INFO. AS WE WERE DSNDED AND VECTORED WITHIN THE TERMINAL AREA, I ADVISED THE CTLR THAT I DIDN'T THINK THE VISUAL APCH WOULD WORK AS WE WERE IN SOLID IMC AND MODERATE RAIN. I REQUESTED THE ILS RWY 16L APCH, THE ACTIVE RWYS BEING RWY 16L&R ACCORDING TO ATIS INFO. THE CTLR ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT THE GPS. HE DIDN'T INDICATE WHICH RWY. I ASSUMED HE MEANT EITHER GPS RWY 16L OR GPS RWY 16R. I SAID NO, WE WANTED THE ILS. SINCE I WAS REQUESTING THE ILS, I HAD NOT ASKED HIM WHICH GPS APCH HE MEANT. INBOUND FROM THE WSW OF THE ARPT, WE RECEIVED A VECTOR TO 180 DEGS AWAY FROM THE ARPT. WE WERE PROBABLY ABOUT 7 OR 8 NM SW OF THE ARPT AT THE TIME. A TURN TO THE S SEEMED STRANGE, BUT THE CTLR SEEMED ANNOYED WITH US FOR ASKING FOR THE ILS, AND I ASSUMED THE OUT-OF-THE-WAY VECTOR WAS NECESSARY FOR HIM TO ACCOMMODATE OUR REQUEST, WHICH SEEMED TO CAUSE HIM SOME HARDSHIP. AFTER SEVERAL MORE VECTORS, INCLUDING VECTORS THROUGH RESTR AREA R6608, AND ALSO INCLUDING A 360 DEG TURN, WE WERE FINALLY POINTED BACK IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. UNEXPECTEDLY, THE CTLR ANNOUNCED HE WAS TOO BUSY AND DID NOT HAVE TIME TO GIVE US THE ILS. WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT THE GPS APCH. HE DID NOT INDICATE WHICH GPS APCH. I WONDERED WHY HE DIDN'T INDICATE WHETHER IT WAS THE GPS RWY 16R OR GPS RWY 16L. I REALIZED THERE WAS ONLY 1 GPS APCH TO THE N, HOWEVER. SO I DECIDED TO RECHK THE ATIS, WHICH HAD NOW CHANGED. CONDITIONS AT MANASSAS HAD DRASTICALLY DETERIORATED, AND SOUNDED MUCH MORE LIKE WHAT WE WERE FLYING IN. BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE ARPT HAD BEEN TURNED AROUND AND WAS NOW LNDG TO THE N. FROM THE TIME WE ORIGINALLY CHKED THE ATIS, THE CTLR HAD NOT INFORMED US THAT THERE WAS THE NEW ATIS, OR EVEN THAT THE ARPT WAS NOW LNDG THE OTHER DIRECTION. SO NOW I HAD TO SUDDENLY GET THE GPS CONFIGURED FOR THE APCH, WHICH I KNEW WOULD BE THE GPS 34. SETTING UP THE GPS FOR APCH IS NOT ALWAYS AN EASY TASK, ESPECIALLY SO GIVEN THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND THE FLT CONDITIONS, AND OUR PROX TO THE APCH COURSE. I SET UP THE GPS FOR THE GPS 34, WITH THE ENTRY TO THE APCH SELECTED AS 'VECTORS TO FINAL,' SINCE I SEEMED TO BE ON A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE FINAL APCH COURSE. SOON THEREAFTER, HOWEVER, I WAS TOLD TO PROCEED DIRECT BARIN, CLRED FOR THE APCH. I FUMBLED THROUGH THE APCH, TRYING TO RECONFIGURE THE GPS FOR THE UNEXPECTED ENTRY, AS WELL AS TRYING TO AVIATE AND NAV. WE WERE STILL IN SOLID IMC AND RAIN. I FLEW AN UNSTABLE APCH, AND AM UNCERTAIN AS TO WHETHER I FLEW THE CORRECT DSCNT PROFILE. IN RETROSPECT, I BELIEVE I MAY HAVE DSNDED TO MDA TOO SOON. IF I DIDN'T, IT WAS ONLY BY CHANCE, AS MY POSITIONAL AWARENESS WAS INADEQUATE. I SPENT TOO MUCH TIME TRYING TO GET THE GPS TO CORRECTLY RECYCLE FOR A DIFFERENT ENTRY. I SHOULD HAVE EITHER ASKED THE CTLR FOR A VECTOR TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE, OR ABANDONED THE APCH AND SORTED THINGS OUT AT A SAFE ALT. I SHOULD NOT HAVE LET THE CTLR BRUSH ME OFF AND MAKE ME FEEL INTIMIDATED. NOR SHOULD I HAVE DSNDED WHEN I WAS NOT TRULY ESTABLISHED, NEITHER COURSE-WISE, OPERATIONALLY, OR MENTALLY. THE CTLR DIDN'T HAVE HIS ACT TOGETHER EITHER. I TOLD HIM I HAD THE ORIGINAL ATIS INFO AND HE NEVER NOTIFIED ME THAT THE SUBSEQUENT ATIS INFO WAS CURRENT. HE ALSO KNEW I HAD ASKED FOR THE ILS RWY 16. DID HEKNOW THEN THEY WERE LNDG ON RWY 34? ALSO, HE NEVER SAID WHICH GPS APCH TO EXPECT. I SHOULD HAVE ASKED, OF COURSE, BUT I DIDN'T EXPECT ANY SURPRISES AND DIDN'T WANT TO BOTHER HIM SINCE 'HE WAS BUSY.' I KNOW THAT WE MUST HAVE PASSED WITHIN ABOUT 1/2 MI OF SOME TWRS, PROBABLY WITH INSUFFICIENT VERT SEPARATION. I WISH I COULD REMEMBER FOR SURE WHERE WE HAD STARTED DOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.